Office of the Historian

56. Memorandum From David Klein of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy)1

Washington, October 16, 1964.

McGB—

SUBJECT

  • The Changes in Moscow

For what it is worth, this is my view of the Soviet scenario.

(1)
I am struck by the coincidence of the overthrow of Nikita with the Chinese test and more particularly, the French Communist Party’s declaration of independence.
(2)
I think Ambassador Kohler was right in his message this morning pointing out Nikita’s lack of success in handling major issues.2 But a theme that seems to dominate the others is the Chinese-Soviet split with the consequent problems raised not only in Moscow and the satellites, but also reaching deep into the Communist Parties outside the bloc. The problem is clearly a festering one and continuing along this Khrushchevian course, it is conceivable that the hierarchy felt that the situation was certain to worsen.
(3)
This suggests at least two possible alternatives. A decision to try to paper over the problem with Peking and thereby attempt to slow down the deterioration; or a decision to bring the problem to rapid decision, letting the chips fall where they may, but ending the uncertainty and consequent confusion and conflict.
(4)
In either circumstance, it is not difficult to postulate the hierarchy’s need to eliminate Nikita. If the papering over course was to be followed—and this will be tested by what the new regime does or does not do about the forthcoming December meeting—then Nikita had to be replaced by a leadership more palatable to Peking.
(5)
On the other hand, if the decision is to break quickly and cleanly with Peking, Nikita’s tactics were unsuitable and new hands and leadership were needed.
(6)
Significant in all this is the new government’s attempt to reassure other governments (Western governments) of Soviet intentions to continue on the Khrushchevian course of peaceful co-existence. If [Page 132] Moscow enters a more serious stage of conflict with Peking, then there is a need to batten down the hatches. This perhaps would also be true if Moscow wanted to try papering over its problems with Peking. But in the latter contingency Moscow has to be ambidextrous for peaceful co-existence with the West is not compatible with Moscow-Peking cooperation.
(7)
In any event, it is clear that for the moment we are going to see a slow down in Soviet diplomacy, at least as far as East-West relations are concerned, until the government shakes itself down and the leadership takes hold.
(8)
Over the longer term, two-headed leadership is improbable. It couldn’t work in this country, and is even less likely to work in the Soviet Union. It is only convenient during the interregnum when time is needed to establish leadership. At this juncture, the odds are in Brezhnev’s favor. He controls the important lever of power. However, the Soviet game also includes coalitions and divisions, and the shape of the possible coalitions is not clear. I would go slowly in suggesting that Podgorny is the most likely successor. He may be, but no one really knows.
(9)
From our viewpoint, it is important to indicate to the new government our intention to continue along the course we have been going. This is the only one that makes any sense and permits us to deal with the urgent and crucial issues facing both of us.
David Klein 3
  1. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, USSR, Vol. VI. Secret.↩
  2. Document 52.↩
  3. Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.↩