Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XIII, Western Europe Region

61. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Washington, December 8, 1964, 4 p.m.

PARTICIPANTS

• The President
• The Secretary of State
• The Secretary of Defense
• The Under Secretary of State
• Ambassador David K. E. Bruce
• McGeorge Bundy
• William R. Tyler
• Richard E. Neustadt
• The British Prime Minister
• The Foreign Secretary
• The Defense Secretary
• Lord Harlech
• Sir Burke Trend
• Sir Harold Caccia

The Prime Minister opened the conversation by saying he had 19 points to raise in connection with the American paper and one general question to ask—was his assumption correct that the British paper² and the American paper entitled “Comments on the UK Proposal” (attached) were to be read together? (Secretary Rusk indicated that they could, but this would not imply a commitment by the US side.)

Then, referring to the American paper, he wondered whether the phrase at the bottom of page 1 to the effect “any future agreement must be acceptable to the alliance” implied a readiness to accept a French veto. (Mr. Bundy said this was not the case.)

On page 2, under the section on “Objectives”, he thought a third item should be added indicating that anything done in this context should not foreclose the possibility of an East-West detente.

The Prime Minister said the British would have to reserve their position on paragraph 3 c. dealing with the surface fleet.

He felt paragraph 3 d. lacked definition. Moreover, it was the British impression that the Nassau commitment required equal U.S. and U.K. contributions.

The British felt further discussion was needed of the permissive action links. The Prime Minister reserved the British position on the “eventual mixed-manning of submarines.”

He said the UK could not make a commitment to contribute manpower to the operation of a mixed-manned surface force and would have to reserve on paragraph 4 b.

The Prime Minister asked for a fuller explanation of the phrase “a partial substitute” for programmed U.S. forces in paragraph 4 c. (The British subsequently accepted “substitution for part of” as an unambiguous and understandable word.)

In connection with paragraph 4 d., he wondered about the firmness of the figure “not less than 200 missiles” and specifically how Blue Steel, V-bombers, and other British contributions might be counted against the total.

As for paragraph 4 e., the Prime Minister said the British were in agreement but this raised the question of maintaining national communication with the submarines in the event the force was dissolved. This problem clearly needed further discussion and understanding.

With reference to paragraph 5 on the possible contribution of U.S. strategic weapons he wondered which weapons the U.S. had in mind and whether the U.S. contribution would match the British.

He reserved Britain’s position on paragraph 7 dealing with command arrangements and the force’s NATO connection.

He said the British welcomed the first sentence of paragraph 8, but could not accept the second sentence. In their view, provision had to be made for a specific UK veto as well as a potential French veto. (Gordon Walker elaborated on this to say that however this was done, the countries having the veto had to be specifically named.)

The Prime Minister said he was unclear as to what was meant by “France” in paragraph 9 (which called for periodic meetings of defense ministers). If this were to take place in the multilateral force context, Britain, by having given up its independent deterrent, would be meeting France on unequal terms. This made no sense. The entire paragraph should be dropped. If the suggestions dealt with periodic defense ministers’ meetings outside the framework of the multilateral force, this would best be raised in another context.

The Prime Minister said he was not sure what the phrase “a unified Europe” in paragraph 10 meant. There was no precise definition of this. Definition was important because the British were against U.S. surrendering its veto to several things that might pass for a unified Europe. More specifically, how would this qualification be phrased without suggesting that the U.S. would sell off its share, and thus vitiate its veto.

In the last sentence of para. 10, the Prime Minister asked whether the words “new as of now” could be added to protect the British position. Without this qualification, the British might be placed in the category of a non-nuclear power at the time of the force’s dissolution. (Secretary Rusk agreed there was no problem here. He said the language was designed to prevent the establishment of new systems.)

In para. 11 a., the Prime Minister expressed uncertainty as to the meaning of the phrase “these matters.” He presumed this meant the totality of both the U.S. and UK documents and comments. (The Secretary agreed it did.)

And as for para. 11 b., he wanted the whole section deleted. As it now stood it put France above the UK.

Replying to the Prime Minister’s comments, the Secretary of State said that the proposed proviso concerning the possible frustration of an East-West deterrent had to be handled carefully. The multilateral force concept had to be dealt with in a context other than nonproliferation. The Soviets had to understand that this force could only be subject to the process of disarmament and could not be canceled out in a non-dissemination framework.

The Secretary went on to explain that the question of the numbers of missiles and possible substitutions had to mean specifically the submarine Polarises—not free-falling bombs. Mr. Bundy added that the UK paper seemed to make it clear that the subs would replace the V-bombers and therefore both the subs and the V-bombers could not be added together. The 200 had to be Polaris missiles.

