139. Intelligence Report1

No. 0582/68

SECURITY AND SUBVERSION IN THE PERSIAN GULF

Summary

The Persian Gulf is one of the least known corners of the globe, parts of it virtually unchanged since the 15th century. Only two or three of the states in the area deserve to be called countries—Iran, [Page 284] Saudi Arabia, and possibly Kuwait. Most of the rest are shabby sheikdoms with a few square miles of territory and a few thousand inhabitants. But the entire area lies above some 67 percent of the world’s known oil reserves, much of it exploited by US companies and vital to Europe’s economy and to Western defense.

British troops have been stationed in the gulf area for over a century. Air, naval, and ground contingents in Bahrain and Sharjah were, until last November, backed up by even greater troop strength in Aden. Now, Aden has become the radical independent “People’s Republic of Southern Yemen,” and the UK has announced its intention to pull its remaining troops—some 9,000 at present—out of the gulf area before the end of 1971. In an attempt to plan for the future, the nine protectorates in the area—Bahrain, Qatar, and the seven Trucial sheikdoms—have agreed to federate this March, although few details have been worked out. The British apparently also plan to sever their semipaternalistic ties with the Sultanate of Muscat and Oman. Whether British political advisers and seconded officers will continue to work with the governments and security forces in the region is still an open question.

Except for Iraq, with its minuscule border on the Persian Gulf, all of the states in the area are conservative—some medievally so—and are vulnerable to agitation for change. Iran can certainly take care of itself, however, and Saudi Arabia may prove able to do so despite a growing threat in its Eastern Province. So far, subversive activity in the Trucial States is minimal. But open revolt has already broken out in Muscat and Oman, and Southern Yemen is making revolutionary noises on its border; Bahrain and Kuwait are sitting on top of highly developed networks of subversion; and the ruling regime in Qatar seems to have thoroughly alienated the population. Whether the indigenous security forces are capable of coping with such problems—with or without British assistance—is far from certain. What is certain is that they can expect no help from radical regimes in Egypt, Syria, and Iraq, whose agents have been working for years to spread the “Arab revolution” to the gulf.

[Here follows the body of the report.]

  1. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Middle East, Vol. I, 6/65-3/68. Secret; No Foreign Dissem. Prepared in the Directorate of Intelligence of the Central Intelligence Agency. A note on the first page of the memorandum indicates it was “produced solely by CIA” in the Office of Current Intelligence and coordinated with the Office of Strategic Research and the Clandestine Services.