Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XV, Germany and Berlin

78. Memorandum of Conversation¹

SecDel/MC/46

New York, December 19, 1964, 1 p.m.

SUBJECT

• Germany and Berlin

PARTICIPANTS

• U.S.
  • The Secretary
  • Ambassador Stevenson
  • Ambassador Thompson
  • Mr. Akalovsky
• U.S.S.R.
  • Foreign Minister Gromyko
  • Deputy Foreign Minister Semenov
  • Ambassador Dobrynin
  • Ambassador Fedorenko
  • Mr. Sukhodrev

The Secretary recalled Mr. Gromyko’s remark to the President² that he did not exclude the possibility of new elements in the Soviet position. He wondered whether there was anything Mr. Gromyko could say now.

Mr. Gromyko confirmed he had made such a remark to the President with respect to Western forces in West Berlin. However, no exchange of views on the problem was now taking place. Indeed, on the basis of the Secretary’s remarks on the German question, he did not see much prospect for progress. The Secretary had been referring to such matters as unification, disarmament, etc., and it was difficult to imagine movement on that basis.

The Secretary pointed out that the three governments on the Western side were necessarily involved in the German problem. As a result of World War II, the U.S., the U.K., and France have specific responsibilities and rights. It would be difficult to have discussions on a bilateral basis because we did not know what new elements the Soviet Union had in mind and also because we did not know whether we could deliver anything that might be agreed upon in the absence of the other parties concerned. In any event, there was a range of matters on which further movement should be possible. We were pleased with the Christmas pass arrangement and perhaps the four parties could sit down informally and see what could be done to move further in that direction. Of course, our approaches to the German problem were different, but perhaps it would be useful to discuss, without any agenda, the whole range of questions involved in it. The Secretary said he would advise against such discussions as could produce crises, of which we had had enough already. He also pointed out that he was not proposing anything formally. He had not been instructed to do so, but he thought perhaps it would be useful to look at the whole range of questions and see where progress could be made. The Secretary said he could not make any formal proposal to this effect until he knew Mr. Gromyko’s reaction.

Mr. Gromyko said the Soviet Union was ready to enter into discussions, but he wished to stress that to tie reunification, disarmament, and other problems of that magnitude into one knot was unrealistic, and it would be difficult to have discussions on that basis. Discussions should take place on a realistic basis and the Soviet Union believed that there were possibilities for understanding on some of the points discussed earlier. The Soviet Union had come to this conclusion on the basis of previous talks, but to have talks on a new basis would be difficult. The Soviet Union was prepared to have discussions, but what would be their purpose?

The Secretary said that to take the least, perhaps progress could be made in the humanitarian area, such as reunion of families, expansion of cultural exchanges, etc. Frankly, he did not believe that such discussions would lead to a final solution of the German problem. However, some progress could still be made.

Mr. Gromyko suggested that humanitarian aspects could be worked out and agreed upon between the two Germanies, as had already been done in certain areas. However, such understandings did not move us towards the solution of serious problems which still remained unsettled.

The Secretary wondered what level Mr. Gromyko had in mind in suggesting bilateral discussions. He personally would be quite busy over the next several weeks in connection with preparations for the President’s State of the Union message and other matters. Did Mr. Gromyko have in mind our Ambassadors or perhaps some other level?

Mr. Gromyko said the U.S. should inform the Soviet side when it was ready to start discussions. We had two capitals and perhaps discussions could rotate between them. The Soviet Union was prepared to have discussions on a realistic basis at any time, and it was up to the U.S. to decide when. The problem of European security was very important to the Soviet Union; it concerned the Soviet Union’s own security as well as that of its allies.

1. Source: Department of State, Secretary’s Memoranda of Conversation: Lot 65 D 330. Confidential. Drafted by Akalovsky on December 21 and cleared in S on December 30. The meeting was held at the Secretary’s suite in the Waldorf Towers. The source text is marked “Part III of IV.”
2. See footnote 1, Document 74.