Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XI, Arms Control and Disarmament

275. Record of Meeting of the Executive Committee of the Committee of Principals¹

ACDA-3024

Washington, August 22, 1968, 4:30 p.m.

PARTICIPANTS

• See Attached List²

REFERENCES

1.

Memo to Executive Committee with attachments, 8/21/68 (ACDA-3010)³

2.

Memo to Executive Committee with Agreed Changes, 8/22/68 (ACDA-3011)⁴

Summary of Actions

1. It was agreed that hereafter the term “national” means of verification would be used in place of “unilateral” or “external.” An explanation of this term should be prepared and consideration given as to informing the Soviets of our understanding of its meaning.

2. Paragraph 7 on page 3 of the Basic Position Paper (ACDA-3009/Rev. 2, August 20, 1968, which was attached to Reference 1 above) was revised as follows:

“7. After an exchange of initial views on the proposed force limitations, the Delegation should explore the problem of verification. The U.S. proposal has been drawn up on the assumption that in each instance we could agree to exclusive reliance on national means of verification. We should first, however, make a concerted effort to gain Soviet agreement to additional means of providing reassurance. Specifically, we should propose that both sides agree to arrangements for supplementary procedures involving agreed procedures for selective direct observation on Soviet and U.S. territory for those restrictions which cannot otherwise be verified with high confidence. The delegation should concentrate its efforts on those items for which supplementary procedures will be demonstrably useful in increasing the confidence that the agreement is being complied with. This concept should be pursued during these portions of the negotiation, but not to the extent of prejudicing the negotiations or precluding, if so instructed, reliance solely on national means of verification. The delegation should also explore other means of providing reassurance. (Studies are underway to define these items and procedures, and the results will be made available to the delegation.)”

3. Paragraph V-4 on page 14 was revised as follows:

“4. The Soviet Union has been widely deploying a strategic air defense system called the SA-5 or Tallinn system. It is generally agreed in the U.S. Intelligence Community that the Tallinn system does not at present have an ABM (except possibly for a limited self-defense capability, such as the Nike-Hercules or any other air-defense missile). However, since it is conceivable that it could be augmented and converted to acquire such a capability, a discussion of the capabilities and purposes of this system would be in order. The delegation should seek to elicit information on the Tallinn system to assure us that it is not and will not be upgraded into an ABM system. Our main aim would be to satisfy ourselves that the Tallinn system is not and will not be upgraded into an ABM system without our knowledge. If we cannot satisfy ourselves on this matter, then Tallinn launchers must be⁵ included in the agreed Soviet ABM level. As a means of gaining assurance regarding Tallinn, we should raise the question of radars and attempt to obtain as part of an understanding that replacement of the Tallinn site radars, for example, would be prohibited if Tallinn is to be treated as air defense.”

4. The Secretary of State recommended that consideration be given to modifying Paragraph X-1 on page 22 as follows:

“1. Discussion of the form that an agreement might take should be deferred until we have a clearer picture of what such an agreement might cover. Any agreement should be sufficiently explicit to minimize subsequent possible misunderstandings. Although it is normal practice to embody disarmament agreements in treaty form, other forms of agreement should not be excluded at this time.”⁶

5. No comments were made on the other changes agreed and recommended by the Working Group in its memorandum of August 22, 1968 (ACDA-3011).

Secretary Rusk opened the meeting by pointing out that the question of going ahead with the talks and the timing were now obviously uncertain as a result of the Czechoslovak situation.⁷ However, it was not the purpose of the Executive Committee meeting to consider that, but to give to the President the necessary material to permit him to go ahead with the talks if and when he desired.

Mr. Foster reported that, as a result of a suggestion by the Defense Department, the Working Group had met in the morning and prepared some revisions to the draft Initial Presentation and Basic Position Paper previously forwarded to the Executive Committee (Reference 1). With the exception of the four items covered in the memorandum from the Working Group to the Executive Committee (Reference 2), the Working Group agreed on all other changes.

