201. Circular Telegram From the Department of State to Certain Posts1
1893. Jordan Waters. Depcirtel 1854.2 Assistant Secretary Jernegan opened fifth final session of current round talks on subject with Israeli Minister Gazit3 by reiterating several points central to understanding U.S. position on subject: US supports Unified Plan fully as Plan or yardstick. No change in US position. It is not agreement and we do not believe parties involved should be expected abide by “every dot and comma” as if they were parties to agreed document. Projects now beginning take shape on upper tributaries do not seem to accord with UDP and we have argued thus with Lebanese. Must recognize argument that particular point does not agree with UDP is of limited usefulness with Arab riparians. US would not acquiesce in major divergences from UDP that would cause trouble. View held at highest level USG was that use force in this matter not advisable and USG could not acquiesce in it. We counting on GOI use peaceful means.
Without attempting answer directly to these points Gazit said he had two or three of his own to make. GOI was interested in Lebanese reaction to our demarches. Jernegan said Lebanese did not accept all our arguments but they glad not to force issue. We could not say how this would come out but we confident Lebanese would do all they could to drag out matter.
Gazit said GOI considering suggestion made that it take up Lebanese diversion projects in ILMAC. Would make decision in one or two days.
Re use force Gazit said GOI not trigger-happy but could not be expected abjure force in matter of vital interest. For GOI use of force was “last rather than first thing.”
Gazit said GOI attached considerable importance to knowing whether US agreed with Israel on out of country diversions (water transfer problem) and out of basin diversions. Re latter Jernegan said it clear from record Johnston negotiations out of basin diversion contemplated [Page 431] for Israel but not for Arabs. This was not helpful argument to use with Arabs, however. As for out of country diversion this apparently not contemplated by negotiators. It hard to say whether it considered and turned down.
Gazit said GOI attached much importance to preventive diplomacy and wondered whether US felt it doing all it could. Jernegan said we were and assured him we would continue our efforts. Pointed out we had most influence in Beirut and after that, though considerably less, in Cairo. If we could increase our influence in Cairo could be more helpful because UAR key in this matter.
Gazit urged US press undesirability Wadi Sreid canal in specific terms with Lebanese. We said we wished consult with Ambassador Meyer before pursuing this particular tactical line.
Jernegan said he sure Talbot ready discuss in Israel aspects Jordan Waters we had covered in our discussions but be felt matter had been dealt with thoroughly during last week and he did not see what more there was to say at present time.
- Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, POL 33–1 JORDAN RIVER. Confidential. Drafted by Stackhouse, cleared by Symmes, and approved by Jernegan. Sent to Amman, Beirut, Cairo, Damascus, Jerusalem, London, Paris, Tel Aviv, and to Geneva for Talbot.↩
- Circular telegram 1854, April 1, summarized working level meetings with Gazit held March 29 and 31 and April 1 on the subject of Jordan waters. (Ibid.) The meetings are also recorded in memoranda of conversation dated March 29 and 31 and a memorandum of April 1 from Davies to Jernegan. (Ibid.)↩
- A memorandum of the conversation is ibid.↩