Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XIV, Soviet Union

77. Action Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs (Tyler) to the Ambassador at Large (Thompson)¹

Washington, December 4, 1964.

SUBJECT

• US-Soviet Exchanges-Soviet Political, Economic, and Military Leaders

With the advent of a new regime in the USSR and the completion of our own elections, it would appear particularly timely to seek methods of increasing the political impact of our efforts through the exchange program with the USSR. It is too early to be certain that the new Soviet leaders will, as they claim, continue on their present course. However, on the basis of their statements, the outlook for more significant exchanges now seems somewhat improved.

While we can look with satisfaction at the number of Soviet technicians, cultural figures and agricultural specialists who have visited the United States, a striking gap in our efforts to open up the USSR exists in the lack of visits by Soviet political, economic and military leaders to this country. We consider it is highly desirable to move now to fill this gap. We would hope to thus achieve a better appreciation by Soviet political, economic, and military leaders of United States strength and provide them with a firsthand comprehension of the dimensions of the problem which they face in the pursuit of a basically hostile policy toward us. At the same time we would seek to portray to them the benefits of genuine peaceful coexistence and even cooperation.

In the post-election period we assume that domestic American receptivity to the types of visits we are proposing is enhanced not only by the completion of the election, but also by a record of several months in which the Soviets have behaved with relative restraint.

In general terms we recommend preparing a program specifically designed to bring to the United States as many members of the Central Committee as possible, and a cross section of top level and second echelon Soviet military and economic officials. It would, of course, be necessary to bring Central Committee members in some capacity other than their Communist Party position. Since most of them have dual roles this may be accomplished under programs such as those listed below as well as others which would be suggested from an examination of the CC membership in detail. While the exchanges program is the most obvious vehicle for such an endeavor, a number of extra-agreement programs might be considered and some traditional taboos within the exchanges program might be reconsidered. The following examples are illustrative of what we have in mind:

Political Exchanges

1. Parliamentary Exchange. We have long resisted any exchange between Congress and the Supreme Soviet on the basis that the two bodies are not equivalent. It has been assumed that Congress would object strenuously to any such exchange. However, we have had several indications in recent years that many Congressmen, if not most, would not oppose such exchanges. The Soviets of course have assiduously sought to establish exchanges of this sort. If a review of the question with selected Congressional leaders shows general support for such an exchange, it would provide broad opportunities to bring a large number of present and potential Soviet leaders to the United States. In such an effort the Inter-Parliamentary Union might prove useful.

2. Trade Union Exchanges. This also is a category which we have avoided because of reluctance to accept the Soviet trade unions as a genuine labor movement and the possible complication of our efforts to promote the ICFTU. Our position has also been in deference to the hostility of most American trade union leaders to the Soviet trade union movement. The Soviets have persistently attempted to develop exchanges in this field. It would seem to be worthwhile to discuss this question with American trade union leaders and urge them to reconsider their opposition to controlled exchanges on the grounds that it would expose important Soviet leaders to the power of United States and our democratic trade unions. It has been amply demonstrated that American union officials are well equipped to out-argue Soviet visitors and present the United States point of view with impressive conviction. Dealing with individual Soviet unioners certainly need not amount to endorsement of the WFTU at the expense of the ICFTU.

3. Information Leaders. While a number of prominent Soviet journalists including Adzhubei have visited the United States, we have so far only skimmed the barrel in this field. We would recommend that, with the cooperation of RSB, we single out present and potential Soviet leaders in the field and through devices such as regional and city publishers and editors exchanges, get as many of them as possible to the United States.

4. Local and Provincial Government Leaders. A careful analysis of the paths to top-level political authority in the USSR would probably indicate that tomorrow’s Presidium members are today’s provincial leaders. Because of the barrier posed by the Communist apparat as opposed to the governmental track of authority, it may often be difficult to define the actual seat of power in such a way that we can get at such people and arrange their participation in exchanges trips. However, one promising vehicle would be to exploit mayor to mayor, governor to governor, pairings. This type of exchange has often been approached with legitimate tenderness because of presumed domestic political back-lash. It would seem that careful selection and proper persuasive briefing could reduce this to a marginal problem, and permit us to exploit Soviet interest in such contacts.

5. Review Present Programs. A few Central Committee members have already visited the United States under functional programs. An analysis of the Central Committee membership would in many instances provide functional and professional interests of the members. This in turn would enable us to attempt to get them to the United States under professional or technical exchange auspices.

6. Economic Leader Exchanges. A reverse Business International Conference is only one of many possible techniques for attracting top-level Soviet economic figures.

Military Visits

Plans have already been made for a Soviet military delegation to visit the United States early next year in exchange for our latest National War College trip to the Soviet Union. We also “owe” Marshal Vershinin a visit in exchange for General Twining’s 1956 trip to the USSR. Beyond that, we consider that a number of possibilities exist to bring significant numbers of Soviet officers to the United States under a program deliberately designed to exploit exchanges and other devices to achieve this end. Such things as Civil War centennials, military athletic contests, space launchings, and military academy functions could be considered. Finally the oft proposed Red Army Chorus visit might also prove appropriate (in exchange for an appropriate American feature) within this context.

In all these programs two important restraining factors obviously have to be kept in mind. First, if handled with too much publicity or in too grand a fashion, suspicion would inevitably develop. Thus the broad outlines of the program would perhaps better remain veiled. Timing would also be a critical factor. Too much at once-too many visits within too short a time, obviously would increase the possibility of the programs being misunderstood. As a general rule of thumb it would seem desirable to avoid drawing attention to the fact that a program as such is involved. Secondly, it would be essential to clear individual aspects, if not the overall design, with our interested allies. This is particularly true of military projects. Since discussion of a project in general terms would raise the possibility of publicity through leaks and the very domestic hostility which we seek to avoid, allied interests would probably be best handled on a case by case basis. A purely bilateral coloration should be avoided as far as possible to reduce the possibility of misinterpretation. However, even though a certain amount of criticism would inevitably develop, we are convinced that the potential gains to primary United States objectives are clearly overriding.

Recommendation:

If you agree, SOV together with SES will undertake discussion of these objectives with appropriate DOD, CU and USIA offices. We will also review these ideas with RSB and elicit their assistance in preparing a study of areas and individuals suitable for attention. SES has seen this memo and agrees with its objectives. They do have, however, certain reservations about a few of the specific proposals.²

1. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, S/AL Files: Lot 67 D 2, Staff Memos. Secret. Drafted by Jenkins on December 3 and cleared by Henry, Jones, and USIA.
2. On December 5 Thompson replied saying that he thought it would be a good idea to expand exchanges at that time. However, he expressed reservations about both the trade union and military exchanges and suggested that an exchange allowing the Soviet Union to see the role of regulatory agencies in the United States and the placing of a Russian-speaking American in a Soviet factory would be valuable. (Ibid.)