258. Letter From Secretary of State Rusk to the Permanent Representative to the North Atlantic Council (Cleveland)1

Dear Harlan:

The problem of alliance consultation on the prospective strategic arms limitation talks, to which you refer in your letter of July 12,2 is one which we here have fully in mind in our planning. In general, I share your conclusion that our interests and the interests of our allies in this matter can be reconciled.

I am glad to have your projection of various possibilities for use of alliance consultative machinery in coming months. Until our positions are more fully developed and the course of the talks becomes clearer, we cannot commit ourselves to any specific longer range program of action in alliance consultative and planning bodies.

You should continue to make clear as you have already done, that we plan to consult in NAC as the situation develops. At this time, the exchange of views already underway in NAC on possible Soviet motivations and objectives is, in my view, an appropriate starting point for such consultations. You may also cite as appropriate the President’s message of July 16 to the ENDC and its indication of an initial emphasis on a limitation or leveling off of strategic delivery systems to be followed by consideration of reductions of existing systems. If it would be useful in further allaying unwarranted concerns, you may point out to our allies that since the US, for sound reasons of national interest, could not conceivably agree to impair its deterrent, the interests of allied governments in maintaining this deterrent would not be affected.

At present, there are certain difficulties which you should be particularly alert to avoid. I believe that studies by the International Staff, the [Page 649] NPG, or Polads at this stage could only be detrimental to US freedom of action as we approach discussions in this sensitive area. Moreover, we would not be able to make sufficient data available to them to assure a realistic analysis. Accordingly, you should seek to anticipate and avoid, insofar as possible, any actions or proposals to institute such studies, and continue to concentrate on the numerous other areas of disarmament activity already under consideration in the alliance. It is also important, when the limits of useful consultation cannot yet be delineated, to avoid any actions which would give rise to excessive expectations.

As regards the substance of our position, you should be particularly alert to avoiding speculation and discussion of the issue of verification, which is, as you will appreciate, extremely sensitive.

We will be giving consideration to a draft statement when the time comes for a fuller statement in the Council.

With warm regards, Sincerely,

Dean
  1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF 18. Secret; Exdis. The source text is Tab A to a July 17 memorandum from Springsteen to Secretary Rusk.
  2. Document 254.