Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XV, Germany and Berlin

75. Memorandum From the Ambassador at Large (Thompson) to Secretary of State Rusk¹

Washington, December 13, 1964.

SUBJECT

• Initiative on the German Problem

At the experts meeting on December twelfth,² I gave a fairly full account of your discussions with Gromyko,³ including hint of Soviet willingness to resume dialogue with us. The only thing I omitted was the indication that the Soviet intention was to begin with troop presence in West Berlin and the question of access. There was general agreement that the Soviets would not be receptive to any proposals on the German problem which were couched in traditional terms of Four Power responsibility for reunification based on self-determination, all-German elections, etc. The German side nevertheless put forward three versions of an “initiative,” the texts of which are attached.⁴ Number one calls for the establishment of a “Standing Council of the Four Powers for Germany,” in order to reduce tensions and achieve reunification. This is the type of broad language which would run the risks you have already foreseen in the unlikely event the Soviets indicated initial acceptance and then asked what should be discussed. The other two were generally agreed by the British, French and ourselves to be completely unacceptable to the Soviets because of the references to elections, reunification and self-determination. The German side maintains that some form of initiative is necessary to maintain the faith of East and West Germans in eventual reunification and that a proposal to the Soviets along the lines submitted would accomplish this result even though it would be rejected by the Soviets.

After considerable discussion, the following four points were agreed to be suitable for discussion at the Quadripartite dinner Monday night:

1. Is an initiative along the lines proposed by the Germans desirable even though we recognize that the Soviets would promptly reject it?

Comment: We feel that it would be a mistake to submit such obviously unacceptable proposals to the Soviets. The contents of the more detailed proposals would be rejected and we feel that the rejection and almost inevitable accompanying counterblast would make the proposals appear as a routine exercise having no serious objective and, as such, might have negative repercussions on East German opinion. Moreover, it would do nothing to improve Western relations with the Soviets on the Berlin problem; on the contrary, owing to the generally accepted view that Russian policy in Germany is immobilized by internal considerations, it could harden existing Soviet policy on Germany. However, if the Germans insist on the necessity of making a proposal to the Soviets, the language of any proposal would have to be worked out carefully—and should be remitted to the Ambassadorial Group in Washington.

2. Should the proposal be reworded to try to make the establishment of Four Power machinery acceptable to the Soviets, by omitting reference to reunification, and assigning it some such task as handling current points of friction with the thought it might eventually gradually work into dealing with more substantive problems?

Comment: What the British apparently have in mind is to build on a small base—possibly the current Soviet moves to get together in Berlin. Such machinery could start with consideration of day-to-day problems in Berlin and then gradually spread its umbrella over more important matters such as humanitarian problems, trade and economic matters, and, after a substantial period of time, political problems leading to unification. This is such vague proposal that it should be considered in more detail at a later time by the Ambassadorial Group.

3. Should Western substantive positions on the German problem and European Security be reexamined?

Comment: All four Western powers agree that the Soviet internal situation rules out Soviet acceptance of any new Western substantive proposals. At the same time, the Soviet proposals for reactivating a Quadripartite dialogue in Berlin (or at least in Western Berlin) suggests the Soviets wish to open the door by a crack. We feel we should do nothing to discourage the Soviets in this direction, particularly if it turns out that the Soviets are willing to re-emphasize Quadripartite responsibility for Berlin as a whole. We see no need for re-examination.

4. Timing of any initiative.

Comment: It is interesting to note that even the Germans, although pushing the idea of an “initiative” doggedly, are not in a particular rush to do anything. They recognize the aura of political uncertainty now prevailing in the East and they note the Moscow meeting of Communist leaders just scheduled for March first. We will also need to define clearly what we are proposing to negotiate before we agree to a proposal to negotiate. Thus it is unlikely that we will have anything before mid-March or April.

The question could also put to Schroeder whether it would not be wise to await further Soviet response to the query which the Germans have put to the Russians whether the projected visit to the FRG will be picked up by the new Kremlin leadership.

It might be argued that no new German initiative should be undertaken until after the international meeting of Communist parties has taken place (the latest information is that a preparatory meeting will convene on March first although no information about place, participants, or terms of reference is now known).

The French are likely to cite the current MLF negotiations as another reason for delay.

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files,POL 32–4 GER. Secret.
2. A memorandum of conversation is ibid.
3. See Document 74.
4. Not found with the source text.