Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XI, Arms Control and Disarmament

83. Report by the Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (Foster)¹

Washington, June 18, 1965.

Summary of Session of United Nations Disarmament Commission

After almost two months of discussion, the United Nations Disarmament Commission adjourned on June 16, having adopted two resolutions: (1) a Yugoslav-sponsored resolution recommending that the General Assembly urgently consider the convening of a world disarmament conference “to which all countries would be invited”² and (2) a “non-aligned”-sponsored resolution recommending the early resumption of the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee at Geneva to consider various measures, with particular emphasis on a comprehensive test ban and non-proliferation.

The resolution on the world conference was adopted by a vote of 89-0, with 16 abstentions. However, vigorous lobbying by the United States delegation had succeeded in obtaining some revisions in the resolution, including deletion of one of its more objectionable features. The United States abstained, but most NATO countries, led by the United Kingdom supported the revised proposal. The predominant issue was the strongly expressed desire of most members to associate the Chinese Communists with disarmament negotiations and the desire on the part of many to bring them, via such negotiations, into the United Nations, although some said they expected only to create a situation where the Chinese Communists negative attitude toward disarmament could be fully exposed.

Despite opposition by the Soviet Union, the “non-aligned” resolution carried 83-1-18, with the United States supporting despite some reservations, Albania opposing, and the Soviet bloc abstaining. Until the very last moment the Soviets made strenuous—but unsuccessful—efforts to have that resolution revised so as to omit language implying a condemnation of Chinese nuclear explosions and to include a formulation on non-proliferation aimed at possible NATO multilateral arrangements.

The Soviet Union apparently grossly misjudged the support it could develop for its two draft resolutions, one calling for the withdrawal of foreign troops and bases,³ and the other for outlawing nuclear weapons and as a first step for a non-first-use pledge by the nuclear powers.⁴ Rather than risk defeat on the bases and troops resolution and a poor showing on the ban-the-bomb resolution, the USSR declared at the last moment that it would not press its resolutions to a vote. The United States then agreed to refrain from pressing to a vote its own draft resolution which had been introduced to counter the Soviet proposals. The United States resolution urged ENDC consideration of the United States proposals for a cut-off and transfer agreement and a freeze on strategic nuclear vehicles and paralleled the non-aligned text in calling for priority negotiations on a comprehensive test ban and a non-proliferation agreement.⁵

The most salient features of the Disarmament Commission’s session were:

(a) the coming to the surface of a growing resistance on the part of non-nuclear states, particularly those which are potential nuclear states, to a non-proliferation arrangement prohibiting acquisition of nuclear weapons without imposing any obligations on nuclear states in terms of limitations on, or reduction in, their own nuclear capabilities;

(b) the relative sophistication and realism displayed by many delegations in the course of the debate, in large part due to the leadership displayed by the Eight who had participated in the ENDC at Geneva and who were well informed as to the substantive issues involved;

(c) the obvious misjudgment by the Soviets of their ability to use its attacks on United States action in Viet Nam and the Dominican Republic as a means of ramming through two politically motivated resolutions; and

(d) growing sentiment that the deadlock between the great powers should be broken by mobilizing the voices of the world at large, coupled with the desire on the part of some of the non-aligned—particularly Yugoslavia, the UAR, and India—to play a prominent role in that effort and thus strengthen their general position of leadership among non-aligned nations.

On the basis of our contacts with the Soviets in New York, it appears questionable that they will agree to a resumption of ENDC negotiations this summer. They have expressed skepticism about the usefulness of reconvening the ENDC in the absence of prospects for agreement. However, their position seems to be determined by broader political considerations relating in particular to their dispute with the Chinese Communists. For our part, we have suggested July 6 or July 13 as a suitable ENDC resumption.

1. Source: Department of State, S/S Files: Lot 70 D 217, ACDA/Foster. Confidential. The source text was sent under cover of a June 21 memorandum from Foster to President Johnson, stating that the report was his evaluation of the results of the session. “I hope you will agree,” he concluded, “that on balance, it went well for the United States.”
2. Resolution DC/224, adopted by the U.N. Disarmament Commission, June 11, 1965. (Yearbook of the United Nations, 1965, p. 47)
3. DC/218, May 27, 1965; text in Documents on Disarmament, 1965, pp. 206-207.
4. DC/219, May 27, 1965. (Ibid., pp. 207-208)
5. DC/220/Rev. 1, June 10, 1965. (Ibid., pp. 244-245)