Office of the Historian

137. Circular Telegram From the Department of State to Certain Posts1

Washington, February 21, 1968, 2104Z.

118823. State 116285 (Notal).2

1.
Reftel dealt with USG position regarding status Bahrain. In light evolving situation in Gulf generally, notably reported announcement “federation” Abu Dhabi and Dubai (Jidda 2921, Notal),3 addressees may find following guidance helpful with respect USG attitude toward Gulf problems generally. We would not wish publicize our position at this time but following paragraphs may be drawn on in response queries.
2.
With respect various small Arab states in Persian Gulf, US has considered them independent states in special treaty relationship with UK. We cannot at this time comment on the situation as it may evolve in the future. For example, it would be premature for US to take position regarding UN membership for any of these states at this time.
3.
Re arms supplies, we believe these states should continue to fill their legitimate arms requirements from their traditional British supplier. The UK has long provided these items for the Persian Gulf states and British officers have been closely associated with many of them, both in operational and training capacities. Continued reliance on British procurement will therefore, among other things, serve to reduce maintenance and spare parts problems.
4.
With respect political evolution among these Arab states, we believe strongly this is matter for states themselves to determine without outside interference as part evolution their previous special relationship with British. We have noted with interest communique re possible federation of lower Gulf states, notably Abu Dhabi and Dubai, [Page 281] and would wish any such arrangement well. We have, however, no plan regarding developments in this region and do not expect to be consulted by the states concerned as to any political arrangements which they may find useful or desirable for themselves. We are maintaining our interest in this region and hope developments will provide for maintenance of stability and orderly progress there.
5.
For Beirut: Do not believe you should make any direct response to Kazzan (Beirut A-704, Notal).4 Should he again raise question assistance to Qatar, you may comment along foregoing general lines.
Rusk
  1. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 19 BAHRAIN IS. Confidential. Drafted by Brewer on February 20; cleared by Rockwell, Davies, Hartley, Eliot, Assistant Legal Adviser for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs Donald A. Wehmeyer, Cheslaw, Murray (DOD/ISA), and Colonel Herbert J. McChrystal (G/PM); and approved by Battle. Sent to Beirut, Amman, Jidda, Aden, Dhahran, Kuwait, Tehran, London, CINCSTRIKE/CINCMEAFSA, and COMIDEASTFOR.↩
  2. Telegram 116285 to Dhahran, February 16, noted that in responding to queries about the U.S. position toward the future status of Bahrain, the Department believed it important to continue to avoid any possible erroneous impression that the United States was planning to “replace” the British in the Gulf or that it favored certain specific solutions to Gulf problems. The response to any such questions should be that the U.S. Government had considered Bahrain an independent state in a special treaty relationship with the United Kingdom, and that it could not comment on the situation as it might evolve in the future. (Ibid.)↩
  3. Dated February 20. (Ibid., POL 7 TRUCIALST)↩
  4. Dated February 16. (Ibid., DEF 12 QATAR)↩