73. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and
South Asian Affairs (Talbot) to Secretary of State Rusk1
Washington, June 15, 1964.
SUBJECT
- The Palestine Problem, 1964–65
We have just concluded a “think-session” outside of Washington on possible
new approaches to the Arab-Israel problem. Representatives of AID, IO, PPC, INR,
AFN, and CIA, as well as NEA and NE,
pooled their background knowledge and imagination in an effort to provide
guidelines for future policy decisions. The consensus of the group is set
forth in the attached “Possible U.S. Initiatives on Arab-Israel Issues in
1964–65”. The recommendations were concurred in by all present in their
capacities as participants in the conference, although their concurrences do
not represent formal clearances from their respective agencies or
bureaus.
You will see from the paper that we didn’t discover opportunities for
dramatic new departures. I believe, however, the suggestions made therein
will help inch the situation forward.
Attachment2
POSSIBLE U.S. INITIATIVES ON ARAB-ISRAEL ISSUES IN
1964–65
- 1.
- U.S. interests in the Near East have long been vulnerable to
pressures arising out of indigenous social change, the outward
thrust of Arab nationalism against the remaining points of Western
privilege, Communist ambitions, and intra-area disputes,
particularly the Arab-Israel conflict with attendant military
escalation. Nevertheless, we have managed to maintain our basic
interests in the area—access, transit, oil, and the integrity of
Israel and other states—at relatively low costs. Our objective is to
continue to do so.
- 2.
- Despite the bellicose statements we hear, neither Israel nor the
Arab states are prepared to gamble on settling their differences by
war. Neither side has confidence it could win or would be permitted
to keep its gains, or even limit the course of hostilities or number
of participants. Nonetheless, escalation to sophisticated weaponry
and possibly (first on the Israeli side) to nuclears is intensifying
the risk of accidental war and decreasing the certainty that we can
deter or stop it.
- 3.
- Israeli and Arab positions on their principal disputes continue to
be set in concrete. At best there is tacit acceptance of most
elements of the stalemate. Our minimum objective is to prevent this
stalemate from blowing up; if it persists, it might gradually take
the shape of a modus vivendi. Our maximum present objective is to
find ways to dissolve some of the most dangerous of its aspects. The
problem is to encourage the modus vivendi without stimulating
Arab-Israel tension by what we do or fail to do.
- 4.
- Israeli and Arab capabilities to resist unpalatable compromises
continue high. Neither side is particularly responsive to
initiatives by the U.N. or by individual nations, including the U.S.
In 1964–65 the U.S. should be relatively well placed to use its
limited leverage, however. Israeli confidence in U.S. security
assurances has risen. Some Arab confidence in the U.S. has been
demonstrated and Arab reactions to several difficult developments
(e.g., Jordan waters diversion, Eshkol visit) have proved containable. The U.S. can
expect to have an active administration with a strong
mandate.
- 5.
- It follows that certain limited initiatives may be
possible.
On the Arms Race:
- 1.
- Our objectives are
- a.
- To concentrate above all else on preventing the
proliferation of nuclears (which are within the capability
of Israel in 2–4 years), and
- b.
- To resist further rocket programs and thus impede the
spread of nuclear delivery systems and associated
weaponry.
- 2.
- In working toward these objectives, we should
- a.
- Press on urgently with efforts to bring Nasser to self-denial of
further rocketry and to IAEA inspection of any reactors. He would find
this a good deal if it resulted in blocking rocketry and
nuclears in Israel. This effort with Nasser should be the early
business of our new Ambassador, and perhaps of a special
Presidential emissary. After the election, it might call for
a visit to Egypt by the Secretary of State or the Vice
President, followed perhaps by a Nasser visit to the U.S. Hope of success in
this effort would rest on maintenance of effective political
and economic relations with Nasser.
- b.
- While working on Nasser, continue pressing against the
Israeli rocket program and registering our unalterable
opposition to any Israeli activity in the direction of
nuclear weaponry.
- c.
- Exploit any breakthrough with Nasser to get categoric equivalent assurance
from Israel.
- d.
- Consult with Britain, France, Germany and, as necessary,
other Allies on cooperative actions to impede Israeli and
Arab development of rocketry or nuclears.
- e.
- Consider a possible understanding with the Soviets on
mutual denial of assistance in nuclears and rocketry to
Israel and the Arabs.
- 3.
- There are also dangers in the conventional arms race. We should be
alert to targets of opportunity to restrain and reduce this
competition.
Regarding Refugees:
We see no prospect in 1964–65 for another major refugee initiative.
Without some U.S. effort, however, the refugee issue could become more
troublesome than it is. We can usefully pursue the following limited
objectives:
- 1.
- Follow up the PCC property identification report by urging
Israelis to take some initiative now to accept applications from
individual Arabs for settlement of property claims and to
enlarge possibilities for the reunion of families. A small
office might be attached to the PCC to facilitate this
process.
- 2.
- Set the stage for expansion of the PCC to five members,
leaving the door open for ultimate U.S. withdrawal.
- 3.
- As proposed from the 1950’s onward, begin devolution of UNRWA to national units working
under supervision of individual host states. As a two-year
process, this might start with an agreement, to be sought by the
UNSYG strongly supported
by the U.S., with the U.A.R. to take over administration of
relief and works in the Gaza strip.
- 4.
- Make some cut in the U.S. contribution to UNRWA for FY-1966, as a means of pressing the SYG and UNRWA to tackle rectification and
reduction and look to national management of relief and
works.
- 5.
- Accept a two-year extension of UNRWA on the understanding that efforts would be
made by the SYG along the lines of (3) above.
- 6.
- Pre-empt the General Assembly situation by laying the
groundwork for a middle-of-the-road resolution.
Other Issues:
- 1.
- We should remain steady on our present course of supporting all
works in consonance with the 1955 Unified Plan including leadership
in finding finances for the Maqarin Dam.
- 2.
- We should continue to urge maximum utilization of UNTSO including participation by the
parties in ISMAC and EIMAC.
- 3.
- We see no prospect of fresh initiatives in this period on such
other questions as boundaries, boycott, and freedom of
navigation.
