Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XIV, Soviet Union

78. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Washington, December 9, 1964, 5 p.m.

SUBJECT

• U.S.-Soviet Relations

PARTICIPANTS

• U.S.
  • The President
  • The Secretary
  • Ambassador Kohler
  • Ambassador Thompson
  • Mr. Akalovsky
• U.S.S.R.
  • Foreign Minister Gromyko
  • Deputy Foreign Minister Semenov
  • Ambassador Dobrynin
  • Mr. Smirnovskiy, Chief, American
  • Section, Foreign Ministry
  • Mr. Sukhodrev

The President opened by expressing his pleasure at seeing Mr. Gromyko in Washington. He said that the Secretary had reported to him on his conversations with Mr. Gromyko;² he was glad they had taken place and knew they were helpful. The President also said he was pleased to have occasional discussions with the Soviet Ambassador, whom we liked very much.

Mr. Gromyko said he first wished to thank the President for giving up some of his time for the purpose of this meeting. He also wished to convey to the President greetings and best wishes from Brezhnev, Kosygin, and Mikoyan, who had asked him to do so in case he had occasion to meet with the President. Mr. Gromyko said he would like to touch upon certain questions which the Soviet Government believed to be important from the standpoint of U.S.-Soviet relations. He would not go into any details, but would deal with them only in general terms. If it was agreeable to the President, he would raise those questions one by one, hoping that the President would comment on each of them.

Mr. Gromyko said that the first and the main question which was of interest to the Soviet Union was that of the prospects for U.S.-Soviet relations. The policy of the Soviet Union had been and continued to be a policy of peace, of developing friendly relations with all states, and of peaceful coexistence with all states regardless of their social structure. The Soviet Union was ready and wished to develop U.S.-Soviet relations. The Soviet Union was prepared to seek agreement on outstanding questions, both those directly related to U.S.-Soviet relations and broader international problems as well. The U.S.S.R. and the U.S. were poles apart from the standpoint of their social structures, but the Soviet Government believed this should be no obstacle to the solution of outstanding questions, both those directly related to the U.S.-Soviet relations and other international problems. Briefly, this was the general course of Soviet policy, including the Soviet Union’s policy towards the U.S. He would appreciate it if the President would state his views on the prospects for development of U.S.-Soviet relations and on the possibilities for agreement on outstanding questions. In the view of the Soviet Government, this was a question of primordial importance; it was the question of questions.

The President observed that he had been President about a year. As he looked back over that year, he was pleased at the absence of any serious disagreements or differences between our two countries in their day-to-day work. Of course, our two countries had differences of opinion and we approached matters from a different standpoint. However, he believed there had been a feeling of interest, respect, and concern for our position, and we had also attempted to reciprocate. The President recalled his meeting with Mikoyan shortly after he had assumed the Presidency,³ and also said he had enjoyed the various meetings and conversations, both official and social, with Ambassador Dobrynin. After the change of leadership in the Soviet Union, he was glad to learn, through Ambassador Kohler, that there had been no change in Soviet policy and that the Soviet Union would pursue a policy aimed at maintaining peace in the world. He was glad to have received that expression from the new leaders. As he had told Mr. Mikoyan and as he had reiterated to Ambassador Dobrynin, the primary objective of this Administration was to live peacefully with the rest of the world. This was not the attitude just of the present Government, but also of the American people at large. In the November elections, the American people had clearly indicated that they wanted their government to pursue a policy aimed at maintaining peaceful relations with all. The American people had rejected a leadership that would have substituted power and force for reason and patience.

The President continued that in the period of the Democratic administrations, we had been encouraged by the progress made in some fields. Agreement had been reached on the hot line, on the Limited Test Ban, and the Consular Convention now pending before the Senate. Also, there had been reciprocal actions by the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. in cutting back the production of fissionable materials for weapons purposes, and substantial reductions had been made in our preparedness effort. We had observed with pleasure the desire of the Soviet Government to reduce its military budget. As far as we were concerned, in the brief period between 1964 and 1966, there would be a reduction in our military spending by some $2–3 billion; this was a substantial reduction, particularly if one took into account the military pay-raise, which obviously would not add to our military effort but would only make it easier for military personnel to acquire goods for their own use, such as housing, etc. Mr. McNamara’s plan provided for the closing of 566 military installations; just recently, he had announced the closing of 95 such installations. This trend towards economy caused hardships in certain areas, but generally speaking the American people were pleased with it.

