Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XV, Germany and Berlin

74. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Washington, December 9, 1964, 1 p.m.

SUBJECT

• Germany

PARTICIPANTS

• U.S.
  • The Secretary
  • Ambassador Thompson
  • Ambassador Kohler
  • Mr. Tyler
  • Mr. Akalovsky
• U.S.S.R.
  • Foreign Minister Gromyko
  • Deputy Foreign Minister Semenov
  • Ambassador Dobrynin
  • Mr. Smirnovskiy, Chief, American Section, Foreign Ministry

Mr. Gromyko stated the Soviet Government attached the greatest importance to a German peace settlement. Until that problem was resolved, the situation in Europe would be explosive and could not be characterized as normal. This matter had been discussed between the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. on a number of earlier occasions, and on some points the positions of the two sides had become closer. It would be only logical to continue discussion of those points. The Soviet Union was prepared to continue discussing all the points which had been discussed earlier, with a view to arriving at a conclusion. The Secretary had mentioned that he wished to consult the allies.² The Soviet Union recognized that this was only natural and in fact it also consulted its own allies. However, the Soviet Union believed that discussion could be continued now on the same basis as before.

Mr. Gromyko said that one of the crucial points was that of the presence of Western forces in West Berlin. In earlier discussions, the Secretary had raised the question of access, and the Soviet Union had stated its views on this matter. The discussion on that point had not been conclusive at that time, and the Soviet Union was prepared to continue it. If this matter were dealt with, both sides would put forward their considerations and perhaps there would be a greater chance for understanding. Of course, the questions discussed in earlier conversations were interrelated; they were those of Western forces and access, borders, non-aggression pact, GDR sovereignty, subversive activities in West Berlin, denuclearization of the two Germanys.

The Secretary said there were two roads along which we could proceed. First, we could seek a final and historically satisfactory solution of the German problem, a solution linked to major steps in organizing European security and leading to a final conclusion of security arrangements by NATO and Warsaw Pact countries. Such a solution would open vast prospects for disarmament in Europe and North America, for trade, etc. As far as we were concerned, we did not see how a final conclusion could be arrived at without the wishes of the people concerned being taken into account. Of course, we were talking about a vast number of people living in Europe and North America, and we did not believe that the choice of 70 million Germans should be an obstacle to the development of our relations. Next year would mark the 20th anniversary of the end of World War II, and perhaps that would be a good time for a bold and radical solution. On the other hand, perhaps the time for such a solution was not yet ripe and we should see what could be done for the ordinary people living in the immediate area. Some progress in this respect had already been made. There had been some improvement in the relations between the FRG and East Germany, and some steps had been taken to alleviate the humanitarian aspects of the situation. For example, the U.S. was happy about the pass arrangements which had been recently developed. Also, trade between West Germany and Eastern Europe, including East Germany, was increasing steadily and importantly. Perhaps some additional, important steps could be made to make the life of the people in the area more secure. However, the Secretary said, he wished to reiterate that he did not see—and this was not a cold war view—any permanent solution unless the German people had their full say in it. Unless these elementary considerations were taken into account, there would always be a chance for manipulation and for a demagogue calling for a course no one wanted to see the Germans take. The Secretary said he would see his colleagues in Paris and get in touch with the Soviet side thereafter. He wanted to ask Mr. Gromyko directly whether in his view there was a possibility of having a solution based on the judgment of the people living in West Germany and East Germany.

Mr. Gromyko responded that he did not think the term “judgment” was the right one in this context, although he knew what the Secretary meant. The fact was that there were two German States. The division between them was most profound and almost impossible to overcome. Thus, the only possibility of working for reunification was through disarming the two German States and through mutual understanding between them. Mr. Gromyko said he wished to reiterate Soviet readiness to include in any understanding among the Great Powers a provision stating that the Great Powers would make efforts to facilitate reunification. However, the method of reunification should in no way be imposed from the outside.

The Secretary said there was no question of imposition of a solution “from the outside”. The U.S. was ready to accept the choice made by the German people. If the Germans should express the desire to remain as they were now, that would be all right with us.

Mr. Gromyko commented the Secretary was proposing to mix the Germans together and to ask them to make their choice according to U.S. concepts. The Soviet Union’s view was that there were two German States.

The Secretary noted the Soviet Union claimed that only the leaders of the East German Government could speak for the people, whereas we said the people should have their say. He also said he was not quite sure what Mr. Gromyko meant when he said that we wanted to mix the Germans.

Mr. Gromyko said he meant that the Germans would be mixed at the polls.

