Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XI, Arms Control and Disarmament

59. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Washington, January 7, 1965.

SUBJECT

• Secretary’s Meeting with the Gilpatric Committee on Non-Proliferation

The Secretary opened by expressing appreciation that this Committee is working on the proliferation problem, and said that he was awaiting its recommendations with interest. The US opposes nuclear proliferation. Each nuclear power does not wish to see further proliferation. Thus it is easy for the US to speak out against proliferation, but the Prime Minister of India or Japan must look on the question quite differently. The problem of alternatives to national nuclear proliferation arises. It is easier to see solutions in cases where firm defense alliances with the US exist, e.g., Japan and the Philippines. The solution is not so clear or easy in a case such as India. De Gaulle doubts the US commitment even in Europe—it is much easier to have such doubt in distant areas not traditionally bound to us. Moreover, do we want to give guarantees which would guarantee that we will be involved at the risk of 100 to 150 million lives ten years from now in the face of possible Sino-Soviet alliances? An Asian nuclear defense community, perhaps with a US nuclear stockpile available for it to draw upon, may be one solution. A commonwealth nuclear committee for South Asia may be an answer; the UK is ready to commit its nuclear force in NATO, if we can find an answer to support for her commitment East of Suez. In general, a different organization of nuclear arrangements will probably be necessary.

The Secretary remarked that General De Gaulle had said to him that unless the nuclear powers physically suppress proliferation, it is inevitable. De Gaulle opposes, and does not expect, such suppression. On the other hand, De Gaulle has indicated that France would not disseminate nuclear weapons to anyone, including Germany. The UK is more optimistic on agreements to curb proliferation.

We have long sought a non-proliferation agreement; the Soviets have opposed it ostensibly because of the MLF, but really because of their more basic opposition to NATO. The Secretary noted that he had inquired of Gromyko with respect to Warsaw Pact arrangements, and had mentioned reports of Soviet nuclear aid to China in the 1950’s. Gromyko made no comment on the Warsaw Pact, but said only that we should not listen to rumors with respect to Soviet aid to China.² In fact, the Secretary added, we did not know if they did anything more than assist the Chinese peaceful nuclear program. Soviet interest in non-proliferation is 95 percent centered on the FRG, just as we have been on China. The Secretary suggested that Soviet interest in the partial test ban in 1963 seemed to be based in part on a hope to restrain Communist China. This, however, is inference, since the Soviets steadfastly refuse to discuss China with us. For a long time the Soviets played down Chinese nuclear development, until shortly before the Chinese test.

Mr. Gilpatric asked the Secretary whether he had reassured the Soviets on the US veto and European clause in the MLF. The Secretary replied that he had. He had pointed out that the MLF was a move against proliferation and it was the Soviets who had put the FRG in the nuclear picture by targetting them.MLF arrangements would not give the Germans control of nuclear weapons nor would the Germans acquire nuclear weapons technology through it. In fact, he had pointed out that the MLF would be more secure than existing NATO arrangements. Gromyko kept objecting that the MLF was only the “first step” to a German capability. The Secretary noted that he had replied that the Soviets should then sign up on a non-proliferation agreement which would commit us all to the proposition that this “first step” was also the “last step.” Mr. Ball commented that if the Soviets can use an issue to divide the West, they do so. Also, to the extent that the MLF would strengthen the Alliance, they also oppose it. Ambassador Thompson added that the Soviets also oppose an MLF because it would establish a longer term and closer knitting together of the US with Europe in defense.

The Secretary then raised the question of nuclear free zones, stating that we were favorably inclined toward such zones in Latin America and Africa, assuming the problem of transit rights were worked out, because there would be no need for the nuclear powers to target these areas. Other areas are too closely involved both with the presence of nuclear weapons, and as potential nuclear targets. In the Far East there is a special problem of requiring an alternative to conventional forces for meeting the enormous Chinese masses. We therefore oppose the Chinese Communist proposal for no first use of nuclear weapons.

