Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume XVIII, Near East, 1962–1963

189. Memorandum for the Record⁰

Washington, March 11, 1963.

President’s Meeting on Yemen, 4:30 pm, 11 March 1963

PRESENT

• The President
• Dean Rusk
• George McGhee
• Phillips Talbot
• Ellsworth Bunker
• Harlan Cleveland
• Paul Nitze
• Frank Sloan
• General E.G. Wheeler
• John McCone
• James Critchfield
• McGeorge Bundy
• Carl Kaysen
• R.W. Komer

Ambassador Bunker reported on his mission to Saudi Arabia. He found Faysal in a bad frame of mind. The latter said he had left here last October confident of our support. Since then he had refrained from sending more than insignificant aid to the Yemeni royalists, while Nasser was sending huge forces and heavy equipment. Then Nasser began attacking the Saudis; Faysal wanted to know the US reaction. His view was that both sides should get out and leave the Yemeni to settle their own affairs.

Bunker made clear to Faysal that we had not changed our policy; we wanted to help him but found it impossible to do so while he in effect was trying to overthrow a government we recognized. To do so would put us in a position contrary to international law. Bunker then put our “eight-point” proposal. After some discussion Faysal agreed in principle but added six more conditions with respect to the manner of UAR withdrawal, which Bunker thought mostly unworkable. Bunker told Faysal these were a matter for the mediator. In Bunker’s view he left Faysal in a better frame of mind, feeling that the US did want to support him. When Bunker pressed him to receive Bunche, he agreed. He said he had not refused to see Bunche though he felt it unfair for Bunche not to see the royalists.

Ambassador Bunker then described his attempt Sunday to convince U Thant and Bunche that Bunche should return immediately to the area to keep the mediation effort in motion. U Thant suggested that we first get the reaction of Nasser and Sallal to our eight-point proposal since Bunche was authorized only to “fact-find”, not mediate. U Thant also felt he couldn’t send Bunche out again until Faysal agreed explicitly to receive him. If these points could be cleared up first, then U Thant might agree to UN mediation.

Bunche described to Bunker his talks in Sanaa and Cairo. Sallal was agreeable to mutual disengagement; YAR would allow the UAR to start withdrawing its forces on three conditions: (1) as soon as Faysal publicly pledged his word to stop aid to the royalists; (2) as soon as the Yemeni royal princes left Saudi Arabia; (3) a commitment from the UK and SAG to establish diplomatic relations (though he apparently would not make this a precondition for disengagement). Nasser had said his conditions were the same as the YAR’s but did not think it necessary for the royal princes to leave Saudi Arabia; he would be satisfied if they left the immediate border area and settled in Saudi Arabian cities where they could be watched.

In sum, Bunker’s impression was that on the basis of Faysal’s acceptance of the eight-point proposal and Bunche’s soundings, the job of disengagement could be done.

The President asked about the timing of UAR withdrawal vs. Saudi withdrawal. Since one was intervening overtly and the other covertly, it would be hard to get simultaneity. How could we get Nasser to withdraw first? What signal would Faysal give? It was pointed out that Nasser would know from his intelligence sources if Faysal suspended aid, so this wouldn’t be a problem. The President further asked how we could expect Nasser to hold off further attacks. Would he agree to do so for the period needed? Talbot believed so because Nasser had in effect told us he would hold off for a few weeks.

There was discussion of whether Bunche should handle the next phase of the mediation exercise or whether Bunker should go if the former were at all reluctant. Secretary Rusk felt that if Bunche wouldn’t agree Tuesday afternoon to go immediately, we ought to send Bunker back. It was considered that if Bunker prepared the groundwork, Bunche would pick up later. The President said we should tell Bunche there was no use in his going unless he was willing to go the route. Bundy suggested that both Bunche and Bunker should go, but Rusk felt they’d get in each other’s way. Cleveland explained U Thant’s hesitation by saying we had changed the scenario in three ways since U Thant had agreed initially to send Bunche: (1) we had sent Bunker; (2) we had offered a military commitment to the Saudis; (3) we had started the mediation process ourselves.

