Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XIV, Soviet Union

79. Memorandum for the Record¹

Washington, December 12, 1964, 1:15–1:55 p.m.

SUBJECT

• Discussion with the President on Saturday, 12 December

In addition to personal matters, covered in a separate memo,² the following subjects were discussed:

[Here follows material on the Congo and foreign aid.]

2. I told the President we had completed our series of estimates of Soviet Military Posture³ and I had concluded the Soviets were pursuing a dynamic military program and seem to be oriented more toward quality improvements in their offensive and defensive capabilities as contrasted with quantitative conditions. I said this did not imply a crash program but we saw no evidence that their program was being cut back, diminishing, or resources diverted from the military to private sectors. I said I viewed with considerable suspicion Kosygin’s statement about a reduction in budget for 1965 and 1966 and noted that their military expenditures could easily be hidden in other segments of the budget. At this point I said we had noted a continual construction of plutonium-producing reactors and the continual expansion of U–235 facilities, despite Khrushchev’s commitment of January, 1964 to cut back. The President asked about the two reactors on which construction was reportedly stopped and I said this was very possibly the dual purpose reactors now obsolete which were displayed in Geneva in 1958 and were to be built at Tomsk in Siberia. I said it was very possible the construction of these two reactors had been halted, but we knew the construction was proceeding on more modern and more efficiently designed reactors.

The President asked if my remarks implied a criticism of our policies and a recommendation that they should be reviewed. I said that I had none but that I had not studied our own program in detail, except for the stockpile availability of plutonium and U-235. With respect to these materials, I had concluded that our resources would vastly exceed the Soviet Union’s by 1970 even though we cut back our program and they did not cut back their’s. Furthermore, I felt we had more than enough to meet our military requirements and had advocated a cut back when I was Chairman of the AEC in 1960. With respect to our overall program, we must be alert to possible breakthroughs in delivery systems and in Air Defense.

3. The President raised the question of South Vietnam and I responded that the actions he approved were being taken and I would prefer he receive reports through appropriate channels.

4. The President expressed satisfaction with the intelligence reporting.

1. Source: Central Intelligence Agency, DCI (McCone) Files: Job 80–B01285A, DCI Meetings with the President. Secret; Eyes Only. Drafted by McCone) on December 17. The time of the meeting is from the President’s Daily Diary. (Johnson Library)
2. Not found.
3. The summary and conclusions of NIE 11–8–64, “Soviet Capabilities for Strategic Attack,” October 8, and the conclusions of NIE 11–3–64, “Soviet Air and Missile Defense Capabilities through Mid-1970,” December 16, are scheduled for publication in Foreign Relations, 1964–1968, volume X.