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  4. Document 292

292. Memorandum From the President’s Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson1

Washington, November 14, 1968, 5:30 p.m.

Mr. President:

Herewith an initial comment on Dobrynin’s position at the lunch he initiated.2

1.
Moscow is clearly ready to go—and eager—if you can work it out.
2.
Their reasons are quite similar to our own: to create a good backdrop for the NPT in January; to keep the momentum of the work on missiles going into the next Administration; and, therefore, to avoid a long delay in both the NPT and the missile affairs.
3.
Reading over the proposed joint communique statement on the missile talks,3 I have two reflections:
  • —first, they need some staffing out by Sect. Rusk and a few others;
  • —basically, they represent the kind of public commitment that might emerge; although the heart of the matter will lie not in the public statement of principles, but rather in the simple fact that initial positions have been exchanged between the two governments and that further rational negotiation can proceed early in the next Administration.
4.
The heart of the matter, then, is not so much in the refinement of the principles, but in persuading Nixon that this is the right course for him, for the President, and for the nation.
5.
With respect to a rationale for Nixon, these are key points:
  • —we have been working on this since January 1964, and working intensively since the Glassboro sessions;
  • —we start with a position which is fully acceptable to the JCS and all civilian authorities in the government;
  • —any modifications and negotiations from that position will lie in the hands of the next Administration;
  • —a coming to grips with this matter at an early date would make it easier to get the NPT through the Senate in January;
  • —equally important, if Nixon encourages the President to go forward with this, it will virtually guarantee Soviet restraint on Berlin and Eastern Europe in the first phase of his Administration because once the talks are started, the Soviet Union will have a major interest in not creating circumstances which would require that they be broken off. We have been clear with them about both Berlin and Czechoslovakia.
6.
I have no doubt that there will be those who argue to Nixon that he should wait and take this matter in hand himself. I understand very well the leverage we had on him on the Vietnam matter; but I am not clear what leverage the President will have on this issue except:
  • —his power of initiative even without Nixon’s assent;
  • —an appeal to statesmanship and self-interest.
W.W. Rostow 4
  1. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Memos to the President, Rostow, Vol. 105, Box 42R. Top Secret; Sensitive; Literally Eyes Only.↩
  2. No other record of this luncheon has been found.↩
  3. Presumably a reference to Document 287 or to an early U.S. draft joint statement; not found.↩
  4. Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.↩