131. Record of Meeting1

IRG/NEA 68-8

INTERDEPARTMENTAL REGIONAL GROUP FOR NEAR EAST AND SOUTH

Record of IRG Meeting—February 1, 1968

The major part of the meeting was devoted to a consideration of our interests in and policy vis-a-vis the Persian Gulf, with particular regard to the forthcoming British withdrawal. (The first part of the meeting, regarding the forthcoming overseas personnel reduction, is recorded in IRG/NEA 68-7.2)

The CIA member gave an intelligence briefing on the current status and prospects of subversive forces in the Gulf area, as well as of the elements of stability in the region. He said that the Arab Nationalist Movement (ANM) has emerged as the dominant subversive organization in the Gulf area, and that Bahrain is probably the Gulf state most vulnerable to subversion. The CIA member concluded, however, that on balance the chances are reasonably good that general stability will be maintained in the Gulf region for the next several years, largely because of the limited capabilities of those who would foment unrest. Contingencies which he felt could change this picture include the death of King Faisal of Saudi Arabia and the entry into the Gulf area of a sizable quantity of Soviet weapons, possibly through an increase of UAR activity. The CIA member provided copies of a report just prepared by the Office of National Estimates on the new situation in the Gulf (copy attached).3

Reviewing the Country Directors’ paper on the “Effect of British Withdrawal from the Persian Gulf and Recommended US Action” (circulated with IRG/NEA 68-6),2 the Group agreed that it provided a sound assessment of the problems and identification of US interests in the area. Although there were differences on some of the specific recommendations, the low-key policy approach recommended by the paper was generally endorsed.

The Group agreed that although the Soviets will try to increase their presence and influence in the Gulf area, the key to the future of [Page 273] the region in the next few years will be developments within and among the various Gulf states themselves. It is neither politically feasible nor desirable for the US to “replace” the British presence in the Persian Gulf. Our policy should be directed along the lines of (a) encouraging the British to maintain as much of their present special role in the Gulf as they can, as long as possible (including their role as principal arms supplier to various Gulf states); (b) encouraging the Saudis and Iranians to settle their outstanding differences regarding the median line and other issues; (c) encouraging greater political and economic cooperation generally among the Gulf states; and (d) avoiding an undue military buildup by Gulf littoral states.

Our very important oil and strategic interests in Iran and Saudi Arabia will require us to continue to play a leading role in those countries. It was agreed, however, that in other respects the most suitable direct US involvement, under the above policy guidelines, would be generally in low key and peripheral to the activities of the British and the indigenous Gulf states. Among other things, it would be useful to increase the American commercial presence in the region. It was agreed that the American oil companies operating in the Gulf area should be sounded out on the possibility of expanding their activities among the Gulf populations and take a more enlightened view of their role in that part of the world.

The Chairman noted that a study had been undertaken within State aiming at a preliminary Department view on the security aspects of the British withdrawal and on possible alternative military arrangements. It was agreed that results of this study should be fully coordinated with Defense and the Joint Staff prior to possible preparation of a recommendation for IRG consideration.

MEMBERS PRESENT

Executive Chairman: Mr. Battle

AID: Mr. Williams

CIA: Mr. Critchfield

DOD: Mr. Schwartz

JCS: Captain Murphy

NSC: Mr. Saunders

USIA: Mr. Carter

Commerce: Mr. Kearns-Preston

State (NEA): Messrs. Davies, Rockwell, Brewer, Eliot

DOD: Mr. Reed

Staff Director: Mr. Sober

S.S.
Staff Director
  1. Source: Central Intelligence Agency, DDO/NE (Critchfield) Files: Job 80-00105A, Box 2, IRG/NEA Working File, Communist Presence—Arabian Peninsula, Persian Gulf. Secret. Drafted by Sober on February 3.
  2. Not printed.
  3. Not attached.