Mr. Fisher then discussed point No. 1 of Reference 2 dealing with what term to use to describe certain verification methods. It was pointed out that in previous correspondence with the Soviets the terms “unilateral” and “national” had been used, and that there was some worry that inserting a new word might confuse the Soviets. Mr. Rostow suggested that a word be picked, and then the delegation establish a legislative record in the talks with the Soviets on the meaning of the word, including reference to observations from satellites. Mr. Foster pointed out that the Soviets might object to any formal understanding on this point, although they had already agreed tacitly. Mr. Rostow thought that in this critical case it might be desirable to get a formal understanding. Secretary Clifford stated a preference for either “unilateral” or “national” over the word “external” which had been agreed upon at the last meeting. Secretary Rusk said he was quite willing to return to the term “national” and that it might be useful to have an explanation of the meaning of the term.

With reference to point No. 2 of Reference 2 relative to negotiating instructions on the subject of verification, Mr. Fisher stated that discussion had centered on the degree to which the delegation should push for supplementary inspection procedures. With the exception of the Department of State representative, all members of the Working Group had agreed with the underlined wording proposed in paragraph No. 2 of Reference 2.

Secretary Rusk stated that in his view the negotiations might proceed as follows: First, a general discussion of verification in which the desirability of supplementary verification procedures would be placed in the record on a low-key basis. Secondly, the discussions would then turn to the details of the items to be limited. After these had been agreed upon, the discussion would proceed to verification required for each of the specific items. He felt that to ensure Congressional support for any agreement it would be necessary to make it clear that we had pressed for that verification which we believed to be useful, if not essential. Mr. Bohlen pointed out that we would have to be careful not to give the impression to the Senate that the Soviets had talked us out of something that was necessary.

Secretary Brown felt we should not press vigorously for on-site inspection as a principle, but push for specific cases (e.g., Tallinn) where one could justify that supplementary procedures would significantly improve confidence that the agreement was being complied with. Secretary Katzenbach thought that the inclusion of the words “vigorously” and “fallback” in the proposed instruction might be too strong and suggested deleting “vigorously” and modifying the final clause as follows: “precluding, if so instructed, reliance solely on national means of verification.” The Executive Committee agreed with this substitute formulation.

With respect to paragraph No. 3 on instructions re the Tallinn system, Mr. Fisher pointed out that two alternative formulations had been put forth by the representatives of DOD and JCS on the one hand and by State and ACDA on the other. He pointed out that there were two basic differences of views: (1) should we seek assurances that the Tallinn is not now an ABM system in view of the agreed intelligence analysis which had already received considerable publicity that it was not an ABM system; and (2) should we consider the Tallinn launchers and missiles to be included in the agreed Soviet ABM limitations if assurances could not be received that they would be upgraded, or only at such a point as we believed they had been upgraded? Mr. Helms stated that no one in the Intelligence Community really thought that the Tallinn system was now an ABM system, but there were some who thought it might be upgraded to become one. Secretary Nitze agreed that the present deployment was against aircraft, but that it might have a self-defense capability against missiles. Furthermore, if a Dog House were added, it could have increased ABM capabilities and was therefore now an ABM. General Wheeler stated that if it were hooked up to Hen-House, which would be impossible to determine, then they could have some ABM capability today. Mr. Foster asked whether the Soviets informing us that it was not an ABM would satisfy us. Secretary Nitze said it might be useful for them to tell us this, and Secretary Brown said there might be some questions which could be answered which would give us increased confidence.

