Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XVIII, Arab-Israeli Dispute, 1964–1967

44. Memorandum of Conversation¹

New York, April 17, 1964.

PARTICIPANTS

• H.M. King Hussein of Jordan
• Ambassador Adlai Stevenson
• Ambassador Robert G. Barnes

Following a dinner which he had given in honor of King Hussein, Ambassador Stevenson took the King aside for a private conversation. In the course of their discussion the Ambassador said that in his opinion the time had come for a serious effort at finding some solution to the Arab-Israeli conflict. As the King had been told, the U.S. would not countenance any effort to exterminate Israel and equally we could not tolerate Israeli aggression against the Arabs. If both sides could accept this it should be possible to discuss possible ways and means of ending the present conflict. Otherwise we appeared to be on the edge of a new arms race which might have disastrous results for the whole area. There were two elements which appeared to give new hope. First, in the post-Cairo atmosphere, he assumed it would be possible to find a single Arab voice. Second, he gathered from what the King had said that he would be willing to give a private commitment of the territorial integrity of Israel. If these two suppositions were true, it should be possible to undertake some private talks, without any publicity, about ways and means of ending the present impasse.

After it was pointed out that territorial integrity was a difficult concept because there were territorial aspects of the present controversy, Ambassador Stevenson suggested that what he really meant was mutual pledges of no aggressive intentions. This should create the basic condition necessary for some exploratory discussions. The King said that the Arab states were prepared to give such a pledge of no aggressive designs on Israel provided there was no publicity. He then went on to stress what he called the “inequality” of past actions with respect to Israel, the basic distrust which the Arabs had of Israeli intentions, plus the suspicion in many Arab quarters that the U.S. shared the Israeli aggressive designs on Arab land. Under the circumstances he thought that finding an amicable solution to some specific problem such as the salt pans dispute would greatly assist in establishing the bona fides of Israel and the U.S. Government and would thereby facilitate the steps which Ambassador Stevenson had in mind.

The King then reverted to the point he had made both publicly and privately over the previous few days that he hoped the U.S. could look at the Arab-Israeli dispute “from both sides.” He implied that in his opinion an examination of the record over the past few years would indicate that we had not been impartial. The only example which he would offer was that Jordan invariably faced great resistance whenever it sought financing for something that competed with Israel, such as the proposed potash plant.

Governor Stevenson continued with the comment that the Arabs were their own worst enemies. Statements about driving Israel into the sea merely built up Zionist determination to fight the Arabs and their ability to raise funds. The time had come to face this whole issue realistically and to work toward some solution. Otherwise we faced a new arms race with no one gaining and all losing. Hussein said he felt the Arab leaders were prepared to face the problem realistically. Further he had left Washington with a real feeling of the President’s sincerity and he therefore understood what Ambassador Stevenson was saying. In response to a specific query, he said that Jordan did need some increase in its military forces but that he had in mind only incorporating the national guard into the regular army which would increase overall security and also lead to better discipline and control over all Jordanian forces. He did not want sophisticated weapons but just the necessary small arms. He stressed the importance of receiving help on this in order to maintain at least some Arab states with western type equipment.

In concluding the conversation Ambassador Stevenson commented on the relative lack of any attack on the King in the American press. He said it was very important to try to keep the public aspect of the trip balanced and he still hoped to see a headline before the King left quoting him to the effect that peace was possible in the Middle East. This would help more than anything else the King could do. He knew the King had a message to get across in the Arab world but he should also remember that he had a message to get across in America. The representative of the Arab League who had just joined the group expressed his agreement with this comment. The King said he still hoped to return some day in a private capacity with his family and perhaps really get to visit and understand America.

1. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, POL 7 JORDAN. Secret; Limit Distribution. Drafted by Ambassador Barnes on April 22 and approved in S/S on April 29. The meeting was held in Ambassador Stevenson’s apartment.