Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XI, Arms Control and Disarmament

295. Memorandum From Secretary of Defense Clifford to President Johnson¹

Washington, December 2, 1968.

SUBJECT

• Strategic Talks with the Soviets

Now that Saigon has agreed to come to Paris, I believe that the time is ripe for a re-evaluation of our position on the question of holding Strategic Arms Limitations Talks with the Soviet Union. In my judgment, we should move forward on this matter at this time, beginning with a meeting at the heads of government level, followed by working level talks.

1. If the Soviets were to accept an agreement along the lines of the one unanimously recommended to you, we would maintain a substantial part of our present strategic advantage; a year from now it will be much more difficult to devise a proposal which takes account of existing strategic forces and is in our interest. Over the next year or two, as the Soviets continue their build-up of ICBM’s beyond 1200 and begin to approach parity with us in Polaris-type submarines, our edge in these areas will be eroded and a freeze at a later date could leave us without any significant advantage. Furthermore, the Soviets may well begin to deploy land-mobile systems which would greatly complicate the verification issues associated with a future agreement.

2. If US-Soviet discussions have not yet begun, it is improbable that a new Administration would initiate them immediately; but if Talks were already underway, it is unlikely to call off the negotiations. If we do not move forward now, I believe that it is almost certain that there will be a delay of a year or more while the new Administration examines this question and makes its own determination on strategic policies and force procurements.

3. If we do not initiate Talks now, any future movement on this issue might have to be over the objections of the Joint Chiefs rather than with their concurrence. The Joint Chiefs of Staff’s concurrence in the proposal stems from a number of factors, including the freezing of our strategic advantage, which are unlikely to be repeated at any time in the future. Moreover, under a new Administration there is almost sure to be military opposition to a freeze in our strategic arms until it can be seen what forces the new Administration is prepared to buy in the absence of an agreement.

4. The Russian invasion and occupation of Czechoslovakia need no longer delay our going forward with the Strategic Talks.

a. Indications from our allies have been that they want the Talks to go forward; we should, of course, inform them before any public announcement of our decision to begin the Talks. The Non-Nuclear Conference which ended in Geneva on September 28 unanimously passed a resolution calling upon the U.S. and the Soviet Union to begin Strategic Talks. Both the FRG and Italy voted in favor of this resolution. And at the NATO Disarmament Experts Meeting during the first week of October, representatives from several countries reaffirmed their Government’s support of this resolution, with the FRG representatives urging that such Talks begin “at an early date.” Denis Healey of the UK raised the subject with me at the time of the NPG Meeting in October, expressing his belief that we should go ahead with Talks. My conversations with Schroeder and Kiesinger over the past two months persuade me that the Germans would not object if we went ahead. Foreign Minister Brandt, at the meeting of the SPD Executive Board in Bonn on November 22, is reported to have said that direct Talks between the great powers should continue on such matters as the limitation of strategic nuclear weapons. In my report to the NATO Nuclear Defense Affairs Committee on November 14, I referred again to the importance of strategic arms limitations. None of the NATO Defense Ministers indicated any objection to the initiation of Talks. Their comments stressed only the desirability of advance notice and continued consultation with our NATO allies as such Talks progress. While these discussions did not focus specifically on a heads of government meeting, I do not believe that our allies would object to a businesslike working meeting at that level.

b. If the Talks were underway, we could use our continued participation in them as a lever against further Soviet repressive measures in Czechoslovakia, or as a way of deterring Soviet moves against other Eastern European nations. The apparent eagerness of the Soviets for these Talks makes this kind of threat seem plausible. Kosygin’s remarks in his meeting with Bob McNamara two weeks ago confirmed their strong desire that such Talks be initiated.

5. Mr. Nixon’s public statements after his meeting with you make it difficult for him to object to the Talks.² After his meeting with you on November 11, Mr. Nixon asserted his recognition of the need for continuity “on matters like Vietnam, the current possible crisis in the Middle East, the relations between the United States and the Soviet Union with regard to certain outstanding matters.” He said that in each of these three instances “I gave assurances … to the Secretary of State, and of course to the President, that they could speak not just for this Administration, but for the Nation, and that meant for the next Administration as well.” Accordingly, it seems likely that he would not object to the opening of discussions.

6. The Heads of Government Talks should be held in Geneva and should aim at political agreement on the great importance of limiting and then reducing strategic forces. Opening the Talks at the summit will provide a momentum which will make it difficult for either side to call off Talks without first making a serious effort to reach an agreement. Moreover, agreement in principle between heads of government on the urgent need to control the strategic arms race will greatly facilitate discussions at the working level. You might want to seek agreement with Kosygin on a statement along the following lines:

“The President and the Prime Minister discussed their common interest in reaching an agreement on the limitation and subsequent reduction of strategic offensive missile systems and systems of defense against ballistic missiles. They concluded that agreement on this question would be of great value not only for the people of their two countries but for all mankind. They directed representatives of their two governments to begin meeting immediately to exchange views and proposals on this question.”

7. Talks at the Foreign Minister or Head of Delegation level should begin immediately following the heads of government discussion of this issue. At these talks the U.S. side would deliver the approved initial presentation of our proposal and proceed to explain the proposal following the agreed set of Instructions to the Delegation. The Soviets would presumably table their own proposal. We could then decide how to proceed, but in any event the discussions would be well launched and the prospects for an agreement clearly established.

8. There now exists an appropriate occasion for moving ahead with missile Talks as a means of reaffirming your undiminished interest in seeking to control the nuclear arms race. In the present climate, criticism of this action, here and abroad, would be difficult to imagine. Coupled with your decision to end the bombing of North Vietnam and the start of substantive negotiations in Paris, the beginning of Strategic Talks with the Soviet Union would create a momentum towards world peace that would last for years to come.

Clark M. Clifford

1. Source: Johnson Library, Clifford Papers, Kosygin-Talks with Soviet Union (3), Box 22. Secret; Sensitive. The date has been inserted by hand. Attached is a memorandum from Clifford to Walt Rostow, December 2, asking Rostow to forward his memorandum to the President.

   Rostow forwarded Clifford’s memorandum to the President under cover of a December 2 note, which noted Clifford’s “strong case for beginning strategic talks with the Soviets at the heads of government level, followed by working level talks,” and continued: “If I may say so, the problem with working level talks (as opposed to simply exchanging positions and asking some initial clarifying questions) is:

   • “—We will have to take some time to study throughout the government the Soviet paper;
   • “—We are pretty well committed not to negotiate off our initial position during the life of this Administration.
   • “Perhaps Clark’s point could be met if:
   • “—On the first day of the talks the chiefs of government presented their respective positions;
   • “—On the second day working sessions were held to clarify the respective positions while the chiefs of government met separately on Vietnam, the Middle East, etc.” (Ibid., National Security File, Memos to the President, Rostow, Vol. 109, Box 43R)

2. For texts of President Johnson’s and President-elect Nixon’s remarks to the press following their November 11 meeting at the White House, see Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Lyndon B. Johnson, 1968-69, Book II, pp. 1119-1120.