Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XIV, Soviet Union

57. Telegram From the Embassy in the Soviet Union to the Department of State¹

Moscow, October 17, 1964, 8 p.m.

1176. Embtel 1148.² While we believe our initial analysis of Khrushchev’s downfall remains essentially valid, some refinement, as result further reflection and on basis additional indicators—especially today’s Pravda leader—now seems warranted.

With new team moving to establish itself we are seeing beginnings of exposition of its position, from which it possible to read something of anatomy of change which has occurred.

As key statement thus far, Pravda leader serves general function of assuring Soviet population and other readers of legitimacy of new leadership and of essential continuity of national policies and goals. This is, in a sense, paralleled by statements Soviet Ambassadors in West are now making to host governments concerning continuity of policy. We would suspect that new leadership is in communication as well with bloc leaders—particularly on matters of direct bloc significance and interest.

Burden of Pravda leader lies in strong if general assertion of main line of party in classical terms with emphasis on continuity of drive toward Leninist goals, with people, party and collective leadership moving together. In this connection, we are struck by renewal of reference, along with 20th and 22nd, to Twenty-first Party Congress—still ignored as recently as previous day—possibly designed to show leadership as heirs to entire range of recent party decisions. Tone of declaratory portions of statement is exhortatory and includes call for solidarity which, however, in less strident terms than previous such appeals and may imply confidence that its position and control established.

Beyond thematic function, statement bears on number of policy areas to shed some light on line or tactics of new leadership:

1. Foreign policy statement essentially repeats previous coexistence line, with inclusion of references to strengthening defense potential of USSR and safeguarding integrity of frontiers. This not only calculated to reassure Soviet military and dissuade any who might contemplate attempt exploit change but should give pause to speculation that strategy, as opposed to tactics, toward Chinese may be shifting. At same time, reference to safeguarding security of entire socialist community, while not new, is reminder to Chinese and world at large that Soviet commitment remains valid.

2. Position statement on international Communist conference stands almost alone in Pravda leader as explicit expression of policy on specific issue. This quick declaration seems clearly to demonstrate urgency and fundamental importance of issue as factor in leadership change.

Declaration on conference noteworthy for (1) silence on preparatory meeting (2) reference to universality of attendance and (3) broadened catalogue of aims, which should make it acceptable to all including Italians, Rumanians, and possibly Chinese.

There is no hint—and we believe it would be basic mistake to read signs—to shift in strategy on or lines of policy on Chinese issue. What statement does is to open options to new leadership which Khrushchev’s actions had foreclosed. Above and beyond fact that he personally, as Chinese devil, represented bar to any cooling of dispute, series of Soviet actions had left little choice to forcing December 15th meeting in spite almost inevitable failure to achieve declared Soviet purpose. Recent protestations new statement opens possibility that leadership can (1) leave schedule as it presently stands pending reaction from other parties and make renewed private appeal to all parties to attend upcoming meetings with special efforts to placate Rumanians, Cubans, Indonesians, Vietnamese etc. or (2) use Khrushchev’s removal as excuse to postpone conference till more propitious time or, conceivably decide to drop whole idea as Khrushchev mistake. Publication today of resolution adopted by French CP plenum October 9 and 10, would tend to suggest that for time being new leadership favoring first option.

Key, however, lies in very fact that options are now available along with greater possibilities to repair relations with bloc and other major parties, while gaining breathing space to deal with underlying and continuing power struggle with Peiping.

3. Treatment of Khrushchev’s faults could relate primarily to economic-administrative problems. It appears likely that some Khrushchevian economic policy or perhaps even specific economic-administrative proposition may have been important factor in formation of a coalition against him. Possible that such proposal or policy may have been advanced by Khrushchev or discussed at length at the recent mysterious meeting of the Presidium, Council of Ministers and top party and economic leaders of the country reported Embtel 957.³

It would be in keeping with Khrushchev’s character and past performance on economic-administrative matters to have thought up some sweeping radical reorganization of economic management or shift in emphasis of allocation of resources and to have aired it at the enlarged economic meeting or sometime before as something he intended to accomplish at the November plenum. This proposal might have been so radical, at least it might have threatened to gore so many oxen that it facilitated organization of anti-Khrushchev coalition of power in Central Committee during Khrushchev’s absence on vacation almost immediately after meeting.

While a drastic Khrushchevian administrative proposal might have been averted, there is some indication that conservatives may have opposed his “consumer oriented” line. In this connection, absence in the Pravda October 17 editorial of any references to individual or consumer welfare which have been Khrushchevian stock phrases may be significant. Only positive economic references may be read as reminders of the grim slogans of an earlier period: construction of material-technical basis of communism inseparably linked to Communist education (as opposed to material incentives); and the emphasis is on sacrifice and achievements of labor and the construction of new enterprises. On other hand, conservative emphasis may simply reflect the closing of ranks on most hallowed traditional party grounds as immediate aftermath of palace coup and that the initial conservatism may soon give way. This latter thesis would seem to be supported by Kosygin’s personal identification with consumption sector and light industry.

Quick and vigorous attack on Khrushchev (which adds some new words to lexicon of denunciations) erases any doubt that new leaders determined to destroy him and use alleged sins to help justify shifting tactics and explain away continuing difficulties over which they may trip. It is surely opening gun in effort to undermine his personal popularity and justify removal to population, which particularly necessary if no conspicuous changes or improvements become apparent to them. Mirrored against the action taken against Khrushchev, words of condemnation seem to support conclusion (reftel) as to origins and causes. Along with other indications discussed above, these bring us again to see his removal as triggered by complex of factors of which struggle with Chinese and difficulties with bloc and world CP movement on one hand, and internal economic problems and issues on other hand, predominant. Concern over other failures or blunders and irritation over Khrushchevian tactics and behavior played additional role of greater or lesser importance to the various former colleagues who brought him down.

Kohler

1. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, POL 15 USSR. Confidential; Priority. Repeated to Bonn, London, and Paris.
2. Document 52.
3. Dated October 2. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, POL 12 USSR)