Mr. McNamara agreed with the Prime Minister that direct national communication with the submarines was needed in the event of dissolution of the force. He assured the Prime Minister this and PAL could be handled so that the interests of the UK and the U.S. would be protected.

At this juncture British Defense Minister Healey turned the conversation to the Nassau communique, asserting that the U.S. had agreed to an equal contribution with the UK. Unless this were done, the UK contribution would be difficult to sell politically.

Replying to this, Secretary Ball said we had to be concerned with two concepts of equality—one with Germany which was essential and the other was equality with the U.S. which had to be brought into sensible focus. As for the Nassau commitment, Mr. Ball made the point that this present concept was far more ambitious than that envisaged at Nassau and therefore the Nassau communique could not be governing. Moreover, the U.S. was prepared to make a very substantial contribution to the surface fleet.

Joining the argument, Mr. McNamara added that one had to look at the Nassau components as linked parts—requiring the U.S. and UK to join the multilateral force, without specifying the contributions but making it clear that the input would be seaborne. The clear implication was there would be British participation in the multilateral arrangement—the mixed-manned element.

In connection with the same point, Mr. Bundy said there was a significant difference between the British problem and that of the U.S. The UK wanted to put its total strategic force in the hands of the Alliance. Therefore, it was to the British advantage to put the submarines into the new force. The British could put specific ships in with an irrevocable commitment. The U.S. could not follow suit and it was therefore not possible to insist upon an equal contribution. Since the ships involved would be a portion of the total U.S. force, the U.S. would have to be able to rotate them. The arrangement therefore must be asymmetrical. Moreover, the U.S. contribution to the force could not be part of an Anglo-American package; it had to be handled in a broader context.

Healey was prepared to accept this rationale. He added, however, a U.S. contribution of submarines to the force should be equal to the British even though the terms of the assignment might be different.

At this point the Prime Minister made some comments about the Nassau meeting generally, saying it was hastily and badly done. This time he hoped the nuclear issues were being handled more sensibly and perhaps the services of Neustadt would not be called for again.

Going on to a discussion of voting arrangements, the Prime Minister made the point that the right of decision to fire the force was also the right of decision not to fire the force. Gordon Walker seized this opportunity again to explain the difference between nuclear and nonnuclear members of the force and to insist the British did not want to be locked into a European veto but had to have a veto all their own.

This caused Mr. Ball to ask whether the British were not thereby denying German equality.

Healey, ignoring this point, went on to stress that the nuclear powers had to retain their vetoes, otherwise nuclear proliferation would take place.

Secretary Rusk ended this part of the discussion by saying that this problem of how the Europeans organized themselves had to be dealt with on the other side of the Atlantic between the British and the other Europeans.

This brought the discussion back to paragraph 9 with Gordon Walker reiterating that the American proposal tended to give France a political advantage over the UK.

Mr. Bundy denied this and asked rhetorically whether the British were prepared to accept a breakdown of communication with France. And after some more remarks by the British Foreign Secretary, the Prime Minister said this particular problem could be resolved by dropping the paragraph entirely.

Returning to the definition of a unified Europe, as used in paragraph 10, Gordon Walker reiterated it could be anything, including Fouchet’s version—and if this were the case, the question of a European force without a U.S. veto was absolutely out of the question.

Under Secretary Ball denied there was any fuzziness about the concept of a unified Europe. In political terms it meant the delegations of authority to a single political executive empowered to make decisions of peace and war. To deny that we would never give up the veto would imply we were against the unification of Europe and play directly into the hands of the Gaullists. The U.S. could not promise that it would retain its veto forever. It could make it clear that without a veto it would have no interest in maintaining its share of the force and feel free to withdraw its umbrella. (This pleased Gordon Walker and he said so.)

The Prime Minister agreed Mr. Ball’s point was most important, and added that the establishment of a new nuclear power via the European route was intolerable.

Secretary Ball reiterated if the European force went European it would have to do so without U.S. warheads. But the important point was that we had to be responsive to the honorable and responsible Europeans.

Secretary Rusk reminded the Prime Minister that this problem was already with us. France was a nuclear power without the U.S. or UK veto. And Mr. Bundy added we clearly would not have sovereign power over such nations; all we could do was make their enterprises more difficult.

Healey said he had no problem with this point so long as the ideas just exchanged were properly spelled out.

Turning to the German aspects of the case, Gordon Walker asked whether the Americans could not tell the Germans that the U.S. was not partial to any particular version of the multilateral force so that an honest German reaction to the surface fleet might be elicited.

