299. Memorandum From the President’s Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson1

The purpose of our meeting at 11:30 a.m. on Wednesday, June 15 on the Israeli and UAR desalting projects is to surface for you the wide range of opinion and controversy over them. I hope the discussion will give us a clearer sense of how to sort these out and move ahead.

[Page 598]

Basically, the argument is between the desalters and the disarmers, with varied views between:

  • —The AEC and Interior want to push ahead with nuclear desalting. They admit money is a problem because a big nuclear desalting plant, while technologically feasible, is still not economic with normal commercial financing.
  • —AID and Budget Bureau want to save us from building a white elephant which we would have to subsidize.
  • —State hopes we can use these projects to bargain for IAEA safeguards on all Israeli and Egyptian reactors. They feel that subsidizing a plant might not be too big a price to pay.
  • —The disarmament experts fear putting any new reactors in tense areas because they would increase ability to produce weapons. Some of them have little faith in safeguards or feel there may be better ways to buy nuclear controls.

To make the most of this meeting, you might want to state your view of the problem and then follow up with the tough questions.

Suggested talking points:

The problem. We want to push ahead with nuclear desalting as rapidly as makes sense. We also want to keep Israel off the nuclear track. Can we do both?

The questions.

1.
If nuclear desalting still can’t pay its own way without subsidy, what about other sources of water? We’ve talked so much about desalting, have we overlooked other angles in Israel?
2.
Is there a chance that new technology combined with Israel’s increased need for water will make desalted water economical in the 1970’s?
3.
If there is no other way, how much is the Israeli project worth to us?
4.
Since we are worried about nuclear proliferation, how about non-nuclear desalting? Have we closed our eyes to this angle?
5.
Should we go ahead with desalting if Israel won’t accept safeguards on all its reactors?
6.
How good are IAEA safeguards? Are they worth giving away a nuclear desalting plant for? How can we make them better?
7.
Should we link the Israeli and Egyptian projects?

Attached is a summary of Secretary Rusk’s recommendations and of the paper prepared by Dr. Hornig’s, Charles Schultze’s and my own [Page 599] staff.2 At the close you might say the discussion was helpful in exploring the issues that will be faced by our coordinator on the U.S.-Israel project; and that the next step is for Rostow, in consultation with those represented around the table, to formulate terms of reference for the coordinator for submission to you.

Walt
  1. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Subject File, Desalting Projects, Vol. I. Secret.
  2. The summary is attached but not printed.