Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume XVIII, Near East, 1962–1963

187. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs (Talbot) to Secretary of State Rusk⁰

Washington, undated.

SUBJECT

• Resolution of Yemen Conflict

I. What Has Been Accomplished

A. In accordance with instructions from the President, Ambassador Bunker met with Crown Prince Faysal in Dammam, Saudi Arabia, on March 6, 7, and 8, and presented eight specific points for a disengagement program.¹ These were:

1. An agreement by the SAG to suspend its support to the Royalists.

2. An agreement by the UAR to begin withdrawal of its troops simultaneously with suspension of aid to the Royalists by the SAG.

3. Agreement to stationing of neutral observers in Najran–Jazan area to certify support activities are suspended, and at Hodeidah and YAR airports to certify to outward movement of UAR forces and equipment.

4. Cooperation of SAG, with SYG’s representative to reach agreement on modalities through him with YAR and UAR.

5. Prevention by SAG of efforts of Imam’s adherents to continue support from Saudi territory.

6. Implementation of UAR pledge to remove troops, and restatement publicly of its determination to withdraw.

7. Military support to the SAG to deter attacks.

8. Encouragement of moderation, and concentration on domestic affairs by YAR.

Crown Prince Faysal indicated that he was prepared to accept in principle the suspension of aid, provided that he could be assured that UAR forces would indeed get out of Yemen. In addition, Faysal wished that consideration be given to the following points:

1. There should be a stoppage of all UAR raids and all other actions of aggression on Saudi territory whether by air or sea.

2. At the time that simultaneous disengagement is agreed upon, there should be cessation of all military actions by UAR forces in Yemen.

3. These UAR forces should return from field activities to their bases in Yemen, pending withdrawal, where they would be under the supervision of neutral observers.

4. These UAR forces should then be withdrawn with all officers and men and all the equipment such as tanks, planes, etc., which they had introduced into Yemen.

5. As soon as there is agreement on all these points, the Saudi Government will order a cessation of all aid to the Royalists.

6. There must be a time limit to withdrawal of all the foreign forces from Yemen.

Ambassador Bunker made clear that the foregoing points should be properly addressed to the mediator and are subject to mediation by the latter. Faysal agreed to receive Dr. Bunche without preconditions.

B. Ambassador Bunker met with U Thant and Dr. Bunche on March 10² and reviewed his discussions with Prince Faysal. Dr. Bunche in turn revealed the results of his trip: 1) Nasser wants only an assurance from Saudi Arabia that it would end its assistance to the Yemeni Royalists, and 2) the YAR wants firm assurances from Saudi Arabia and the UK that they will put an end to infiltration into Yemen, expulsion of the Yemeni Royal Family from Saudi Arabia, and Saudi and UK recognition of the YAR. In return for the foregoing, the YAR would refrain from intervention in Saudi Arabia and Aden.

Bunker urged that the Secretary General dispatch Dr. Bunche to Saudi Arabia immediately. He stressed that Faysal is in a receptive frame of mind and, additionally, it is essential to keep the mediation exercise in motion in order to avert the resumption of UAR attacks on Saudi Arabia.

II. The Role of the UN

The Secretary General indicated he was prepared to send Dr. Bunche to Saudi Arabia, provided 1) instructions to the Saudi representative to the UN make clear that Faysal would receive Dr. Bunche without requiring that he visit the Royalists in Yemen, and 2) reactions were obtained from Cairo and Sana’a to the USG proposals (minus point 7 relating to US military support to Saudi Arabia).

The Department has sent an instruction to Ambassador Hart to seek a clear and unconditional invitation to Bunche from the Saudi Arabian Government.

However, Dr. Bunche’s terms of reference to date charge him only with finding facts. The Secretary General feels that before undertaking mediation the assent of all parties must be obtained. Quite clearly this is counter to Faysal’s feeling that mediation should be conducted between the Saudi Government and the UAR.

III. Courses of Action

A. It is essential that mediation be initiated immediately.

B. Our first preference, but one we should not press on the SYG is to have Dr. Bunche proceed to Riyadh by the middle of this week with full authority to mediate.

C. If the SYG is not prepared to send Dr. Bunche to the area in the course of this week, we should be prepared to ask Ambassador Bunker to return to the area by mid-week as the United States emissary. In so doing, we would be in the position of meeting the SYG’s second requirement, i.e., trying out our eight points on the UAR and YAR. Appropriate consultations would be held with the SYG by Ambassador Bunker before his departure.

D. Ambassador Bunker should have the authority in his discretion to seek Faysal’s private assurance that he will suspend aid to the Royalists, during the period of mediation, against Nasser’s agreement to avoid any hostile actions against Saudi Arabia. Should Ambassador Bunker decide to exercise his discretionary authority, he must have the further power to promise dispatch of the air squadron shortly after Faysal’s agreement to suspend, provided such a promise is necessary to achievement of the desired results.

E. Otherwise, the air squadron should be dispatched simultaneously with Faysal’s agreement to disengage and Nasser’s agreement to begin troop withdrawal. Its primary mission would be to reassure the Saudis and deter UAR attack against Saudi territory; ostensibly it would be there on a training mission to accelerate development of a Saudi air defense capability.

F. If Ambassador Bunker returns to the Near East pursuant to C above, he should seek to carry the mediation either to conclusion or to the point where it can be brought to a successful conclusion by the UN.

0. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 YEMEN. Secret. Drafted by Grant and Davies. This memorandum was transmitted to Bundy on March 11 under cover of a memorandum from Brubeck that indicated that it covered points to be discussed at a White House meeting at 4:30 p.m. on March 11, which McGhee, Talbot and Bunker would attend.
1. Transcripts of Bunker’s meetings with Faysal on March 6 and 7 were transmitted to Bundy under cover of memoranda from Brubeck, dated March 27 and 19, respectively (Ibid., POL 27 YEMEN and NEA/NE Files: Lot 66 D 116, Gen. Truce. Cease-fire. Armistice (Bunker Mission & UN Effort) Other than tels.) For Bunker’s initial reports, see Documents 180 and 181.
2. Reported in circular telegram 1554, March 12. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 26 YEMEN)