The President then noted that he had tried, notwithstanding occasional failure, to understand some things he saw in the papers. He had tried to refrain from criticizing Soviet leaders personally, even though sometimes he read in the papers about their views on what he did in certain parts of the world. He simply took the papers home, showed them to his wife, and tried to forget, without replying. He did so because he sincerely believed that both of our countries wanted peace if they could only find it. They were like children hunting for Easter eggs, and it was important that both of them searched until they were found. Things would be all right if both of our countries showed patience and understanding and if they adhered to the principle of “do unto others as you would have them do unto you.”

Summarizing, the President said we wanted to do everything in order to improve U.S.-Soviet relations. He reiterated his pleasure at the hot line agreement, and said he was also pleased with the Exchange Program and the understandings reached in the field of outer space. He noted that he had received an excellent report from his Science Advisor, Dr. Hornig, who had been very well received in the Soviet Union and who had greatly enjoyed his discussions there. He had also received a good report from the U.S. businessmen who recently had visited the Soviet Union. Reiterating that the Consular Convention was pending in the Senate, the President also noted that the U.S.-Soviet Air Agreement was ready for signature; however, we didn’t want to kill the former by signing the latter prematurely. The President reiterated that the November elections clearly showed that the American people rejected the course advocated by Goldwater, a course which was opposed to the one the present Administration was following. Some people had said rather ugly things about Mr. McNamara in connection with his economy drive. But we believed that the American people at large supported the policies of the present Administration.

Mr. Gromyko thanked the President for his views and said he would convey them to the Soviet Government. He thought there were two main questions relating to the U.S.-Soviet relations. The first one was that of the arms race. Arms were constantly piling up; indeed, stockpiles were as high as the Mont Blanc. However, what was important was not only their quantity but also their destructive capability. The Soviet Government believed it would be important if both the U.S. and the U.S.S.R., as well as other countries, were to find a radical solution to the armaments problem. In such a case, all would gain-both the U.S. and U.S.S.R., and also the U.K., France, and others. Of course, this was a very complex problem and even if there was a will to resolve it, its solution would require time. Therefore, partial steps were needed. He did not wish to enumerate the individual steps which the Soviet Union believed would lessen tensions and facilitate disarmament, inasmuch as he had discussed them with the Secretary. However, he did want to draw the President’s attention to one area where the Soviet Union believed there was possibility of agreement. The Soviet Union believed that it should be possible to reduce U.S. and Soviet troops, as well as foreign troops generally, in Europe. Such a step would not be important from the standpoint of the existing correlation of forces since such correlation would remain unchanged; however, such a step would reduce tensions in Europe and in the world at large. Referring to the President’s remark about the closing of 95 bases, Mr. Gromyko said he wished to point out that one could close 95 obsolete bases and build two new ones which would be more powerful than all the 95 taken together. He thought this point only emphasized the importance of disarmament.

As to the President’s remark about some statements aimed at him personally, Mr. Gromyko said they were probably an incorrect interpretation by the American press. There had been no statements by Soviet leaders aimed at personalities; they spoke only in terms of the principles of policy. Mr. Gromyko then said he wished to turn to the European problem, and particularly the German question. However, perhaps the President might first wish to comment on the arms race problem.