The Secretary replied the long history of the concept made it impossible to say at this juncture that specifics made no difference to the U.S. It was too far along for that. However, the U.S. had no objections to the British discussing this matter frankly with the Germans.

Amplifying the Secretary’s remarks, Mr. Ball said that the surface fleet had a number of purposes and to say that the U.S. was now indifferent would be tantamount to asserting that the conclusions reached over a long time were being disregarded. There was no question that the German views should be based on their needs and not on our desires. But there was no reason to believe their views as given to us were not so based.

In this connection Mr. Bundy stressed the importance of giving the Germans a sense of the discussions taking place here in Washington so they could make sensible judgment about the concept and their commitment to it.

Healey interjected to say that the past proposals had been acceptable only to the Germans. The new proposals would add the UK to the group of supporters. Indeed, this might well bring others along. Therefore, when these discussions are reported to the Germans, some sympathy should be shown to the UK proposals for, in fact, it is important the UK needs be met along with the German needs.

Mr. Ball said the Germans really did not have many options. The alternatives to the mixed-manned surface force were the MRBMs which had been ruled and the Minutemen which had been ruled out. So were the submarines. Therefore, their only alternatives were ships and V-bombers. And the clear fact was that the V-bombers were obsolescent.

Healey then insisted that it was difficult for Britain to participate in a surface fleet. Therefore, it was important to be sure that British participation was an essential German requirement and not merely something the Germans were stressing because they thought the Americans wanted it.

Mr. Bundy said he could understand the British political problem, especially given the positions taken by the Labor Party when it was in opposition. But it was difficult for him to conceive that Britain, the “mother of sea power” could not recruit 100 technicians for the mixed-manned force.

The Prime Minister took time out to say that the mixed-manned surface fleet issue could bring the Labor Government down. Even though the Tory Government had given equivocal support to this concept, the Tories were now ready to bring the Labor Government down on this issue. Therefore, the U.S. position was most important and the British attitude toward the force would be governed by the permanence of the American veto.

Secretary Rusk reemphasized the need for a clear British exchange with the Germans. And the Prime Minister, picking up this point, said there ought not to be any impression anywhere of an Anglo-American fix.

The Prime Minister then changed the line of discussion and told the President that he expected to have a problem with this broader issue next week when there would be a parliamentary debate on foreign and defense policy. (In passing, he commented caustically about the debate the Tories forced on him on the eve of his Washington trip.) He expected the talk to be rough, but promised to stand by the communique and “not to put a gloss on it.”³ He assured the President his statement of the American position would be the same as that in the communique. But he also wanted to be able to discuss the British document handed over the previous day and wondered whether this would cause a problem.

The Secretary of State said he thought it could, because it was difficult to debate publicly issues being discussed privately.

The Prime Minister noted he would feel compelled to spell out some of the points covered in the communique and the Foreign Secretary added that the government would almost certainly be forced to discuss the U.S. veto.

Mr. Bundy felt suitable language could be found. He thought this might be workable if the Prime Minister checked his proposed language with us before he used it in parliament.

Saying he was thinking out loud, the Prime Minister told the President he would tell the Commons where the UK Government stood; that it had presented a comprehensive proposal; that he would stand on his earlier statements on the surface fleet and non-proliferation; but that he would emphasize that the problem was under discussion with the allies, and the British participation in the mixed-manned force was being reserved. He would also have to spell out the new British proposal but in his presentation would play down negative aspects and stick to the communique in describing the U.S. position. In any event, he would explain that all these proposals were subject to allied decision.

There was a clear understanding at the end of this discussion that the Prime Minister would have his proposed language on this matter, particularly that dealing with the U.S. veto, cleared with the U.S. before he went before the Commons.

[Here follow 2 pages of discussion on Vietnam.]

Attachment⁴

Washington, December 8, 1964.

U.S. COMMENTS ON THE UK PROPOSAL OF A PROJECT FORAN ATLANTIC NUCLEAR FORCE

1. Preamble

After review of our own views and those of our allies, and after particular consideration of the proposals of HMG for an Atlantic nuclear force, we offer the following comments relating to the establishment of such a force. These comments are designed to take account both of the extended discussions which have occurred since 1962 and of the new proposals of HMG.

We believe that any successful plan must be responsive to the real requirements of as many members of the Alliance as possible. In this spirit, we emphasize that these suggestions are subject to discussion and revision in the light of the comments which will be sought from other interested governments.

As the President and the Prime Minister have agreed from the beginning of these discussions, no agreements or commitments are being made in this first exchange of views. Moreover, the issues before us extend far beyond the interests of our two nations alone, and any future agreement must be acceptable to the Alliance.

