Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XVIII, Arab-Israeli Dispute, 1964–1967

311. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the United Arab Republic¹

Washington, July 28, 1966, 6:42 p.m.

17321. Following summary uncleared FYI/Noforn and subject to revision upon review memcon.

Salient points Secretary’s remarks to UAR Ambassador Kamel July 28:

1. US wants find continually strengthened basis for its relations with UAR. This does not mean we seek agreement all points. Does mean it important that we look at points difference, resolve them if we can or try to circumscribe them if we cannot.

2. Secretary wants come Cairo but unable set date at this time. Not likely be before November. Secretary would like visit Cairo and other countries in area.

3. We would let Kamel know re appointment with President.

4. Congressional visits to UAR would be useful, probably more feasible after November elections. We could exchange suggestions as to whom UAR might wish invite.

5. Re Yemen, Secretary said we had taken full note Kamel’s July 13 statement that UAR would do nothing exacerbate situation provided SAG did likewise. Everyone seemed want settlement but up to present settlement “just beyond our fingertips.” We remained interested in settlement and would continue direct contacts with interested party. We did not wish undertake formal role in mediation but would pass on thoughts or ideas as they occurred.

6. Secretary congratulated UAR for having obtained necessary 10% American bank guarantees for CCC food purchases and said we would try expedite CCC implementations.

7. On UAR’s longer term food needs, Secretary noted El Sayah July 22 statement to Hare that UAR hoped be able obtain food requirements without outside assistance by 1972. On unofficial basis Secretary suggested might be helpful if UAR could let us have what information it could on its plan. Seemed to Secretary that approaching UAR food problem in broader framework of world situation might allow all of us to be more constructive and more relaxed.

8. Secretary emphasized that maintaining confidence of IMF and IBRD was extremely important to any country.

FYI. Kamel’s reaction to para 7 indicated concern lest GUAR might get impression USG was foreclosing resumption of PL 480 Title I sales. He said this matter would have to be handled in Cairo with great delicacy. Secretary assured him our continuing interest UAR food problem. End FYI.

Rusk

1. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, POL UAR-US. Secret. Drafted by Bergus and approved by Hare. Also sent to Jidda and Taiz.