Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XI, Arms Control and Disarmament

264. Paper Prepared by the Interagency Working Group¹

Washington, July 31, 1968.

STRATEGIC MISSILE TALKS PROPOSAL

The elements of a U.S. proposal for the proposed U.S.-USSR strategic missile talks are outlined below. This proposal should be viewed as an entity since that is the basis on which it has been evaluated.

I. Fixed Land-Based ICBM Launchers

The proposal would require cessation of the initiation of construction of any additional strategic offensive land-based missile launchers as of September 1, 1968. The Soviet Union would be permitted to complete the launchers which it is constructing as of that date. Beyond that date, however, it would not be allowed to initiate further deployment of fixed ICBM launchers. Under no circumstances would either side be permitted to deploy more than 1,200 ICBM launchers. Building of additional silos, enlarging of existing silos, changing basic external configuration of silos and other launchers, and the relocation of launchers would be prohibited. No additional restrictions would be imposed upon technological improvements of launchers or missiles already deployed including increasing the hardness of existing silos and deployment of MIRV’s, or the retrofitting of existing launchers with new missiles.

II. Fixed Land-Based IRBM/MRBM Launchers

Further construction of fixed land-based launchers for IRBM/MRBM (ranges greater than 1,000 km) would be prohibited. The retrofitting of existing IRBM/MRBM launchers to accommodate ICBM missiles would be prohibited. The installation of ICBM missiles on IRBM/MRBM launchers would be prohibited as would the conversion of IRBM/MRBM missiles to ICBM missiles. Building of additional silos, enlarging of existing silos, changing basic external configuration of silos and other launchers and the relocation of launchers would be prohibited. No additional restrictions would be imposed upon technological improvements of launchers or missiles already deployed or the retrofitting of existing launchers with new missiles of intermediate or medium range.

III. Mobile Land-Based Strategic Offensive Missile Systems

The proposal would impose a complete ban on the deployment of mobile land-based, strategic offensive missile systems (ranges greater than 1,000 km). Missile systems with such ranges carried by waterborne vehicles on inland waterways would also be prohibited. Any such existing systems would be destroyed.

IV. Mobile Sea-Based Strategic Offensive Missile Systems

A. The proposal would ban the construction of additional strategic offensive missile launching submarines or of additional launchers in existing submarines. This prohibition should apply to all submarines with ballistic missile or cruise missile launchers. Such submarines under construction as of September 1, 1968, could be completed, subject to agreement on their number. There would be no limitation on the characteristics of SLBMs or SLCMs, or on retrofitting missile submarines with new or larger missiles of the type with which they are equipped. The fitting out of surface ships with facilities for firing offensive ballistic missiles would be prohibited.

B. There would be no replacement of ballistic or cruise missile submarines within the first five years of the agreement. During that period the two sides would undertake to reach agreement on rules governing subsequent replacement of submarines. In the absence of a supplementary agreement on such rules, each side may replace submarines after five years from the date of the initiation of the agreement provided that replacement does not increase the total number of submarines or of submarine-launched ballistic missiles or cruise missiles.

V. ABMs

The proposal would ban the deployment of more than a set and equal number of fixed, land-based anti-ballistic missile launchers and associated radars. A total prohibition on deployment of mobile ABM systems, both land-based and sea-based, would be imposed. There would be no other constraints on the characteristics of the ABM systems deployed.

VI. Aircraft and Anti-aircraft Systems

The proposal would not include limitations on aircraft or anti-aircraft systems.

VII. Technological Improvements

There would be no prohibition of technological improvement within the constraints of the agreement.

VIII. Verification

The limitations described in paragraphs I through V are proposed to be verified by national means.

IX. Provisions for Revision and Withdrawal

A. Either party may propose revision of the agreement if it believes that conditions affecting the agreement have changed. The two parties shall meet from time to time to discuss the operation of the agreement and possible revisions.

B. Ten years after entry into force of this agreement the two parties shall meet for a formal review of the operation of the agreement with a view to assuring that the purposes of the agreement, with any revisions that may have been made during the 10-year period, are being realized. In the absence of agreement by the two parties on the continued operation of the agreement with necessary revisions, either party may withdraw by giving six months notice prior to 11 years from the day of entry into force of the agreement. Otherwise, the agreement shall be automatically renewed for another ten years, at which time this review procedure shall be repeated.

C. Either party shall in exercising its national sovereignty have the right to withdraw from the agreement at any time if it decides that extraordinary events, related to the subject matter of the agreement, have jeopardized the supreme interests of its country.

1. Source: Johnson Library, Clifford Papers, Kosygin-Talks with Soviet Union (2), Box 22. Top Secret; Nodis. According to a memorandum from Fisher to the Executive Committee of the Committee of Principals, July 31 (reproduced in Seaborg, Journal, Vol. 26, pp. 341-342), this paper is a revision of an earlier draft sent to the Executive Committee of the Committee of Principals on July 26. A copy of the July 26 draft is in Johnson Library, Clifford Papers, Kosygin-Talks with Soviet Union (2), Box 22. A revision of the July 26 paper, marked “ACDA-2956/Rev.2,” dated July 30, and containing proposed last-minute changes by DOD, is attached to a memorandum from Shaw (G/PM) to Bohlen, July 31, with recommendations on the positions Bohlen should take on these proposed changes at the interagency working group meeting that afternoon. (Department of State, Central Files, DEF 12)