58. Memorandum From the Executive Secretary of the Department of State (Read) to the President’s Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy)1
SUBJECT
- Khrushchev’s Replacement: Significance for U.S.-Soviet Relations
We can only conjecture as to the significance for U.S.-Soviet relations until we have more solid information as to the circumstances and rationale of the event, and until we can observe the revised Soviet leadership in action.
It seems certain that Khrushchev has been forced out against his will. All indications thus far suggest an orderly transition of power to his top lieutenants and long-time associates, Brezhnev, Kosygin and Mikoyan. They probably will share their power with the other members of the Party Presidium for at least an interim period. Their new preeminence may be transitory.
Of the numerous problems which may have contributed to Khrushchev’s ouster the relatively most critical at the moment is, in the context of the Sino-Soviet dispute and the competition for influence in International Communism, Soviet relations with bloc parties and key parties outside the bloc. In the short term the new regime’s probable granting of priority to this problem above others argues for the continuance of Soviet policies directed at the gradual improvement of U.S.-Soviet relations or as a minimum the avoidance of actions which could severely strain those relations. On the other hand, we should expect no early major Soviet initiatives in U.S.-Soviet relations.
The foregoing assessment is consistent with what we know of the personalities and past actions of Brezhnev, Kosygin and Mikoyan. None of these politically sophisticated individuals is associated with inflexible Stalinist attitudes toward the United States. It must be noted, however, that we as yet have no measure of any alignments of forces within the Presidium which could condition their policy positions vis-á-vis the United States. Should there continue to be serious divergences of opinion within the top Party leadership contributing to an atmosphere [Page 137] of indecision, this would support the maintenance of the status quo in U.S.-Soviet relations.
- Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, USSR, Vol. VI. Confidential. No drafting information appears on the source text, but according to the Department of State copy it was drafted by Owen on October 16 and cleared by Davis and Thompson. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, POL 15–1 USSR)↩
- Hawthorne Mills signed for Read.↩