General Gruenther asked the Secretary if he would comment further on France. The Secretary drew attention to the extreme sensitivity of the information he was about to give. For De Gaulle, the French nuclear program is strictly political, not military. There is a touch of Poincare in De Gaulle’s view that France must have a special place, and is only safe when Germany is in a secondary position. [2 lines of source text not declassified] De Gaulle objects that an MLF would give Germany a preferred position, though France has always been invited to have that same opportunity. De Gaulle is not yet prepared to say that Europe should organize its defenses entirely separately from the US. He would preserve the Alliance, while giving Europe an independent ability to bring the US in. Messmer did say that France would talk about coordinating nuclear targetting with us when the Force de Frappe was ready.

The Secretary noted that strategy is discussed in NATO on three levels: (1) Deterrence—with a premium on telling the opponent that all hell would break loose right away; (2) the question of how to wage combat—for example, there has been full agreement on the measured use of force in our Berlin contingency planning; and (3) talk about strategy, by those (such as De Gaulle) who assume there will be no war, and therefore manipulate strategic questions for present political purposes. Our forces are under the NATO Guidelines; the French are not.

Mr. Ball noted the French justification for the Force de Frappe. Pompidou has said that [6 lines of source text not declassified]. Recently Raymond Aron has also written an article contending that proliferation is not a very serious danger.³

The Secretary raised the problem of US actions with respect to the French nuclear program. To begin with, we are clearly obligated not to transgress the provisions of the partial test ban. But there is a difficult question of where, beyond that, we should draw the line. The US has never openly opposed or adopted sanctions against the French program. Nor for that matter, the Secretary said, will US sanctions stop the French. We do not want out of vexation to open a spiral of economic reprisal and retaliation. Should we not sell to France that which we would sell to other Allies? Finally, there would be particularly serious consequences of attempting to stir up resistance to the French program. Mr. Gilpatric noted that Mr. Ball had earlier stated that the French expect such a policy of us. Mr. Ball replied that there were problems on the border line, but that we have not tried to use our power in the way the French might have if they were in our place. General Gruenther asked how the French react to our decisions on the sale of computers. Mr. Ball noted particularly the problem of a nuclear weapons laboratory as a designated recipient. Mr. Watson, remarking that he was not speaking from the standpoint of a selfish interest, raised the question of possible repressive retaliation by the French against a company with large assets in France. Mr. Ball agreed that we must look hard at this problem and that the French might use such instances as an excuse for action against American subsidiaries. The current instance of artificial limitations on the dollar element in the French treasury reserve is an example of political interjection.

Mr. Gilpatric asked the Secretary’s view on what the FRG would do if the MLF/ANF does not come into being. The Secretary replied that the German elections this year might make a difference. But more generally, in the long run the Germans would face a choice between two solutions: (1) joint development with France in a European force, or (2) a national nuclear weapons program. Mr. Ball remarked that Germany would probably first of all turn to us for bilateral arrangements with MRBMs in Germany under the two-key system. The Secretary remarked that the Germans seem to have drawn away from the idea of placing MRBMs on their own territory, where they would attract additional fire. He believed the FRG would probably reject De Gaulle’s terms for collaboration in a basically French controlled force, so that in the long run the pressure would be for a German nuclear capability. Ambassador Thompson suggested the Germans might also increase pressure for more tactical nuclear weapons. The Secretary stated his agreement with Mr. Ball and Ambassador Thompson that in the first instance the Germans would seek bigger and better bilateral arrangements with the US, but that later they would seek their own. Mr. Ball remarked that many German ministers and others have been saying that without an alliance nuclear arrangement there will inevitably be pressures for a German nuclear force. The Secretary said that when Secretary McNamara had asked von Hassel why the latter wanted an MLF, he replied that he wanted it first to tie the US to Germany [1-1/2 lines of source text not declassified]. Mr. McCloy noted that Erler of the SPD is also concerned over eventual pressures for a German force. Mr. Ball noted that after World War I four restrictions had been placed on German rearmament, but three went by the board very quickly, and the last by 1936. We can not make the Germans into second-class citizens. We can not subject them to a discriminatory state of original sin. In the first place, the Germans themselves would not put up with it, and in the second place, over time the West itself would refuse to press such discrimination. The Germans had already spent $850 million in atomic energy research. The Secretary said that in Adenauer’s last year as Chancellor he had privately declared that the WEU restrictions were no longer binding by virtue of rebus sic stantibus.

