Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XI, Arms Control and Disarmament

87. Record of Meeting of the Committee of Principals¹

Washington, undated.

PRESENT

• Secretary Rusk, Chairman; Vice President Humphrey, Foster, Fisher, Rowan, Seaborg, Thompson, Raborn, McCloy, Bundy, Keeny, and Admiral McCormick of Joint Chiefs of Staff

Rusk opened the meeting by saying to Bill (Foster) that he has quite a party coming up to discuss disarmament, although we may be rearming the very day that he gets to Geneva. He asked him to comment on the strategy of starting the meeting when he gets there. He asked whether Foster might open by making a statement updating what we have already proposed, or whether he should make a general policy statement possibly preceded by private talks with the Russians.

Foster said he thought he would start with a statement as to why we are in Viet Nam and he would go back to the Khrushchev letter of January 8, 1964,² and the answer from President Johnson of January 21, 1964;³ he would describe the nuclear threat that faces the world, especially the proliferation problem. He thought that this might all be in his own statement, not a Presidential statement. Then he would go to Tsarapkin to talk privately, emphasizing that in spite of Viet Nam the nuclear race needs to be controlled. He would point out that there have been many meetings last year and this year, and that 114 Nations are vitally interested in the outcome.

Rusk said to Foster that he would have to deal with Viet Nam rather directly, pointing out that we are willing to cooperate, but that our efforts have not borne any fruit, and that he might recapitulate those efforts. Fisher protested that too much detail on Viet Nam might lead to the wrong impression as to our objectives, and he said that the Soviets will certainly bring up this question in any case. Foster pointed out that the Soviets will be the first to speak.

Rusk again made the observation that Tuesday of next week, the opening day of the ENDC Conference, will be a hell of a day to make a speech on disarmament.⁴ He asked Foster when he planned to leave. Foster said he would leave on Saturday morning, seeing the British on the way, at their request. Rusk then read from a message that he is sending to the British⁵ in which he is sharply critical of the British response to our counter proposals to their draft treaty on nonproliferation. This message would state that a reply is hoped for before July 26. The problem is that Germany insists on retaining the concept of MLF, while the UK resists putting in any nonproliferation agreement statements which provide for a MLF. The British feel that this weakens the nonproliferation treaty in a serious manner. Bundy suggested that we might try to persuade the British to add a clause which would be helpful with the Germans, and less objectionable to the British. This language was handed out at the meeting by Fisher, and is attached to this memorandum.⁶ Rusk asked if this language would permit the MLF, and Bundy responded that it would. Bundy was concerned that we should not table something in the NAC that would lead to a civil war of words among the Western Alliance. Foster pointed out that the UK had already tabled their resolution in the NAC.⁷ Rusk said that in his opinion the UK wouldn’t do much before their election. He also said he thought Germany would not give up the MLF. Perhaps it would be best to find out what the Russians have in mind by talking to them before we start; their aim may be primarily to break up the MLF, McNamara’s Select Committee,⁸ NATO, etc. Bundy again stated that the UK objects to the US version of the nonproliferation treaty⁹ because it clearly was written by someone who was defending the MLF. Foster pointed out that Prime Minister Wilson made a speech on December 16, 1964, in which he, in fact, said that he couldn’t do what the US would now have him do.¹⁰ Bundy suggested that the Rusk message should be sent to the UK so that we could see what their response would be. He read a copy of Wilson’s speech of December 16, 1964, and said that he thought our language is consistent with this and that we should say this in the Rusk memorandum to the UK. Rusk agreed to this. Bundy and others suggested that maybe the Soviets would agree to going back to the earlier ’63 language¹¹ saying they would withdraw from any nonproliferation agreement if there should turn out to be a MLF. Rusk made the observation that it is entirely possible that by the time a MLF came into being that the Soviets would say that it isn’t a proliferation step. In any case, we shouldn’t conclude this nonproliferation agreement before the German elections. Bundy summarized by saying that we would send the Rusk memorandum to the UK in order to have one more try.

Rusk then suggested to Foster that we go back to a discussion of his opening statement. Foster said that he would probably open by defending our valid position in Viet Nam, probably as a response to an earlier Soviet statement on this. He would re-emphasize the continued US resolve to respond to subversion; he would then say something on the nonproliferation question and something on the need for a comprehensive test ban treaty and something on the destruction of nuclear warheads.

Rusk said he doubted that Foster should say anything on the destruction of nuclear warheads on Tuesday, in view of the other statement that would be issued about then concerning our future plans in Viet Nam.

Foster said that he had in mind saying that such destruction would be on the basis of the transfer of fissionable material to peaceful uses.

Bundy agreed that this might not be the right thing to say early next week. We couldn’t be in the position of going in to get new Congressional authority and then mention at the same time that we were going to destroy nuclear warheads, creating the impression that we did not need them.

Rusk was of the opinion that perhaps the best strategy would be to go into a general negotiating situation, discussing these matters for about a week or so before revealing our detailed position.

Humphrey expressed the opinion that Foster should limit his statement to the nonproliferation treaty and the comprehensive test ban, or at least give these the emphasis. He said he thought that Foster should proceed like a boxer, and feel them out for a while before committing himself. He should let someone else carry the ball. It might be all right to also propose a cutoff of fissionable material with emphasis on peaceful uses. He said that if we do all the rest that we plan for next Tuesday, and tell the Nation that we have a hell of a job in Viet Nam and that we are in a hell of a mess in Viet Nam, we shouldn’t at the same time say we’re cutting back on warheads. Humphrey said he thinks we can sell the nonproliferation concept and that we can sell the comprehensive test ban.

