Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XIII, Western Europe Region

69. Telegram From the Embassy in Germany to the Department of State¹

Bonn, January 15, 1965, 9 p.m.

2643. Subject: Meeting with Erhard. In my one and a half hour meeting late today with Chancellor Erhard, on the eve of his visit with General De Gaulle at Rambouillet on Jan. 20, he dispelled any question that might have arisen that any serious misunderstanding existed between him and us—or any apprehension we might have had about how he would conduct himself during the meeting.

1) MLF

The Chancellor opened by asking the interpreter to read an extract from the speech he had made in Berlin on January 12. “Soviet medium range rockets on the boundaries of this country are a reality. We have never demanded control over nuclear weapons, but we desire to be defended with the same weapons as threaten us. One may discuss the form or purpose of various possible organizations. The political and military reality, however, remains unchanged. We have therefore stated ourselves to be prepared—also because we feel threatened perhaps more than any other country in Europe—to carry our share of burdens and responsibilities.” This, he said, was his reply to those who questioned his determination to proceed with the MLF.

It was, moreover, not just a question of the British, with whom he was prepared to negotiate next week, but also of the Italians and Dutch. Their views must be fully considered so that they will be willing to come along. He was also interested in the time element. As I knew, the Bundestag would recess on July 1 for the elections. There was in fact not sufficient time remaining for it to approve the MLF. He would like, moreover, to prevent the MLF, as a result of being a daily subject of conversation, from becoming an “apple of discord” during the campaign. He agrees with the President that the time element is not so important. However, the finalization of the MLF should not be delayed unduly.

2) Basis for meeting with De Gaulle

With respect to his forthcoming meeting with De Gaulle, he did not expect the General to raise any serious issues. He does not believe that De Gaulle wants to sever France’s friendship with Germany. He would be guided in the meeting by the following principles, which had been agreed to by the CDU Party meeting in Berlin. First, the Alliance must never renounce its integrated structure. Second, Germany cannot, will not and must not renounce the nuclear protection of the U.S. Third, no matter who raises the issue, he will never question the need for the continued presence of US forces in Germany.

3) NATO

The Chancellor asked what we thought could be proposed regarding the reorganization of NATO which would be acceptable to De Gaulle. I replied that I know of nothing that would satisfy General De Gaulle, in his present attitude, that would also be acceptable to us. De Gaulle has removed most of the French members of the NATO staff, has withdrawn his naval forces, is against an integrated command structure, has opposed strategic planning in the Alliance, opposes incorporating the ANF/MLF in the Alliance, and indeed has indicated that he wishes to withdraw from NATO—not the Alliance—in 1969. I was unaware of any proposal of a positive nature that de Gaulle had ever made concerning the reorganization of the NATO. Perhaps the Chancellor could elicit such a proposal during his forthcoming meeting.

4) European political unity

The Chancellor observed that both Presidents Kennedy and Johnson had urged Europe to unite—that a united Europe would be easier for the US to deal with rather than separate countries. He was not sure, but he hoped during his forthcoming meeting with De Gaulle to move him to encourage increased political ties in Europe. He commented on the reference he had made to this question in his speech in Berlin. “What is important is that we be aware of and unified on the basic principles of how Europe should be brought together: Europe must embody a democratic form and must involve democratic responsibility.” What would be the US position if he and de Gaulle made progress in this regard?

I replied that the US had consistently supported European unity efforts which will enable Europe to play its true role in an Atlantic partnership, contribute to an effective NATO, be open to other eligible countries and not diminish the progress made in the Community. We assumed that this meant the ultimate development of supra-national institutions, however, this did not now seem feasible in the light of De Gaulle’s position. We had studied carefully the German political unity proposals and considered that, in the light of the realities of the present situation, they represent as good a proposal as could be made. Although we did not wish to give them the “kiss of death” with De Gaulle by approving them publicly, we wished him success in his discussions with De Gaulle on this point.

5) Future of the Alliance

The Chancellor interjected at this point that De Gaulle seemed to draw a distinction between NATO as an organization and the Atlantic Alliance. It had been proposed (I am not quite sure he said actually by De Gaulle) that the present form of the Alliance might be succeeded by one starting with the European countries alone. Another alliance might then be negotiated between this Alliance and the US. I replied that this did not seem feasible and would not, I believed, be acceptable to us. An old-fashioned alliance including a number of European states and depending on unanimity for action would be an unwieldy partner for us to deal with. Until real political unity could be achieved, and Europe could speak with one voice, I was sure that we would not be willing to forego our present direct relationships with the individual European countries.