Secretary Rusk stated that he was not in favor of an agreement which justified very large numbers of ABM’s. One of the purposes of the discussions was to try to limit ABM’s to a low value. He did not like to see an agreement which allowed several thousand ABM’s on each side just because we could not obtain any greater assurance than we have already that Tallinn was not an ABM system. Secretary Nitze thought they might give us some interesting information on radars, but Secretary Rusk pointed out that, at the JCS’ recommendation, we were not limiting radars. Secretary Nitze said we would have to if we were to prevent upgrading. Secretary Rusk asked the status of the Working Group studies on radars, and Mr. Fisher stated that the Working Group had nothing to report at this time. Mr. Helms pointed out that page 15 of the proposed instruction directed the delegation to raise the question of radars and to attempt to obtain an understanding that replacement of the Tallinn-type radars would be forbidden. Mr. Fisher said he understood that the Tallinn system was of little value without new radars. Secretary Nitze agreed, but said we were not stopping radars. Secretary Brown pointed out that it was not the DOD’s objective to have an agreement which allowed large numbers of ABM’s, but only to provide a lever to get information from the Soviets which would increase our confidence that the Tallinn system was not an ABM. He also pointed out that since the Tallinn’s effectiveness as an ABM would, in any case, be very low, the equivalence between Tallinn missiles and Sentinel missiles would not need to be on a one-for-one basis.

Secretary Rusk asked whether we would be in favor of an agreement that banned all ABM’s if the Soviets offered this. Secretary Clifford said not necessarily, since we had to worry about China. Secretary Nitze said it might be in our interest, but that was not obvious at this time.

Mr. Fisher pointed out that we should keep in mind that the Soviets are likely to raise Nike-Hercules as the counterpart of the Tallinn system and that it might be difficult, even though we were presumably willing to disclose information on Nike-H, to prove to the Soviets that it was not tied in to the Sentinel system. There was no intention to sweep the problems of the Tallinn system under the rug, and he did not believe that any of the proposed wordings did this. Mr. Rostow pointed out that the Tallinn problem would be the first test case of our ability to obtain adequate assurances from the Soviets. Situations will undoubtedly arise on many occasions during the negotiations and after any agreement is in effect.

After considerable discussion of alternate language to follow the third sentence of paragraph 4 on page 14 of the Basic Position Paper, it was agreed that the following sentences would be inserted: “The delegation should seek to elicit information on the Tallinn system to assure us that it is not and will not be upgraded into an ABM system. Our main aim would be to satisfy ourselves that the Tallinn system is not and will not be upgraded into an ABM system without our knowledge. If we cannot satisfy ourselves on this matter, then Tallinn launchers must be⁸ included in the agreed Soviet ABM level.”

With respect to item 4 on the Instructions re the form of the agreement, Secretary Rusk stated that he could not accept any language which committed us to a formal treaty at this time, even though this might turn out to be the form when the agreement had been reached. He suggested that the following sentence be inserted at the end of paragraph X-1 on page 22 of the Basic Position Paper: “Although it is normal practice to embody disarmament agreements in treaty form, other forms of agreement should not be excluded at this time.” There was only a limited discussion of this suggestion, and it was agreed that the Working Group would see if this suggestion would be satisfactory.

1. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Rostow Files, Non-Proliferation, Box 11. Top Secret; Nodis. No drafting information appears on the source text. Typewritten notations on pages 3 and 7 indicate that they were revised on September 11. The meeting took place in the Secretary’s Conference Room.
2. Not printed.
3. Attached to the August 21 memorandum, “Initial Presentation of US Position and Basic Position Paper,” are earlier drafts, ACDA-2951/Rev. 3 and ACDA-3009/Rev. 2. (Washington National Records Center, RG 383, Central Policy File: FRC 85 A 83 Committee of Principals Master Book #2, July-September 1968)
4. The August 22 memorandum is entitled “Suggested Changes in Initial Presentation and in Basic Position Paper.” (Ibid.)
5. Subsequent to the meeting, it was agreed to insert “limited and” after “must be” in line 5. [Footnote in the source text.]
6. Subsequent to the meeting, it was agreed to delete second sentence of proposed paragraph X-1 and insert the following sentence at the end: “Should the Soviets raise the subject, the Delegation should seek instructions.” [Footnote in the source text.]
7. See Document 274.
8. Subsequent to the meeting, it was agreed to insert “limited and” after “must be”. [Footnote in the source text.]