Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XXI, Near East Region; Arabian Peninsula

138. Information Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs (Battle) to Secretary of State Rusk¹

Washington, February 22, 1968.

SUBJECT

• Outlook in the Persian Gulf States

Background

By the end of 1971, British troops totalling some 6,000 ground units and small air and naval components will have been withdrawn from the Persian Gulf. Existing special UK treaty relationships may have then been renegotiated to remove any implication of British “protection.” Decisions have not yet been taken re post-1971 UK subsidies to local security forces in the area, nor policies with respect to secondment of British officers to such forces. With luck the British may be willing to carry on this type of role for a limited additional period.

Several states—Bahrain, Qatar and Abu Dhabi—are expected to opt for full independence. The smaller Trucial Shaikhdoms may evolve into one or more federations. Irrespective of the precise course of developments, the opportunity for direct contacts around the Gulf by major foreign powers will vastly increase.

Strategic Significance

The Gulf’s importance in the world oil picture often obscures its fundamental strategic significance. Together with the Iranian plateau, the region forms the keystone in an arch of non-Communist countries stretching from Africa to South Asia. Here Russia is closest to access to the wide seas. Russian agents and emissaries were active in Kuwait and down the Gulf in the 1890’s. The Molotov/Ribbentrop correspondence of 1939 makes clear that the Persian Gulf has remained a center of Russian aspirations. With the British hold in the Gulf loosening, a new opportunity will arise for the USSR to “leapfrog” over Iran and establish positions for the first time in the Gulf itself.

Attitudes of Smaller Gulf States Towards USG

The concern of Gulf littoral states at the British announcement has already prompted significant gestures in our direction. Kuwait has suddenly become receptive to renewed visits by the US Navy (COMIDEASTFOR) and is urgently seeking to buy naval craft from us. Bahrain has inquired as to our attitude towards the island’s independence and has asked hopefully for information on COMIDEASTFOR’s dispositions beyond 1971. Even Muscat, still slumbering in primordial isolation, has addressed a congratulatory message to Ambassador Bohlen on his new appointment. In their search for powerful protectors, it seems clear that the Gulf states would prefer a greater role on the part of the US, but they will trim their sails in any direction that future circumstances may dictate.

USG Role

The NEA IRG examined implications of the foregoing on February 3 [1].² The IRG agreed that the key to the future of the region in the next few years will be developments within and among the various Gulf states themselves. Our policy should be directed to: (a) encouraging the British to maintain as much of their present special role as they can, (b) fostering greater political and economic cooperation generally among the Gulf states, and (c) seeking to avoid an undue military buildup there.

Some strengthening of the USG presence was discussed. There are now no USG officials posted anywhere in the Horn of Arabia, from Dhahran around to Aden. We have in the past considered opening posts in the Trucial States, in Muscat (where our former Consulate was closed in about 1912)³ and on Bahrain, but budgetary limitations presently preclude action.

The IRG agreed that it would be useful if the American commercial presence in the region could be increased. We will be sounding out the oil companies on the possibility of expanding their activities among the Gulf populations. There are suggestions that the IBRD might consider helping the littoral states establish a regional economic development institution, using funds from the oil rich among them. An informal proposal to this effect emanating from the Chase Bank is already before the IBRD. We will do what we can quietly to encourage such initiatives, bearing in mind both the severe limitations on our own capabilities and the fact that undue support from major non-Gulf powers could well reduce indigenous enthusiasm for any particular scheme.

With due regard for our important interests in Iran and Saudi Arabia, we will continue to examine what we can do ourselves with respect to the Gulf states, now that this region is rapidly becoming both more active politically and attractive economically.

1. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 33 PERSIAN GULF. Secret. Drafted by Brewer on February 9 and cleared by Davies and Eliot. Copies were sent to Country Director for Soviet Union Affairs Malcolm Toon, Country Director for United Kingdom, Ireland, and Malta Affairs J. Harold Shullaw, Sober, and Director of the INR Office of Research and Analysis for Near East and South Asia Granville S. Austin. Secretary Rusk’s initials on the memorandum indicate he read it.
2. See Document 131.
3. The Consulate was closed in 1915.