253. Telegram From the Embassy in the United Arab Republic to the Department of State1
1311. Re Deptel 2807.2 Have just completed 55 minute conversation President Nasser. I conveyed President Johnson’s pleasure at receipt Nasser’s message and assured him US desire reciprocate his hope for good relations. Made points in reftel re period of strain, our desire for even relations and hope continue frank exchange of views.
I then stated, as he was aware, US had taken decision offer P.L. 480 agreement. While terms do not include all UAR wanted, agreement reflects requirements world food situation and US policies toward other recipients as well as UAR. Discussed in some detail general problem of food and then urged we look upon new agreement as major new beginning between us and make every effort build on new foundation in the future. I reviewed US problem of obtaining Congressional and public support for foreign policies and stated our ability proceed directly related climate US–UAR relations.
I suggested three areas concern. First, we should try to solve existing problems. Second, we should anticipate new ones and try to prevent them from arising. And, third, we must look for new areas of cooperation. In latter category I mentioned population control and great problem we had in assuring our food did not indirectly encourage population increase. President nodded pleasantly but made no comment. I mentioned need for increasing food production and again he made no comment. I expressed pleasure economic planning and management under new government and noted with satisfaction new UAR attitude towards US business which led us anticipate increased US business activity with cooperative attitude and helpful approval UAR.
President then expressed his very great gratitude to the President of the United States for the resumption of aid. He expressed great thanks to me for my objectivity and help over recent months and stated UAR wanted very much maintain good relations us. “We have nothing to gain from bad relations your country and we will do everything possible to improve them.”
He stated he had wished include something in his speech tomorrow to National Assembly expressing appreciation for new aid but would take my advice and omit any reference even though he must deal with [Page 518] Russian aid and had hoped for balance in statement. I suggested he express gratitude for cooperation in past and pleasure at improved relations between our two countries. He nodded and appeared to agree do so.
I then turned to more difficult problems mentioning first Aden and my hope that this area of contention could be diminished as source of concern to those of us who wanted peaceful Middle East. I expressed hope UAR could normalize its relations with UK and would use its great influence bring about cessation terrorism in Aden. I stated British committed to independence by 1968 and expressed doubt any other solution available before then that would serve anyone’s interest, including UAR’s. Chaos would result from a precipitate British withdrawal and doubtful urban elements who have UAR sympathies would emerge victorious in that situation.
“What can we give the Front?” he asked. “They are not my agents.” I replied, “I never said they were your agents, but your influence over them and in area very great and your influence might be decisive in this delicate situation.”
He ranted for a moment or two and I finally said, “What can you suggest that is constructive in this situation?” He said, “Next move is up to the British. We agreed to deal with Aden problem when Thomson came to Cairo and this was impossible.” He then stated British efforts bring about solution in London meetings totally unproductive but somewhere in this direction British must move again. Assuming the Yemen problem is settled the key moment will be toward end of Egyptian presence. As Egyptians withdraw leaders Liberation Front will become deeply concerned removal Egyptian strength from area. Key moment for British to make move is in three or four months assuming Yemen agreement to be implemented.
I asked how President viewed chances Yemen agreement being implemented.
He replied that three or four days ago he had been pessimistic but things looked somewhat better. Saudis wished proceed although were confusing things by asking for understandings not in basic agreement, such as requiring 4/5 majority on votes at Harad conference when Nasser had anticipated need for only a simple majority. Nevertheless Saudis wanted settlement and he wanted settlement. The only ones who did not were the Yemen Republicans. He said, “I am having as much trouble with them as with the Royalists. I don’t really care who is in charge there as long as the Hamid ad-Din family is not involved. One group is the same as the other to me except for the family. That was no real revolution in Yemen. It was only a plot. But I just found that out lately.” At this point I laughed uproariously and so did he.
I stated US strongly hoped for settlement Yemen question as it had for some time. He stated he too wanted settlement and that issue [Page 519] had been most difficult one for him. “Do you know we have had over 70,000 troops there?” I replied that this was more than I had estimated. He stated military had wanted him expand conflict to Saudi Arabia and that just prior to talks in Alexandria (sic) troop strength had been increased to between 70,000 and 75,000 men in anticipation expanded war (although fewer there now). He stated he had held off military pressure and had attempted political settlement against advice some of his top advisers. Many of them had opposed his going Jidda (“but the world applauded,” I said) and he had in brief conversation been able to do what military could not have done through force—settled problem with King Feisal.
President asked me to carry message to US that it must keep close touch Feisal during this delicate period. Although every evidence Feisal wanted agreement, we must do all possible keep anything from going wrong. I assured him of our continuing interest and of our intention assist where we could.
I then brought up arms control problem in general, stating world must find solution arms race. I mentioned US hope UAR could accept IAEA safeguards, saying that we were not, as he had previously stated, singling UAR out for attention in this field but that we had in fact discussed question safeguards with a great many countries in hope of encouraging general acceptance this requirement. He said, “I told Talbot our position when you and he talked with me.” I said I was aware Egyptian endorsement safeguards system but what was needed was formal adherence IAEA safeguards for its own country. “Have the Israelis accepted?” he asked. “No, but someone has to begin and we are in consultation with them with hope safeguards can become area wide. Someone must begin this vital step.”
I then brought up conventional armaments and expressed hope we could over coming months have searching exploration these problems. He said, “You contribute to it by selling arms to Israel.” I said, “You contribute to it in other ways but that is not for discussion this evening. The only things I want to register are our continuing concern for the problem, our hope that together we might find a solution, and our desire to continue discussions with you on this very difficult problem.” He said, “How many tanks have the Israelis obtained—300, 400, 500?” I said I did not know but I thought his figures highly exaggerated but suggested we deal with basic issues and not numbers any one specific armament. He said, “If you sell planes to Israel, we will buy planes. If you sell tanks to Israel, we will buy tanks.”
I said this reinforced my argument we must find some way to call a halt to resources going into unproductive activity at time they are desperately needed for more important things involving human survival.
[Page 520]I stopped him from extreme emotionalism which built up very readily on this issue, which I have not discussed with him for many months. (Perhaps a detailed presentation should be prepared for my use with him in the near future.)
In conclusion, he repeated again his deep gratitude for US willingness enter into new agreement and his earnest desire to assist in improving relations between us. I remarked rather delicately I would look forward to his speech tomorrow night.
Comment: The meeting was extremely cordial and embarrassingly friendly, with renewed apologies for speech of last December 23 which I told him now part of history. Obviously he wishes desperately get back in good graces with us and will I believe try in his own way to do his part.
- Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, AID (US) 15–4 UAR. Secret; Limdis. No time of transmission is given on the telegram, which was received at 5:44 p.m.↩
- Document 252.↩