6) Nuclear coordination

The Chancellor asked whether it might not be possible to work out some form of coordination between France’s force de frappe and the other Allied nuclear forces, i.e. ANF-MLF and SAC. I replied that although we had every indication that De Gaulle would never agree to participate in the MLF, French MOD Messmer had indicated to SecDef McNamara an ultimate willingness to coordinate in some way the planning and targeting of the force de frappe with our Strategic Air Command. Perhaps some way could be found, either directly or indirectly, of coordinating it also with the ANF-MLF. He might wish to sound out De Gaulle on this question during his discussions. The Chancellor asked me when the force de frappe would be ready and particularly when the land-based and seaborne missiles which the French indicated they were developing would be ready. I replied that to the best of my knowledge the force de frappe itself, although not yet operational, would be by 1967. However, there would be no missiles ready until after 1970. In response to his question I assured the Chancellor that the Polaris missiles which we had proposed for the MLF had already been developed and could be ready in 1967.

The Chancellor speculated that De Gaulle might, in his eagerness to develop his force de frappe quickly, ask for German assistance, say for the non-nuclear part. Might Germany not say that she would be willing to help if De Gaulle would integrate his force with the other NATO nuclear forces? Under such circumstances it might still remain French. I replied that De Gaulle had never given any impression that he would be willing to turn over control of his nuclear forces to anyone else—to the extent which would be required to justify outside assistance. If the force de frappe could really be integrated into the NATO as was proposed for the component parts of MLF, this might be worth considering; however, it did not appear realistic in light of De Gaulle’s attitude in the past.

7) President Johnson’s visit to Europe

The Chancellor then turned to the question of President Johnson’s proposed visit to Europe. I replied that although I did not know when this would take place and what the itinerary would be, I assumed that Bonn would of course be included. The President had stated in his State of the Union message² that he would be returning this year the visits of various European leaders. The Chancellor then referred to rumors he had heard that De Gaulle would insist on President Johnson making a separate visit to Paris. This, he thought, would be most unfortunate. It would create for him a very difficult situation. He would have no objection to the President starting a tour of several countries in Paris, out of deference to de Gaulle. When I queried on a purely hypothetical basis, he said that although less desirable he could live with the President making a separate visit to Paris after a prior visit to several other capitals, including Bonn. However, he did not think the President should visit Paris alone first.

8) Reunification initiative

I referred to the report that the German Cabinet had in Berlin decided on a new reunification initiative. I recalled the background of recent events affecting this issue. Since the real problem for the Germans appeared to lie with the French, i.e., Couve de Murville had blocked the reunification initiative agreement among the four at the NAC meeting in Paris, I suggested that he take this matter up in his meeting with De Gaulle. The Chancellor replied that he believes that France will agree to an initiative. He said he “lived on the earth” and has no undue expectations of what can be obtained from an initiative. The Germans must not, however, agree to give up a whole list of things in return for unification and then find that there is no reunification. I commented that although the Secretary of State has made clear that we expected any new initiative to be a serious one, and that the necessary area of agreement must be found between the four before it is put forward, we did not expect a firm position in advance on all of the questions that would ultimately have to be decided. When the Germans had concluded what form of initiative they wished to put forward, we would be glad to join in giving consideration to it on a four power basis.

Conclusion:

The Chancellor said that he wanted me to assure the President that he would be very careful in his discussion with de Gaulle, not just because of the repercussions it would have in Germany but for the effect it would have on German relations with the US. He would do what he could to preserve French-German friendship, which he considered—and assumed we considered—a valuable asset. Germany could help smooth relations between France and the other Common Market countries.

The Chancellor referred to the recent meeting between German Ambassador Knappstein and President Johnson. He appreciated greatly the assurances that the President had given. For his part he warmly reciprocated them. “Nothing has changed in the German position.” He values his “personal friendship with the President” and assured us of “Germany’s continued commitment to the US.” Indeed, Germany would like to consider itself “our most faithful ally.”

McGhee

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 1 GER W–US. Secret; Priority; Limdis. Repeated to London and Paris.
2. For text of the President’s State of the Union Address, January 4, see Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Lyndon B. Johnson, 1965, Book I, pp. 1–9.