Mr. Dean inquired whether, if we have to give the Germans an MLF, does it not mean the Soviets would not agree to non-proliferation. Mr. Ball noted that the Germans will not sign a non-proliferation agreement except in a situation in which they participate in nuclear defense arrangements. Mr. Gilpatric asked whether it would be possible to put more pressure for German reunification. The Secretary replied that very morning the German Ambassador had told him, not officially under instructions, that there was German thinking along lines of holding back from any further commitments on nuclear non-proliferation as a bargaining counter for reunification.⁴ The Secretary further commented in reply to Mr. Dean’s question that the MLF does not involve proliferation. It would, on the contrary, deal with the German appetite for a nuclear role on a basis of equal participation. Mr. Dean noted that the Soviet delegates still oppose an agreement providing for an MLF. He asked whether this means abandoning a non-proliferation agreement.

Mr. Dulles noted that we all agree that non-proliferation is desirable; the problem is in costs. We apparently need a big effort, with many kinds of measures, to have much chance of success. He then asked the Secretary if he would sacrifice a great deal in terms of other policies in order to get non-proliferation. The Secretary replied that when faced with this question we had not decided in 1956-57 to launch an all-out effort against France, with threats and the like. We probably could not have succeeded even if we had tried. And we have not struck China to deal with its nuclear program. Non-proliferation is not the overriding element in US relations with the rest of the world. In individual cases—e.g., the UAR/Israel—it could become dominant. Mr. Gilpatric asked how we can approach the problem on a case-by-case basis when each case has so much impact on others. The Secretary replied that each case is different. India may face a nuclear attack; the UAR does not. They must be dealt with differently. In general, the Secretary added, there is probably more time to deal with this problem in the Alliance than with respect to India, Israel, etc. Mr. Gilpatric asked what the terms might be if we decided that it was definitely in our interest that India remain non-nuclear. The Secretary replied that the Indians want guarantees from the Soviets and from us. We do not think that a joint guarantee with the Soviets would be feasible or desirable, and we do not believe the Soviets would grant a meaningful effective guarantee. Perhaps some Commonwealth arrangement can be reached providing nuclear weapons to support India in time of crisis. In further reply to Mr. Dulles, Mr. Ball noted that it was necessary to give these potential nuclear powers something concrete in order to get them to give up the nuclear option. A mere general undertaking would otherwise probably be no more effective than the Kellogg-Briand Pact. Mr. Dean questioned whether we would be giving a blank check to India to do whatever it wanted. The Secretary agreed that the question of guarantees opened a difficult chain of problems. He stated that he did not favor one-way US guarantees; an alliance with reciprocal obligations, or to meet certain specified conditions, might be another matter. But a conditional guarantee satisfactory to us might not be sufficiently satisfying to India. Mr. Dean asked what would happen if Japan and India sign a non-proliferation agreement, then later when under threat asked for our assistance and we did not give it—would not the credibility of our commitments in general go down the drain. The Secretary replied that he considered the situation covered in cases where we have an alliance like Japan but not in other cases. Mr. McCloy asked the Secretary if he regarded Indian policy as a complete change from the time of Nehru. The Secretary replied that present Indian policy was not basically different. After all, Nehru had moved into Kashmir, Hyderabad, Ladakh, and Goa. The Indians are probably already working on the first stages of preparation for nuclear weapons if they later decide to proceed. Changes in Indian policy are due more to circumstances than to changes in the leadership. (Mr. Ball left the meeting at approximately this stage in the conversation.)

