Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XVIII, Arab-Israeli Dispute, 1964–1967

213. Telegram From the Embassy in Jordan to the Department of State¹

Amman, May 8, 1965.

668. Deptel 607;² Cairo’s 3898 to Dept.³ During course of conversation with King Hussein and Prime Minister Tell May 6 I had suitable opportunity to inquire specifically what they meant by Arab “plan” for dealing with Palestine. King replied immediately that Arab plan was simply (1) decision to proceed on divergence of Jordan waters coupled with (2) decision to build up Arab armies to point where they would be able to defend against any Israeli attack on diversion plan. This was full content of any plan on which Arab leaders had agreed. [garble—Bourguiba] had been attacked because he went beyond this framework without consulting other Arab leaders and in particular because timing of his public proposals had been most tragic in view of present emotional state of eastern Arabs. Prime Minister confirmed that this was all he had meant by his own reference to a collective plan.

King went on to say that there was absolutely no intention of trying to destroy Israel. He appreciated our efforts over past few months to restrain Israel from any preemptive military move and our assurances that we were prepared to defend independence and territorial integrity of Jordan. In long run however, this not sufficient and Arabs obviously had to feel they were in position themselves to defend against any Israeli aggression. This required improvement in their military posture and “balance” in the military power of two sides which he was afraid was different from kind of balance which we had in mind. However, there was tremendous difference between being in a military position to defend against attack and being in a military position to destroy Israel; latter was totally beyond their intentions or even reasonable economic capabilities of Arab states.

Comments: King did not make any further reference to PLO as he had during our previous conversation (Embtel 656)⁴ but we agree with Cairo’s analysis that there is certain divergence between what Arab leaders have agreed on record and whole underlying concept behind PLO which is today becoming somewhat more important aspect of problem in eyes of Palestinians, and thorn in side King Hussein.

Barnes

1. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, POL ARAB–ISR. Confidential. No time of transmission is given on the telegram, which was received at 7:37 a.m. Repeated to Beirut, Cairo, and Damascus.
2. Telegram 607 to Amman, April 29, was repeated as telegram 6651 to Cairo; see footnote 2, Document 212.
3. Document 212.
4. Telegram 656 from Amman, May 4, reported points made by King Hussein in several conversations during the previous weekend. It stated that concerning the PLO, Hussein had stated that Shuqairi was “throwing his weight around” contrary to summit decisions and would have to be curbed. He thought the basic problem was that “there could be no PLO as defined by Shuqairi alongside Jordan,” and he considered this definitely contrary to summit decisions. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, POL 15–1 JORDAN)