Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XIII, Western Europe Region

68. Letter From Secretary Rusk to Foreign Minister Schroeder¹

Washington, January 13, 1965.

Dear Gerhard:

Ambassador Knappstein will probably have reported to you the conversation we had on January 7 which touched, among other things, on the future of the MLF.² As I stressed to him, our views have not changed. However, because of the misinterpretation which appears to have gained currency on the United States position, I thought I should supplement my talk with the Ambassador with a direct message to you setting forth, as candidly as possible, the way we see the situation on the MLF at this juncture.

President Johnson believes that at this point in the development of plans for restructuring the nuclear organization of the Alliance, the United States should conduct itself so that what emerges will truly represent the views of the major potential European participants and cannot plausibly be challenged as resulting from United States pressure upon unwilling European allies.

Congressional and public support for an MLF will depend crucially upon the attitude of our principal allies and upon the question as to whether it would divide or strengthen the Alliance. We are prepared to move ahead without France, but I know that neither you nor we want to move ahead on a bilateral basis. Drawing Britain and Italy into the party becomes, therefore, quite important.

Unfortunately, indications as to the President’s position appear to have been viewed by some as meaning that there has been a fundamental shift in United States policy, if not a loss of interest on the part of the United States in the problems the MLF was designed to deal with. I can assure you this is not the case. On the contrary, I believe that our position reflects the logical continuity of the policy we have pursued.

We continue to attach great importance to the objectives which can be served by new nuclear arrangements in NATO: to strengthen and rationalize, on an Atlantic basis, the organization of the Alliance’s nuclear effort; to provide a means for the principal non-nuclear powers to share, in a significant and effective way, the responsibility for their own nuclear defense, and to do this in a way which does not contravene, but rather reinforces the principle of non-proliferation, which we feel is becoming ever more important.

In pursuing these ends, it is vital to find the means which meet the needs and aspirations of the greatest number, and particularly of the largest members of the Alliance. For some years, in response to Europe’s desire for a changed organization in the nuclear field, we have sought specific European suggestions for dealing with the nuclear problem. We ourselves suggested the MLF as one possible approach.

The British Government has now come up with an approach which we believe can, through negotiation, be accommodated to the principles we have been advocating in the MLF. In fact, in our view the ANF proposals can leave room for the MLF substantially as it was initially conceived. Moreover, a broader nuclear rearrangement, such as the British propose, introduces a new and important dimension in creating the possibility of the United Kingdom’s divesting itself of its independent nuclear deterrent—the first step which will ever have been taken away from the direction of proliferation. There are, certainly, unresolved problems raised by the British ideas, and the United States has set forth its comments on these in its December 8 paper.³ These comments continue to reflect United States views, and any report, rumor or impression on the contrary is untrue.

The United States strongly hopes that the discussions now in prospect, particularly between Germany and the United Kingdom, will provide a synthesis of views that will make it easier for us to move forward with an arrangement supported by the Federal Republic, as well as the United Kingdom, Italy, the Netherlands, and others. We have told the United Kingdom of the importance we attach to constructive forward movement and of the need for plans to be acceptable to the Federal Republic. While France may not agree to participate in the types of arrangements which are now under consideration, I think we all agree on the need for holding the door open for possible French cooperation with them.

As our European partners progress in exploring this subject, in discussions with which we shall be in closest contact, we can jointly decide how we should proceed with the best prospects for success. I want you to know we attach great importance to these discussions, and we very much hope they will be pursued purposefully and with appreciation of the importance of the stakes involved.

I hope these comments will help you as a background for the discussions you will be having with the British and Italians, which we see as preliminary to multilateral negotiations which should follow. While it will not seek to force a solution upon allies, it is important that you recognize that the United States is not at all neutral or aloof regarding these talks, and the significance of their successful outcome.⁴

At his press conference on January 16, President Johnson was asked about the status of the MLF. After briefly reviewing the ANF proposal put forward by the British in December, the President stated: “We have made clear to the participating governments that we think it is highly important to develop arrangements within the alliance that will provide an opportunity for the nonnuclear members to participate in their own nuclear defense while avoiding the spread of national nuclear systems.” He “strongly” hoped that progress would be made to “allow us to move on to fruitful multilateral discussions.” For the full transcript of the press conference, see Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Lyndon B. Johnson, 1965, Book I, pp. 54–60.

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF(MLF). Secret. The source text bears no drafting information, but the telegram sending a copy to Bonn for delivery to Schroeder was cleared by Ball and Bundy and initialed by Rusk. (Telegram 1955 to Bonn, January 13; ibid.) A similar letter was sent to British Foreign Secretary Gordon Walker on January 14. (Telegram 4338 to London; ibid., DEF(ANF)) On the same day, circular 1267 to the NATO capitals reiterated the substance of the U.S. position set forth in this letter. (Ibid.)
2. See footnote 5, Document 67.
3. Attachment to Document 61.
4. Printed from an unsigned copy. McGhee delivered the letter to Schroeder on January 15 and found him in a “grim mood.” Schroeder read the letter, stated that it was very useful, and expressed his satisfaction that the U.S. position had not changed from that stated in the December 8 paper. McGhee concluded that the letter was precisely what was required for Schroeder and could not have been better; however, part of the problem was public perception, and McGhee argued that the assurances made in the letter should be made public. (Telegram 2610 from Bonn, January 14; Department of State, Central Files, DEF(MLF))