Mr. McCloy remarked that while we were talking about the price of proliferation, he was concerned about the price of dissolving the Alliance. He expressed the view that NSAM 322⁵ placed the ball in the court of the Europeans, who can’t handle it. He had received ominous views from Germany and Brussels of our stepping back from leadership. Is the MLF out? Mr. McCloy noted that Secretary McNamara had said he would give the MLF at most a 50 percent chance. Without arm twisting, we must nonetheless lead. The Secretary replied that he considered the idea of the Europeans looking to us for a lead as phony. They all want us to “lead” in different directions. The Europeans now feel secure, not under threat from the East. This gives them the luxury of playing around in pursuit of other objectives. With respect to the MLF we had attempted to respond to the European view that something was needed. After waiting a year or two after Nassau we said that we would then show them a way. There was at that time no serious objection in the Alliance and eight countries showed serious positive interest. Lord Home said privately that they would go along with the MLF after the election. We went further along the MLF path before meeting real objection in the Alliance. Then, in October 1964, France suddenly got worried about its success and the Scandinavians hardened their position from non-participation to opposition. The Secretary remarked that when he was in Paris the Quai had remarked to the press the incorrect notion that he would ask De Gaulle to coordinate the Force de Frappe with SAC and the ANF. Gordon Walker ⁶ quickly objected, of course, to that idea. Meanwhile, Italy wants a special role with Germany in a Directoire of five. Mr. McCloy remarked that if not the MLF, we need something to keep the Western community together. He did not like the idea of dropping the MLF just to suit the Soviets and De Gaulle. The Secretary said that was not the point. Italy and Germany will next take the lead, then with the UK, and then with us. Erhard and Wilson will meet this month. Moreover, there is more maneuver in the UK position than has been disclosed so far. There is a strong impetus to do something with the UK nuclear deterrent. The problem of control in the ANF is open—the UK wants the veto for all principal members; Germany does not want the UK to have a veto. But the UK will eventually come through, even on participation in an MLF surface fleet component. In Germany the situation is complicated by the fact the present government does not want to give the SPD any chance for credit. Mr. McCloy reiterated his concern over talks among the Germans, Italians, and British without us. The Secretary replied that we will continue to be deeply involved, but that we must stand back from the position of appearing to be out in front of the rest, where we had been with the MLF. It is, he noted, essential to present the ANF to Congress as a unifying measure in the Alliance.

Mr. Perkins inquired whether the Secretary wished to comment on the relation of this subject to German reunification. The Secretary replied that the MLF-ANF, as we had indicated to others, would not be permitted to stand in the way of German reunification, the unity of Europe, or major disarmament.

Mr. Gilpatric requested the Secretary’s view on the appropriate time to broach any non-proliferation approaches to the Soviets. Should such approaches precede or follow the Communist Party talks scheduled for March? The Secretary noted that we have been talking with the Soviets, that there is an on-going dialogue, and that we can approach them at any time that seems appropriate. He added that he was concerned at present about possible erosion of the atmospheric test ban. Mr. McCloy commented that General Wheeler had indicated that the JCS may oppose a comprehensive test ban. The Secretary remarked that he did not see urgency in seeking a comprehensive test ban at a time when France and China are testing. The Soviets, he noted, will not yield on inspection. He had discussed the question with Mr. Gromyko, and Gromyko had made quite clear that inspection is for the Soviets strictly a political question, and that they did not care about the technical side of the question. Moreover, the Secretary continued, it was not inconceivable that under some circumstances the Soviets might test clandestinely in China. In response to a doubting interjection, the Secretary recalled that the Stalin-Hitler Pact showed how two hostile totalitarian states could sometimes get together very quickly when it suited them. In conclusion, the Secretary stated that he was not convinced that a comprehensive test ban would yield a major gain for non-proliferation.

(At this point, the Secretary was obliged to excuse himself to meet another commitment, and suggested that Ambassador Thompson take the chair.)

