52. Telegram From the Embassy in the Soviet Union to the Department of State1

1148. We find it difficult believe that Khrushchev was removed from all party and govt responsibilities “for reasons of age and health” as announced by CC–CPSU tonight. Important to note that he was ousted not only from premiership and first secretaryship slot but also from membership in Presidium. Kozlov has been paralyzed and mentally ill for over a year and is still member of Presidium; Kuusinen retained his membership until his death at age of 83—far more advanced than Khrushchev’s 70. In any case, Khrushchev apparently was in good health—although perhaps not spirits—when Palewski saw him at Gagra two days ago. After that he returned by air to Moscow, arriving on the afternoon of the 13th. Presumably he would not have done this unless convoked personally to the Central Committee meeting on the 14th, since a really ill man’s “request to be relieved” could have been considered in his absence. Thus if there any “illness” involved it could not be any sudden crisis or deterioration, but something more chronic or slow-moving. This would not have required such precipitate action, embarrassing to the visit of the Cuban President and to the full exploitation of the “Voskhod” flight. We cannot therefore accept the published explanation.

It is also not credible that Khrushchev would have chosen willingly to retire from all leadership activity for any other “personal” reasons at a time when most of the foreign and bloc policies with which he is identified were such failures or are in such a mess that he must inevitably be made the scapegoat by any successors. His belligerent posture on Berlin in the 1958–60 period was an egregious failure; his Cuban venture of 1962 equally so. His economic and agricultural policies have paid few dividends and have, in the main, simply resulted in compounding the Soviets’ economic dilemma and in the process placed severe strains on Soviet resources. But, above all, his personal vendetta with Mao, with the attendant strain on Soviet relations with bloc parties, both in and out of power, has substantially weakened the world Communist movement and the Soviet role as its vanguard. Beyond this, Soviet posture has suffered from Khrushchev’s recent gaffes in his impromptu remarks to visiting delegations and journalists—particularly his flat statement that the Soviets would not withdraw from [Page 123] the UN regardless of the outcome of Article 19 issue. All of this must add up to a sorry record, indeed, in the eyes of his comrades.

It is, therefore, hard to escape the conclusion that Khrushchev has been jettisoned by his colleagues. Just why and how this occurred is far from clear at the moment. The keys would seem to lie mainly in the person of Brezhnev, whose ambitions Khrushchev has been obviously trying to frustrate and in the problem of the Sino-Soviet split—in what way and what proportions we cannot determine at this point.

At the moment we would not, as result of change in top command, expect any major change of policies except in area of Sino-Soviet dispute. We would guess that one of first results would be shift in tactics on conference issue closer to position held by PGI2 and Rumania.

In other major areas of foreign policy—particularly attitude toward US—we anticipate no basic change. In this connection, I am impressed in retrospect by tenor of remarks by Polyansky and Dymshits to me this evening at Afghan reception; both took considerable pains to impress upon me desirability continued improvement our bilateral relations after recovering from “shock” at initial exchange re “exciting news”—Embtel 1146.3

To complete narrative of evening’s developments, I should add that huge portrait of Khrushchev noted earlier on Hotel Moskva was removed shortly before midnight. Banners, slogans, and portraits of cosmonauts and Lenin—but none of other Soviet leaders, past or present, are now being erected in Red Square in anticipation of Saturday ceremonies honoring latest space heroes. Meanwhile, city is quiet and there is no evidence of unusual activity by crowds, police, or military.4

Kohler
  1. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, POL 15 USSR. Confidential; Flash. Received in the Department of State at 11:04 p.m. on October 15.
  2. Presumably a reference to the PCI (Partito Communista Italiana), the Italian Communist Party.
  3. Dated October 15 (9 p.m.), it reported that three usually reliable correspondents in Moscow had stated that Khrushchev had been “forced out” or “stepped down”. (Ibid., POL 15–1 USSR)
  4. Circular telegram 664, October 16, sent information and guidance on Khrushchev’s fall based on the Embassy’s reports to all U.S. posts. (Ibid.)