Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XVIII, Arab-Israeli Dispute, 1964–1967

110. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the United Arab Republic¹

Washington, November 27, 1964, 6:08 p.m.

3101. At our request, UAR Minister Eleish met November 27 with Jernegan discuss Thanksgiving day vandalism against Embassy (Ambassador Kamel in New York). Jernegan delivered copy of Embassy’s note protest (Embtel 1856),² emphasized that Department strongly supports statements contained therein, and expressed concern at recent trend of misunderstanding that had crept into US–UAR relations along lines Deptel 3092.³

Jernegan said we took serious view of attack because felt could have been prevented if adequate action taken. Press reports had noted that Ambassador Battle who lives further away than fire or police stations able reach Embassy from his home through mob before police and firemen. Also noted that when police did arrive, concentrated on front of building leaving rear unprotected where burning occurred.

Because we considered UAR had responsibility in this matter, Ambassador Battle had delivered note of protest to Acting Foreign Minister Abu Shadi. We understood from Ambassador’s report,⁴ Abu Shadi expressed astonishment at protest and claimed UAR had done all that could be expected. Also, that Washington not taking as serious view as Embassy. We wished disabuse UARG of any such idea. Dept fully expected UAR compensate for damages and believed proper for UAR publicly express regret. Jernegan noted only regret so far had come from Chief of police and from Abu Shadi, but latter very matter of fact. Ordinarily, this handled by foreign government official visiting scene and government issuing public statement.

After presenting substance Deptel 3092, Jernegan remarked that series of things had created impression in US of UAR hostility. It seemed there no policy followed by US which free UAR criticism. While we recognized that US–UAR relations cannot be based on what said in press, USG could not help but think UAR press treatment past two months symptomatic of UARG attitude. Added this had effect on Congress, American public and other US officials. Thus, attack on Embassy, while in itself not incident of grave severity, could have effect out of proportion to actual damage done.

Eleish expressed his personal regret for mob attack, agreed report conversation, and expressed appreciation on learning neither Dept nor Embassy intended release text of note.

Rusk

1. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, POL 23–8 UAR. Confidential; Immediate. Drafted by Dickman, cleared by Davies, and approved by Jernegan.
2. Telegram 1856 from Cairo, November 26, transmitted the text of a note Battle planned to deliver protesting an attack on the Embassy that day by several hundred African students. (Ibid.)
3. Telegram 3092 to Cairo, November 27, endorsed Battle’s protest note and stated that the Thanksgiving Day vandalism was particularly disturbing as a symptom of the “dissonance” that had recently entered U.S.-UAR relations. It noted increasing criticism by the Cairo press of U.S. policy in Vietnam, the Congo, India, Sudan, and elsewhere and a Foreign Ministry statement of November 25 condemning the U.S.-Belgian rescue of foreign nationals in the Congo. (Ibid.)
4. Battle reported his meeting with Acting Foreign Minister Abu Shadi in telegram 1068 from Cairo, November 27. (Ibid.)