The President noted that both sides had had a great number of discussions about disarmament and had submitted their respective proposals at various times. He said only today he had suggested to the Secretary that the Soviet December 7 statement on disarmament⁴ be fully explored in order to see whether it contained any hope of agreement. Earlier this year, the President continued, he had made a statement expounding the views of our Government on the subject of disarmament. He hoped progress could be made in this area. We were particularly concerned about the problem of non-proliferation. He had spent the past two or three days discussing this very problem; namely, how to keep nuclear weapons from getting into the hands of others. As to the bases we were closing, they were not essential to the state of preparedness we believed was required, and we would save the salaries of 50,000–60,000 men who would be released as a result of that action. The President reiterated his pleasure at our intended reduction in military spending by $2–3 billion between 1964 and 1966, and at the Soviet-announced cut of 500 million rubles in their upcoming military budget. He said the U.S. would be willing to consider any suggestions regarding disarmament and repeated that we would evaluate the Soviet December 7 disarmament statement with a view to fully exploring the possibilities for agreement, if there were any.

Regarding the remarks made about him personally, he did not mean that there had been comments about his height or looks, but he did wish to stress the desirability of not questioning the motives of other governments and of knowing what one was talking about. We had always refrained from questioning the motives of the other side and we believed this was better for our relations.

The President then stressed the concern we had about the nuclear explosion conducted by the Chinese Communists. He said we were anxious to avoid a situation where others might follow in the footsteps of the Chinese. We were doing all we could to discourage others from embarking upon a nuclear weapons program.

Mr. Gromyko said that since the President had stated the U.S. Government’s support for disarmament and non-proliferation, he wished to state that it was the Soviet Government’s firm position to do everything to facilitate disarmament and to prevent proliferation.

Turning to Europe, Mr. Gromyko said World War II had left behind it a very complex situation. The Soviet Union did not regret the results of the War. Both of our countries had been on the same side of the barricades in World War II, and it was as a result of their joint struggle that Nazi Germany had been forced to its knees. However, now the situation was different. In the light of past experience, the Soviet Union wanted to create a situation in Europe where no seeds of a new world war could be sown. Thus, the Soviet Union believed it to be most important for the U.S., the U.S.S.R., and the other states concerned to draw a line under World War II and to have a German peace settlement on the basis of the situation which exists as a result of that war. That would be in the interest of both of our countries.

Mr. Gromyko said that the second point he wished to make was related to non-dissemination and to the general situation in Europe as well. The Soviet Union saw a great danger in the plans for providing the FRG with access to nuclear weapons. The Soviet Union was not concerned over this because the existing correlation of forces would change. The FRG would not become stronger as a result of the implementation of those plans, but the possibilities for provocation by the Germans would greatly increase and the situation in Europe would become much more acute. He continued that the Soviet Union would welcome it if common language could be found on a German peace settlement and on the question of non-proliferation. He wondered whether the President could state his views on these points, noting that he had another brief point to raise later.

The President reiterated that we were greatly concerned about the fact that the Chinese had developed and exploded their nuclear device, and that we wanted to do everything possible to prevent any other power from following the Chinese example. We realized that the more nations possessed nuclear weapons, the greater the danger, and we would not do anything which would increase that capacity. The U.K. now wished to minimize its effort in the nuclear weapons field, and we did not want to stimulate the Germans to exercise the capacity we knew they could possess. The President said he had tried to be very patient during his service as President, and we now had the U.K. discussing the problem with the Germans rather than Uncle Sam having to indicate any particular conduct. Of course, there were some who wanted to encourage the Germans to build up their own capacity. We were trying to counter this because we saw what happened in China. Thus, Mr. Gromyko could be sure that we were genuine and sincere in our attempts to keep nuclear weapons from spreading. We recognized the tremendous power the Soviet Union had, and we also recognized our own tremendous power. We were not anxious at all to see the number of nuclear powers increase. He assured Mr. Gromyko that we did not want to encourage the proliferation process. The President said he was happy that both sides now seemed to be in agreement as to the importance of non-proliferation, and his people would be encouraged by what Mr. Gromyko had said on this point. As to Germany, we would be glad to receive any new ideas the Soviet Union might have on the German problem. Of course, we were familiar with the standing Soviet position that both German states should be recognized. The President said he did not believe much progress could be made on that basis. If the Soviet Union had any new ideas, he would ask the Secretary to stop traveling all over the world and get busy studying them.

