Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XI, Arms Control and Disarmament

57. Memorandum from Spurgeon M. Keeny, Jr., of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy)¹

Washington, December 16, 1964.

SUBJECT

• Arms Control Subjects to be Explored with USSR

I believe that we have reached a crisis point in our efforts to develop concrete proposals to carry out the President’s stated objective in the arms control field. In the attached memorandum to Bill Foster (Tab A),² Ambassador Thompson essentially comes out against all of the arms control initiatives that ACDA has recommended for discussion with the Soviets in their memorandum to the Committee of Principals (Tab B)³ that we discussed last week.

As I pointed out previously, I understand that Secretary McNamara is prepared to support all of the ACDA proposals and that General Wheeler has indicated his willingness to go along with all of the proposals except the item on the moratorium on construction of ICBM and ABM sites which he wishes to consider further. It is my own judgment that the proposals are clearly in conformity with the President’s stated arms control objectives; and that, if properly handled, all of the proposals are to our net security advantage.

The attached memorandum from Ambassador Thompson is really a remarkable document that essentially calls into question our entire arms control and non-proliferation policy. I call your attention in particular to the second paragraph that characterizes in classic fashion a foreign policy based on a desire to react to external events rather than to influence them.

Although I agree with several of the detailed points made in the Thompson memorandum, I am afraid it is basically a collection of arguments designed to assure that no action will be taken in this field in the foreseeable future. I am particularly concerned about their comments on the comprehensive test ban. While at first glance these comments appear to be only a delaying action, I am afraid they are in fact an effort to reopen the whole issue despite rather clear U.S. policy in this area. Among other things, the memo implies that there is no possibility that the Soviets will consider inspection with a comprehensive test ban. I do not think that we should take this for granted. (For your information, Mr. Faber, First Secretary of the British Embassy, reported to me today that a member of the Soviet Embassy in London had told a senior British official informally that he thought his government would be prepared to return to its original position of 2 or 3 on-site inspections.)⁴

There are a number of useful points in the Thompson memorandum, however, I believe that most of these could easily be taken care of on an informal staff basis and are not critical to the proposals. In general, I share the basic concern that ACDA has not done its homework better in spelling out the details of their proposals. On the other hand, these are not new ideas; we have studied the problems (e.g., comprehensive test ban) in great depth and are now presumably interested in indicating to the Soviets our desire to move forward and in determining what general proposals the Soviets might be prepared to pursue. More specifically, I share State’s concern that the 18-24 month moratorium on construction of sites might be difficult to get out of and would complicate our subsequent bargaining position on verification rights. To minimize these effects, the time period, if any, should be short, the arrangement informal, and our future actions closely coupled with Soviet activities in this area. I agree also that Plowshare presents a serious problem under the comprehensive test ban. In order to avoid unacceptable risks or a meaningless treaty, we may have to exclude Plowshare initially with a provision that this subject be re-examined after a few years. However, this problem is one that we can resolve internally and is not immediately involved in reopening the dialogue on this question with the Soviet Union.

I think it is most important that the Thompson memorandum does not become the State Department’s formal position. If it does, the President will be faced with a serious problem that the State Department is effectively preventing the pursuit of his stated policy on arms control and non-proliferation of nuclear weapons.

Bill Foster is going to recommend that you call a special meeting of the Committee of Principals next Monday in the Situation Room to discuss this problem.⁵ He is asking you to do it this way to keep the number of participants down. However, I recommend that, if the opportunity presents itself, you discuss the problems privately with the President, Rusk and McNamara later this week to establish the President’s desires in this area.

Spurgeon

1. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Name File, Spurgeon Keeny Memos, Box 5. Secret.
2. Document 55.
3. Regarding these ACDA recommendations, see footnote 2, Document 55.
4. No record of this conversation has been found.
5. Seaborg’s sanitized record of the discussion at the December 21 meeting of the Committee of Principals in Secretary Rusk’s Office on Monday, is in Seaborg, Journal, Vol. 26, pp. 274-280.