The Secretary said he had in mind separate polls.

Mr. Gromyko rejoined that the people in East Germany had already voted. In any event, the idea advanced by the Secretary was unrealistic and smelled of mothballs. What we should do was to let the two German States get together and discuss their problems.

Commenting that he realized Mr. Gromyko was not a spokesman for East Germany, the Secretary wondered what Mr. Gromyko would say if he were the East German representative and if he, the Secretary, were the West German representative in such discussions.

Mr. Gromyko responded that he would say the two countries should improve their relations, and that this was the only way. He said he knew the U.S. and West Germany did not like it, but the fact was that this was the only realistic way. Sooner or later, East Germany would be recognized, for it was a fact that there existed two separate and sovereign German States.

The Secretary stressed that if there were to be a psychologically stable solution, the German people living in the two parts of Germany would have to have their say in it. If there were separate votes in West Germany and East Germany and if the people in East Germany did not wish reunification, we would respect their desires, just as a decision in the opposite direction should be respected.

Mr. Gromyko repeated that this was subject to an understanding between the two German States. He said he wished to stress that the further the rearmament of West Germany and the plans for the MLF went, the more difficult a solution would be. No solution was possible without disarmament. Indeed, even for an understanding between the two German States, it was necessary for them to be in the same position, i.e., both of them should be disarmed. He said many opportunities had been lost in the past, and what had been possible yesterday was not possible today.

The Secretary said he wished to comment on the relationship between the German problem and disarmament. If one asked broadly for what purpose the U.S. and U.S.S.R. were maintaining such huge forces today, the reply was that they did so because of each other. But then, what would the U.S. and U.S.S.R. have to fight about? As we saw it, it was almost only over the German problem. Thus, if the German problem were resolved, the way towards disarmament would be open. The Secretary recalled his earlier remark to Mr. Gromyko that Stalin had made a tactical error; had Stalin maintained a quiet repose for 10 years after World War II, there would be no need for discussing disarmament today, because the U.S. would have disarmed on its own. The reason we had rearmed was the German problem. The Secretary pointed out the solution of the German problem and disarmament could go together. He said he knew that this was not as simple as it might sound; however, he was convinced that nothing would be so far reaching as the solution of the German problem, with the consequential dramatic possibilities for disarmament.

The Secretary also recalled his earlier remark to Mr. Gromyko that the U.S. had not been the Soviet Union’s ally in World War II against the Nazis in order to fight a third world war over the German question. That would be foolish. The U.S. was concerned about Germany, but we were confident that the present generation in Germany and its leaders wanted peace. Yet nobody could know what was going to happen in 20 or 30 years from now either in West Germany or East Germany.

Mr. Gromyko said he agreed that reunification was not possible without disarmament. However, it was not possible without an understanding between the two German States either. Nevertheless, he believed that some aspects of a German peace settlement could be resolved without disarmament in Europe and without denuclearizing the two German States.

The Secretary observed that from Mr. Gromyko’s remarks, he gathered that the Soviet Union wanted the solution of those aspects to be conditioned on the acceptance of its views on the main problems, such as recognition of the division of the German people.

Mr. Gromyko said that East Germany should be recognized, reiterating that a solution of the German problem could be possible only on the basis of improved relations between the two German States. If one proceeded on the basis of hate and of all kinds of incidents, it was impossible to think of a solution of the German problem.

The Secretary pointed out that as far as we were concerned, the idea of reunification was subject to the will of the German people. Mr. Gromyko had spoken of the differences between the social systems in the two parts of Germany. We did not know whether that factor would influence the decision of the German people. Personally, the Secretary said, he thought that the national feelings would prevail just as he was sure they would prevail if the Soviet Union or the United States were in a similar situation.

Mr. Gromyko inquired whether discussion of the German problem could be resumed after the Secretary’s return from Paris.

The Secretary replied that he didn’t know and that he would be in touch with Mr. Gromyko after he had discussed this matter with his colleagues in Paris.³

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 32–4 GER. Secret; Exdis. Drafted by Akalovsky on December 16. The meeting was held at the Soviet Embassy. The source text is marked “Part IV of VII.” Gromyko also met with President Johnson; a memorandum of conversation of their meeting, which included a brief discussion of German issues, is scheduled for publication in Foreign Relations, 1964–1968, volume XIV.
2. The discussion took place on December 2 during a meeting at the Soviet Mission to the United Nations. A memorandum of conversation is in Department of State, Secretary’s Memoranda of Conversation: Lot 65 D 330.
3. See Document 78.