Foster remonstrated that we have an approved position in the US on the destruction of warheads. He then went on to ask if there was general agreement on what he might say about the comprehensive test ban treaty, reading from a memorandum that had been prepared as a possible guide for a Presidential message on this. (Attached.)¹²

Seaborg objected to the phrase which said that significant advances had been made in the detection of underground nuclear explosions. Foster said that this was nothing more than the language that Stevenson had used in April.¹³ Seaborg then read the entire Stevenson April statement, which included reference to the need for inspections.

Bundy and Rusk both agreed with Seaborg that Foster shouldn’t make a statement that would make it impossible to maintain the position that we would need inspections, or that would decrease the flexibility of our ultimate position because we have not yet decided on the various alternatives for a comprehensive test ban treaty. Bundy emphasized that we shouldn’t tie our hands. Foster countered with the statement that the Ruina report,¹⁴ with which the AEC people were involved, declared that significant progress has been made in the detection of underground [sic]. Seaborg disputed this, saying that he had seen a resume of the Ruina report and it did not say that. Seaborg said that the improvements to which Mr. Foster referred had to do with Large Aperture Seismic Arrays, which were yet to be built and demonstrated, and to underwater Arrays yet to be built and demonstrated.

Rusk summarized by saying that perhaps we should recommend to the President that he give a brief message of greeting and that Foster would make the main speech.

Bundy suggested that with respect to the comprehensive test ban treaty, Foster use both parts of the Stevenson statement, that is, that significant success had been achieved with underground detection, but that verification is still needed in a treaty.

Rusk asked Foster whether he now had what he needed, and Foster said that he thought he did, that he basically needed instructions on the content of his message to the ENDC, and instructions to be tough with the British on Sunday.

Humphrey said he thought that the thing to worry about most in Geneva would be the Russians on Viet Nam, and on the attitude of some of the nonaligned countries. Foster said he didn’t think we needed to worry about the nonaligned countries, and Humphrey answered that he hoped Foster was right.

Foster pointed out that this will be a closed session, although it was also noted that there would be the usual corridor briefings of the newspaper people.

Bundy, in a recapitulation, said that we would be counter-attacking on Viet Nam following a Russian opening statement, and Humphrey agreed that this was the best approach. Foster said he would have a contingency statement ready for this purpose.

Rusk said that NATO had never before been confronted with a disagreement between the US and the UK such as this, and he said that, therefore, a longer meeting than planned would be necessary with NATO.

The meeting broke up with the understanding that the President would give a general message of greeting, and that Foster would make an opening statement that included a rebuttal on Viet Nam, and statements on the US desire for a nonproliferation treaty and for a comprehensive nuclear test ban, with the description of the comprehensive test ban to be general enough so as not to tie our hands in the future. Possibly Foster’s message should include some other aspects of arms limitations as well, such as cutoff of fissionable material.

G.T.S. ¹⁵

1. Source: Seaborg, Journal, Appendix, Vol. 26, pp. 299-303. No classification marking. The source text is undated, but Seaborg indicates elsewhere in his Journal that the meeting occurred on July 22; ibid, Vol. 11, p. 77. The source text notes the meeting took place in the Secretary of State’s Conference Room from 5 to 6:30 p.m. For additional background on the issues discussed at this meeting, see Document 90.
2. Not found; reference presumably is to Chairman Khrushchev’s December 31, 1963, message to world leaders. (Seaborg, Journal, Appendix, Vol. 26, pp. 654-665)
3. Not found; reference presumably is to President Johnson’s January 18, 1964, letter to Khrushchev. (See footnote 6, Document 2)
4. Secretary of State Rusk possibly had in mind the decision to increase U.S. fighting strength in Vietnam announced by President Johnson at a news conference on July 28, the day after the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee reconvened in Geneva. (Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Lyndon B. Johnson, 1965, Book II, pp. 794-803)
5. Document 88.
6. Not found.
7. Not further identified.
8. Reference is to the NATO Select Committee proposed by McNamara at the NATO Defense Ministers meeting in Paris on May 31, 1965, to study ways of extending nuclear weapons planning and consultation.
9. The U.S. draft “Treaty on the Prevention of the Dissemination of Nuclear Weapons,” which the Committee of Principals considered, forms Annex A to the memorandum from Foster to the Committee of Principals, July 16, 1965, “Position Paper on a Non-Proliferation Agreement.” (Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OSD Files: Lot 70 A 1266, 388.3 (2 Feb. 65), 7 July 65-31 July 65)
10. Reference is to British Prime Minister Harold Wilson’s statement in the House of Commons on December 16, 1964, in which he reported on his visit to Washington, December 7-8, 1964, for talks with President Johnson and administration officials, and outlined the British proposal for an Atlantic Nuclear Force. (Keesing’s Contemporary Archives, 1965-1966, Vol. XV, p. 20525A)
11. See footnote 3, Document 85.
12. Reference presumably is to the “Outline of Points for Presidential Message to the ENDC” in Seaborg, Journal, Vol. 11, pp. 81-82. It suggested, inter alia, that the President refer to progress in detecting clandestine underground tests opening up “a wider range of possibilities for extending the scope of prohibitions on nuclear testing.” (Ibid., p. 82)
13. Adlai E. Stevenson, U.S. Representative to the United Nations, spoke to the U.N. Disarmament Commission on April 26; for text, see Documents on Disarmament, 1965, pp. 59-77.
14. The report, presumably by Dr. Jack P. Ruina, Director of the Advanced Research Projects Agency, Department of Defense, is not further identified.
15. Printed from a copy that bears these typed initials.