Office of the Historian

73. Memorandum of Conversation1

Washington, November 23, 1964, 2:30 p.m.

SUBJECT

  • Initiative to Soviets on German Question

PARTICIPANTS

  • United States
    • The Secretary
    • The Under Secretary
    • Mr. William R. Tyler, Assistant Secretary,EUR
    • Ambassador George C. McGhee
    • Ambassador Llewellyn Thompson
    • Mr. James L. Greenfield, Assistant Secretary, P
    • Mr. Alfred Puhan, Director, GER
    • Mr. Richard B. Finn, Deputy Director,GER
  • Germany
    • Foreign Minister Schroeder
    • Ambassador Heinrich Knappstein
    • Dr. Hans Ruete, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State
    • Mr. Georg von Lilienfeld, Minister, German Embassy
    • Dr. Ulrich Scheske, NATO Desk Officer
    • Dr. Klaus Simon, Personal Aide
    • Dr. Jeorg Kastl, Press Secretary of the Foreign Ministry
    • Mr. Wolfgang Behrends, First Secretary

After a discussion of East-West relations,2 the Secretary said that he had talked to UK Foreign Secretary Gordon Walker about a quadripartite meeting in Paris before the NATO meeting.3 The Secretary said that he had suggested that such a meeting would be useful in order to exchange views about the Soviet Union. A meeting of the four Foreign Ministers might be preceded by a meeting of the experts.

Foreign Minister Schroeder said he thought this a very good idea. A preliminary meeting on December 12 would be very useful. However, in the view of the Federal Republic, an effective presentation of the need for German reunification depends on the United States. The US is the only power which can really accomplish anything with the Soviet Union. It is of the greatest significance, therefore, that the position of the US on the German unification question be kept constantly before the people.

[Page 173]

The Foreign Minister said that it would be most useful if the President could mention this subject in his State of the Union speech. He noted that President Kennedy had discussed the need for German reunification in one of his first speeches and this had been useful. The Foreign Minister observed that he had no doubt about US policy but felt it important to restate it.

Mr. Schroeder commented that there are recurring rumors in Europe about negotiations between the US and the Soviet Union. One rumor has it that 140 letters have been exchanged. It is important to counter these rumors. The Foreign Minister said that he would comment on this subject in his talk to the National Press Club on November 24. He would make the point that US talks with the Soviet Union are an essential prerequisite for peace in central Europe. The Foreign Minister reiterated that the Soviets also have an interest in a solution of the German question, and therefore the Federal Republic is happy to see this subject taken up in official statements. It is important to prevent poisonous mistrust of US intentions from arising in Germany.

Secretary Rusk said that the matter of an initiative will doubtless come up at the quadripartite meeting. The Secretary said that he would like to make a distinction between substance and procedure. He commented that our problem was really more on procedure than substance. The Secretary said that the US would be reluctant to take the initiative, then look around and ask where is everybody. He commented that it had taken three years to reduce the Berlin crisis and that this had been done without any French participation.

Foreign Minister Schroeder said that this matter had not been recently discussed with the French but that the French have always argued that the time has not yet come to approach the Soviets. The French say that it is up to the Soviets to reduce tension. Foreign Minister Schroeder agreed that it is important to have Four-Power unanimity and that this would impress the Soviets even if no agreement is worked out with them.

The Foreign Minister referred to the proposal made some months ago in Moscow by then UK Foreign Secretary Butler.4 This proposal (for establishment of a Four-Power council) had met with a complete Soviet rejection. The Foreign Minister wondered, however, whether this proposal should not be pursued further.

He commented that the Berlin situation is calm now but that the problems remain—the Four-Power responsibilities, access, etc. Perhaps some procedural progress could be made. The Foreign Minister reiterated that the new Soviet regime has not been sounded out on this matter [Page 174] and that the Soviets have an interest in a solution. The Foreign Minister said that he thought it would be useful to renew the Butler proposal and that in any case this should be discussed in Paris.

The Foreign Minister commented that a US clarification of its position on the German question has an important influence on the uncommitted powers, as well as on France and the UK.

Secretary Rusk said that he was not so much concerned that the Soviets would say no to an Allied proposal, but rather that they might say maybe and then ask questions where there were no agreed answers. The Foreign Minister said that if a Four-Power approach should be made to the Soviets, there should be previous preparation, perhaps in the Ambassadorial Group. He thought that questions like this should be discussed at the forthcoming talks in Paris. The Foreign Minister stressed the desirability of sounding out the reaction of the new Soviet leaders on the German question and commented that it should not be necessary to have a complete program at the very start.

Secretary Rusk suggested that other initiatives for separate stages of action might be considered. For example humanitarian commissions under Four-Power auspices might be considered.

The Foreign Minister said that the FRG is prepared to return to these ideas. He commented that such ideas were well worth exploration.

Secretary Rusk asked about Ulbricht’s position in the GDR. Mr. Schroeder replied that there was a lot of talk about changes in the GDR. He commented, however, that Ulbricht is a “superprefect” who can adjust to every change that comes along. The Foreign Minister commented that Willi Stoph is a different type: he is a German Communist rather than an emigre Communist like Ulbricht. It may be possible that future leaders of the Soviet Zone will feel more like Germans and less like Communists. The Foreign Minister also commented that East German youth do not appear to react favorably to all the pressure put on them by the Zone authorities, and that proximity of West Germany also has an effect in reducing the attractiveness of Communism.

In any discussions with the Soviets about reunification, Foreign Minister Schroeder thought it important to stress that the Soviets would not lose the economic benefits they now derive from the Soviet Zone. It should be made clear to the Soviets that the type of agreement the West has in mind would take into account the economic interest of the Soviet Union. Any Western program on the German question must be flexible. The Foreign Minister commented that there are independent trends developing in the West as in the East, and that similar factors are at work on both sides.

  1. Source: Department of State, Secretary’s Memoranda of Conversation: Lot 65 D 330. Confidential. Drafted by Finn and approved in S, U, and G on December 1. The meeting was held in the Under Secretary’s Conference Room. The source text is marked “Part 2 of 3.”↩
  2. A memorandum of this part of the conversation is ibid., Central Files, POL 15 USSR.↩
  3. See Foreign Relations, 1964–1968, vol. XIII, Document 43.↩
  4. Butler visited the Soviet Union July 27–August 1.↩