Ambassador Thompson opened by suggesting that the March meeting of the Communist Parties, as it occurs, may tell us more about the Soviet position. Mr. Gilpatric asked for the Ambassador’s view on the signs of displeasure in Moscow at the President’s State of the Union address. Ambassador Thompson emphasized that Moscow’s behavior at the moment is largely conditioned on their expectation with respect to the March meeting. He stated that for the Soviet leaders five other things take priority over general relations with the West: (1) consolidation of their power; (2) dealing with crucial internal problems left by Khrushchev; (3) dealing with the East Europeans; (4) dealing with Communist China; and (5) relations with other Communist Parties around the world. Under these conditions, the Soviet leaders seek to remain loose and flexible. Ambassador Thompson added that he believes the Chinese Communists will force a split in the movement, despite the fact that the Soviets have shrunk back from forcing a split. Dr. York inquired why this should be so. Ambassador Thompson responded by noting that the Chinese were doing well in splitting the Communist movement, especially in Asia. The Chinese leaders also feel that it benefits them, especially with respect to Taiwan, whenever they can raise hell anywhere for the US. The Soviets, by contrast, are playing a longer-range game of establishing their presence and influence in various areas without wildly provoking outbreaks. The Chinese have very real tactical and strategic differences with the Soviets.

Mr. Dulles asked whether the Soviets are really very interested in non-proliferation. Ambassador Thompson stated that he did not believe so, except for their concern over West Germany. The Soviets did make threats when, several years ago, the Swiss considered developing a nuclear weapons capability, and have pressed the Swedes. But in some other areas they may be inclined to see problems caused for us.

Mr. McCloy asked Ambassador Thompson for his views of the possibilities of a Sino-Soviet rapprochement. Ambassador Thompson said that he thought such a development was very remote, that all evidence points to the depth of the split. Of course, as the Secretary has noted, for the very long run we must consider all possibilities.

Mr. Gilpatric raised a question relating to putting pressure on Euratom. He indicated that Dr. Seaborg had said that we should not pressure Euratom because of the value of that institution to European unity, even if Euratom was delinquent in permitting us to verify its safeguards.⁷ Ambassador Thompson replied that he believed we should proceed with the scheduled plutonium transaction, not only for reasons of supporting European unity but because failure to carry out a commitment could have serious disadvantages. We have faced a similar problem with South Africa. Many considerations enter such decisions, including the availability of other suppliers. Mr. McCloy asked whether we wanted the French to dominate Euratom. Ambassador Thompson replied that this was not the case. Mr. Perkins remarked that he had learned that the French serving in the Euratom staff were by no means partisans of General De Gaulle.

Mr. Gilpatric expressed his thanks to Ambassador Thompson for the opportunity to meet with the Secretary. He wanted to express his great appreciation to the Secretary for having made Mr. Garthoff available to assist the Committee. Ambassador Thompson thanked Mr. Gilpatric and reiterated the Department’s readiness to assist in every way that it could. He noted that if Mr. Gilpatric found it useful to submit a draft of the Committee’s conclusions, when such a draft is available, we would be happy to look at it.

1. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Committee File, Committee on Nuclear Proliferation, Minutes of Meetings, Box 9. Secret;Exdis. Drafted by Garthoff. The attached list of participants is not printed.
2. See Document 53.
3. Reference is to Raymond Aron’s article, “The Spread of Nuclear Weapons,” The Atlantic Monthly, Vol. 215 (January 1965), pp. 44-50, which is an excerpt from the concluding chapter of his book, The Great Debate: Theories of Nuclear Strategy, published the same month by Doubleday.
4. A memorandum of Ambassador Knappstein’s January 7 conversation with Secretary Rusk on this matter is in Department of State, Central Files, DEF (MLF).
5. “Guidelines for Discussions on the Nuclear Defense of the Atlantic Alliance,” December 1, 1964. (Johnson Library, National Security File, National Security Action Memorandums, NSAM 322, Box 5)
6. British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.
7. Reference may be to Seaborg’s briefing of the Gilpatric Committee the same morning. Seaborg briefly summarized the briefing, as follows: “I spoke for keeping our commitment to deliver 425 kilograms of plutonium to Euratom (I believe I convinced them) for means of strengthening IAEA safeguards. I expressed my feeling that Plowshare is worth striving for in a Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty.” (Seaborg, Journal, Vol. 10, p. 21)