When the President queried whether it was preferable to have the US or the UN handle the mediatory effort, Rusk favored the UN, since if the situation deteriorated we would want to have the UN involved. U Thant was apparently reluctant to get involved because of the big power (US) role; in fact, however, the big power role was an additional reason why the UN should get in, not stay out. Cleveland felt, however, that if we downgraded the UN now by having it look like a US catspaw, it would be harder to get them in later.

The President asked what other steps were necessary. Komer suggested that the immediate problem was to keep Nasser from upping the ante while the mediation effort was underway, which in turn required that we make every effort to get Faysal to suspend aid. Nitze pointed out the difficulty of knowing whether Faysal had actually suspended aid if he promised to do so. As to the military sanctions available to deter Nasser, the President noted that the JCS seemed very reluctant to get involved in the Middle East, in contrast to other areas. He was concerned as to how we could keep Nasser turned off.

The President then asked when we had to send our planes in as part of the eight-point proposal. Bundy pointed out that we hoped not ever; it was more the prospect of such support which would work on Faysal than the support itself. The question of whether the planes if sent would be authorized to fire on Egyptian intruders was discussed. Rusk’s view was that we wouldn’t let the planes fire until after there had been a UN Security Council meeting in effect authorizing such action. The President thought this made sense. General Wheeler asked what we would do if Nasser bombed Jidda, and pointed out that our planes would in fact have great difficulty intercepting intruders over most of Saudi Arabia. The President’s view was that we were committed to a “training mission” really and should leave the rules of engagement until later.

Mr. Komer raised again the interim problem of how to get Faysal to suspend aid, suggesting Bunker be given two options: (1) appeal to Faysal for a temporary cease-fire for a brief period while mediation went forward, in return for Nasser’s agreeing to suspend attacks on Saudi Arabia; (2) if this were not enough, promise to send our squadron if Faysal would agree to suspend aid. Bunker felt that neither of these proposals had much in them for Faysal and McGhee felt they called for Faysal to suspend aid in return for less than our previous eight-point proposals. The President said that “if we got Faysal turned off, we have got a good line with Nasser.” He was anxious to get Faysal to suspend aid and suggested that he write Faysal again or send Bunker.

The President summed up the meeting by saying that we will press on Bunche our sense of immediacy;¹ if the UN doesn’t respond, Bunker should go back out to Riyadh, Sanaa, and Cairo. We would also send another letter to Faysal laying it on the line.

At the end of the meeting the President raised the question of the 9 March article in the New York Times about Nasser suspending attacks because of the US warning.² He asked how the story got out, commented that it made us look silly, and wanted an investigation made. Talbot did not know how the story leaked but pointed out that there were many possibilities; he doubted that the professional foreign service had done any leaking. The President suggested we use this as a case study.

R. W. Komer³

0. Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Yemen, Bunker Miscellaneous. Secret. Drafted by Komer. The meeting was held at the White House. A briefing paper from Komer to Kennedy, conveying several papers on the Yemen situation prior to this meeting is ibid. Another account of the meeting, made by the CIA’s Chief of the Near East and South Asia Division, James H. Critchfield, is in the Central Intelligence Agency, Job 80 D 01285A, DCI (McCone) Files, Memoranda for the Record. For text, see the Supplement, the compilation on Yemen.
1. In telegram 2319 to USUN, the Department of State instructed Plimpton to emphasize to U Thant that President Kennedy considered it essential that there be a rapid follow-up to Bunker’s mission. Plimpton was to propose that either Bunche proceed to the area, if the Saudis were willing to receive him, or Bunker would immediately return to explain the eight points to Nasser and Sallal. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 YEMEN)
2. Reference is to a story by Hedrick Smith in The New York Times on March 9. In telegram 1795 to Cairo, March 10, the White House instructed Badeau to inform Nasser that the United States was highly embarrassed by the “distorted stories” in the U.S. press and that President Kennedy regretted compromising a confidence between the two leaders. Badeau was also to emphasize the importance of continued UAR restraint while Bunker’s mediation effort went forward. The Department of State added to the White House message the caveat that Badeau should proceed with the instructions if he believed it “appropriate.” (Ibid., POL 7 US/BUNKER) In telegram 1445 from Cairo, March 11, Badeau advised against delivering the apology. (Ibid.) Additional documentation is ibid., POL 27 YEMEN, and in the Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, United Arab Republic.
3. Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.