Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XI, Arms Control and Disarmament

281. Note From the Government of the Soviet Union to the Government of the United States ¹

Moscow, undated.

(Copy of Ambassador Dobrynin’s handwritten paper)

(Sep. 13, 1968)²

1. As before the attitude in Moscow is positive to the idea of meeting with the President of the United States for an exchange of opinions on questions of mutual interest. The wish of President Johnson to have some degree of certitude in the positive outcome of his possible visit to the Soviet Union is understandable to us. It is also far from being indifferent to us what will be the result of such an exchange of opinions, though it is obvious that efforts from both sides will be needed to gain a success.

There is no objection in Moscow as to a discussion during such a meeting of questions named by the American side: curbing of strategic armaments race, question of Viet-Nam and the situation in the Middle East; this, of course, does not exclude the possibility of an exchange of opinion on other questions too.

2. So far as the question of strategic armaments is concerned, our point of view is that an exchange of opinions on this question during the meeting could result in an agreement that fulfilment of certain restraining measures in this field would answer to the interests of both our countries as well as to the task of strengthening international security. It would be possible to agree further on certain basic principles of limitation and then reduction in complex of both the offensive strategic nuclear weapons delivery systems and the systems of defense against ballistic missiles, having in mind that this would constitute a directive of the two Governments to their delegations to engage then in working out of an agreement on the concrete aspects of this problem.

[Here follows discussion of Vietnam, the Middle East, and the long-range importance of a summit meeting for U.S.-Soviet relations.]

1. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Rostow Files, Chlodnick File, Box 12. No classification marking. An attached memorandum from Rostow to President Johnson, September 13, 1:45 p.m., indicates that Dobrynin orally delivered the contents of the note to Rostow just before 1 p.m. on September 13, and also left with him Dobrynin’s “handwritten translation from which we typed up his communication, literally.” The handwritten text is ibid. Rostow also summarized the points he raised with Dobrynin following the latter’s presentation, as they might pertain to a prospective summit meeting. None of Rostow’s points involved the strategic missile talks or arms control.

   Rostow offered his “very tentative first thoughts” on the Soviet message in a memorandum to President Johnson, September 13, 3 p.m. Concerning strategic missiles, Rostow wrote: “The formula on missile talks is probably as far as one could go unless one were immediately to exchange position papers and try to get a bit more substance into the communique.” Later in the same memorandum, he called this formula “promising.” (Ibid.)

   In another memorandum to the President, September 13, 6:40 p.m., Rostow related his just completed conversation with Secretary Rusk about the Soviet note. As summarized by Rostow, their discussion did not touch on the missile talks or arms control. (Ibid.)

2. The September 13 date is not included in the handwritten text.