Office of the Historian

307. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the United Arab Republic1

Washington, July 13, 1966, 7:18 p.m.

7004. Following summary uncleared FYI/Noforn and subject to revision upon review memcon.

1.
UAR Ambassador Kamel saw Secretary for nearly ninety minutes July 13. Kamel opened by saying Secretary had been missed in Cairo. Secretary expressed regret Vietnam matters had prevented his visit.
2.
Kamel detailed number of officials and other leaders he had talked to during his sojourn Cairo, complimented Ambassador Battle, and said he had been in UAR during very critical period in US–UAR relations. He now in position convey officially that Nasser wants work with President and Secretary strengthen relations. As evidence UAR intentions, GUAR had taken following actions:
3.
A. Yemen and South Arabia. Nasser had told Battle UAR did not wish complicate Yemen situation but to settle it. UAR welcomed Kuwaiti mediation, cooperating with Kuwaitis and hoped Saudis would do same. UAR had no intentions jeopardize US oil interests or take over South Arabia. UAR proposed USG exercise its “good offices” informally to help settle matters. UAR would take no action leading to deterioration Yemen situation if Saudi Arabia did not aggravate.
4.
B. Viet Cong. Kamel understood US reaction to opening VC office Cairo. At same time, USG in past had asked UAR to speak to [Page 613] Hanoi. NVN reaction had often been tell UAR to speak to VC. Therefore Egyptians thought that mere “formality” of permitting VC (who were already in Cairo) open office might be helpful. UAR had no intention embarrass USG.
5.
C. AALAPSO Conference. While Egypt not big country it had big government and not always possible control all its actions. Nasser, when told of US reaction to UAR’s hosting AALAPSO conference in 1968, had said, “who knows what will happen between now and 1968.” In any event USG should not condemn UAR a priori.
6.
D. “Blocs” in NE. Nasser had said he against idea of any “blocs, groups or axes” in area. Splitting of Arab world would create tension, attract cold war and Communist exploitation. It was not Cairo that had proposed Islamic Pacts, etc. UAR urged USG use its influence discourage groupings in NE.
7.
E. UK. Kamel told Secretary “officially but secretly” that UAR disposed resume relations with UK. Thought it might take place after upcoming OAU meeting at Addis. Intimated that US might help by speaking to Prime Minister Wilson when he visited US. Said no real conflict between UK and UAR over South Arabia.
8.
Kamel then moved to steps he hoped USG could take to respond to UAR actions.
a.
Kamel delivered Secretary second invitation from Sadat which he said had been authorized by Nasser. Hoped Secretary would visit Cairo perhaps around end of year. Secretary expressed thanks.
b.
Kamel asked for opportunity meet with President. Secretary said we would take it up.
9.
Kamel then reviewed economic actions UAR had taken: settlement for library, discussion re global agreement for US claims, Panam oil agreement, decision buy Boeings, invitations to American industrialists, etc.
10.
Kamel reverted to situation Cairo during his stay there. Said we had won that particular battle but situation still at crossroads. Nasser had spoken to Kamel re US reactions to his speeches on Yemen. Nasser said US should ask for reasons before condemning. There some elements in GUAR who were telling Nasser US was working with Faisal overthrow Nasser. Others did not question US intentions but said USG not using enough influence with Faisal and that risk (e.g. demise of Nasser regime) was the same. Nasser under pressure to save his regime. Nasser saw reports of Congressional and other influential Americans’ statements re “no wheat for Egypt” as invitation to Egyptian people to revolt. UAR Army in Yemen faced with choice between something that could be called victory in Yemen or debacle. Some felt that if debacle in Yemen or revolt in Egypt seemed inevitable there [Page 614] was something to be gained by precipitating crisis now. Nasser had asked Kamel explain pressure UAR was under. Felt USG would understand because it had similar situation in another part of the world.
11.
Kamel then outlined “transitory” steps he hoped USG would take soon:
1)
Reiterate US desire for honorable settlement in Yemen.
2)
Secretary’s visit to UAR at turn of year.
3)
Appointment with President for Kamel. Perhaps correspondence at Presidential level could be resumed;
4)
Visit of US Senatorial delegation to UAR.
5)
Support UAR efforts obtain 10% bank guarantee for CCC wheat.
6)
Move ahead with grain silo project.
7)
Encourage IBRD to resume loans to UAR.
8)

Support UAR efforts obtain help from IMF.

(Secretary interposed UAR’s need to maintain confidence of Bank and Fund. This essential in creating attractive atmosphere for private capital. Visits of leading American industrialists also helpful.)

9)
Postpone UAR debt payments to USG agencies.
12.
Kamel said that on longer term we had to face up to resumption PL 480. CCC might keep wheat channel open for few months. Important thing was that channel not be closed. If it were closed price would be high, although Kamel admitted US could probably afford it. Question would be whether UAR remained nonaligned or not. It was as simple as that.
13.
Final question was question of nuclear weapons in area. UAR would accept international controls over its atomic activities. Secretary said this was very important statement. Kamel said that if Israel produced atomic weapons USSR would obtain bases in NE. Kamel suggested that approach might be in context non-nuclear areas ultimately to be tied into global agreement.
14.
Secretary said he hoped see Kamel again within very few days and give him official answers to many important questions Kamel had raised. Rest of conversation taken up with informal, exploratory comments by Secretary.2
Rusk
  1. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, POL UAR-US. Secret. Drafted by Donald C. Bergus, and approved by Hare. Repeated to Jidda, London, and Tel Aviv.↩
  2. See Document 308.↩