Reverting to non-proliferation, the President said we did not have in mind to give the Germans nuclear technology or to encourage nuclear aspirations in any other way. What we were trying to do was to deter them from seeking an independent capability and to forestall any pressures that might develop in that direction. The U.K. was now prepared to give up its independent capability and to get out of the picture; what we wanted to do was to prevent the Germans from getting into the picture. In this effort, we needed Soviet encouragement and maybe even their prayers. For, as frequently is the case in negotiations, we were not in complete agreement with our partners in the course of the past two days’ discussions. The pressure for an independent nuclear capability in Germany was not strong today, but it could become so quickly in the absence of our leadership.

Mr. Gromyko commented that while it was true that both sides said they were in favor of non-proliferation, they were in agreement only in theory and their actions were in different directions. The President had said the Germans might follow the Chinese example; however, the Soviet Union was providing an alternative, namely, a broad non-proliferation agreement. As to new ideas on the German problem, Mr. Gromyko said that if the exchange of views on the German problem continued, he did not exclude the possibility of the Soviet Union’s putting forward new considerations on some points, particularly on the question of the Western forces in West Berlin.

The Secretary remarked that he would have discussions with his colleagues shortly and that he would be in touch with the Soviet side.

Mr. Gromyko then said he wished to comment on the situation in the Caribbean. He said the Soviet Union did not want to cast any doubt on the President’s statement that nothing would be done with respect to Cuba and that Cuban internal questions should be decided by the Cubans themselves. Neither did the Soviet Union question the President’s attitude towards the understanding reached by the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. on the Cuban question. However, on behalf of the Soviet Government, he did want to draw the President’s attention to the fact that the situation in that area was not normal and that provocations continued there. The U.S. Government denied that it was associated with those events, but the Soviet Government believed that if the U.S. Government wanted to put an end to those provocations, they would cease. Another factor was that there was an actual economic blockade in effect in that area. All this complicated the situation and also indirectly-and he wished to repeat indirectly-complicated U.S.-Soviet relations. Mr. Gromyko said he wished to point out that the Cuban Government, and Fidel Castro personally, had on numerous occasions expressed a desire for good relations with the U.S., something the Soviet Union would only welcome. Consequently, the ball was now in the U.S. court. Mr. Gromyko said he was drawing the President’s attention to all this in the sincere hope that the U.S. Government would take steps to improve its relations with Cuba.

The Secretary noted that the President had an engagement in a few minutes and that there might not be enough time to discuss thoroughly this complex problem here and now. He suggested that, if this was agreeable to Mr. Gromyko, Ambassador Dobrynin and he discuss this matter at a later date. He pointed out, however, that we were greatly concerned by Cuban actions and that concern had also been expressed at the July meeting of the Foreign Ministers. As far as we were concerned, we had repeatedly expressed our interest in peace in the Caribbean area, but that was something that depended on all sides.

The President agreed that in view of the limited time available, it would not be possible to discuss this problem in sufficient detail at this time. If he were to go into detail as regards Cuban activities directed against other countries, he would keep seventy freshman Congressmen waiting for a full hour. He stressed, however, that we had no aggressive designs with respect to Cuba and that he wished the same were true the other way around.

The meeting ended at 6:30 p.m.

1. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, USSR, Gromyko Conversations, Vol. I. Confidential. Drafted by Akalovsky and approved in S on December 15 and by the White House on December 16. The conversation took place at the White House.
2. At a luncheon at the Soviet Embassy at 1 p.m. on December 9, Rusk and Gromyko discussed the Soviet Embassy building in Washington, the MLF, disarmament, Germany, Southeast Asia, U.S.-Soviet trade, and Article 19 of the UN Charter. Memoranda of these conversations are in National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Secretary’s Memoranda of Conversation: Lot 65 D 330. For the memorandum on Southeast Asia, see Foreign Relations, 1964–1968, vol. I, Document 443; the memorandum on Germany is ibid., vol. XV, Document 74.
3. See ibid., 1961–1963, vol. V, Document 381.
4. For text, see Documents on Disarmament, 1964, pp. 509–517.