2. Objectives

We believe that any new arrangement of nuclear forces of NATO must meet the following objectives:

a. To deter nuclear proliferation by making it possible for non-nuclear members of the Atlantic Alliance to participate in the ownership, management and control of NATO’s nuclear forces through collective action and without the creation of new independent national nuclear systems.

b. To strengthen the unity of the Alliance by providing for systematic and greatly increased collaboration and consultation in the nuclear field.

3. Specific Comments on the UK’s Proposed Force

We believe that it would be appropriate to have discussions with other interested NATO governments of a concept of an Atlantic nuclear force which might have the following components:

a. Three or four Polaris submarines to be transferred to the force by the British Government.

b. Such elements of the British V-bomber force as HMG is prepared to contribute.

c. A Polaris surface fleet having substantially the characteristics—if not the size—of that contemplated in the discussions of the working group in Paris. This force should have a size adequate to the needs and interests of non-nuclear powers which wish to participate in it, but we are prepared to discuss reductions from the initial proposals in the light of other contributions now in contemplation.

d. Such strategic nuclear forces as the United States or France might be prepared to subscribe.

4. Characteristics of the Force

a. We consider it essential that all elements of the force be under a common command and control arrangement, including permissive action links. While the Polaris submarines could be organized at least initially on a basis of national manning, the eventual mixed-manning of submarines should not be precluded if subsequent studies indicate its feasibility and desirability.

b. We also consider it essential to the success of this proposal that there should be a substantial UK contribution of manpower for the operation of the mixed-manned surface force, in order to insure that this arrangement commands the confidence of other participants.

c. Creation of this force should be conceived not as an addition to strategic forces that would otherwise be provided, but as a partial substitute, since it is the current expectation that presently programmed US forces will be appropriately reduced as the new force comes into being.

d. We believe that the new force, whatever its eventual components, should have a strength of not less than 200 missiles.

e. All the weapons systems transferred to the ANF would be committed for the life of the force. In the event of dissolution of the force, submarines and bombers would revert to the national ownership of the respective contributing state. Missiles and warheads in the surface fleet would also be returned to the supplying country.

f. We are prepared to consider a change in the name of the force, but we believe a decision on the name should be reserved to later multilateral negotiations.

5. Contribution of the United States Forces

Should the concept discussed above prove acceptable to other allies, we would be prepared to consider a contribution to this new force of certain U.S. strategic weapons provided that discussions with other allies indicate a general desire for such a contribution, and provided that it can be made on terms which are practicable for the United States.

6. Non-Dissemination

The treaty establishing the new arrangements should include undertakings whereby nuclear members would agree not to disseminate nuclear weapons and the non-nuclear members would undertake not to acquire, or obtain control over, them.

7. Command Arrangements in Relation to NATO

We take note of the suggestion that the Atlantic missile force described above might be assigned to a separate commander. We are also familiar with the strongly expressed view of other allies that this force should be under the command of SACEUR. We think that this question of command should be left open for discussion among all interested parties.

8. Voting Arrangements

The agreement of the United States would be required in order to fire the force. The votes of the European members should be cast in a manner agreed to by them. The voting procedure could be revised only with the agreement of all of the participating nations.

9. Periodic Meetings of the Ministers of Defense

In order to make more effective the present procedures for consultation among the Western Powers, we suggest periodic meetings of the Ministers of Defense. These meetings would be held on an informal basis, and would consider targeting policy, new nuclear and conventional weapons developments, nuclear dispersal plans, future force structure, resource allocation, and strategy.

10. Review Provisions

We believe any agreement should contain provisions for review of the arrangements if (a) Germany is reunified; (b) a unified Europe is established, or (c) there is a major movement toward arms control or disarmament.

As stated in 8 above, any new agreement would require the approval of all participants, and we note that in the case of the US any change in control arrangements would be subject to full Constitutional approval.

The agreement should be so drafted that termination of the Force would not result in the creation of new national nuclear systems.

11. Future Procedure

a. A meeting of representatives of interested governments should be held early in 1965. They should be asked to review these matters and to prepare recommendations for their respective governments.

b. At an early stage in the development of these recommendations, and well before any final agreements are reached among interested parties, arrangements should be made for discussions with the Government of France.

1. Source: Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 66 D 110, CF 2460. Secret. The source text, dated December 10, bears no drafting information. The meeting was held in the Cabinet Room.
2. See Document 59. A list of the questions, numbering 20 rather than 19, and the answers are attached to the December 15 memorandum from Bundy cited in Document 59.
3. For text of the joint communique, see American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1964, pp. 615–616.
4. Top Secret. The source text bears no drafting information.