Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XI, Arms Control and Disarmament

223. Telegram From the Mission in Geneva to the Department of State ¹

Geneva, December 15, 1967, 1523Z.

2078. Disto/NATUS/Busec. Subject: Co-Chairmen Meeting on NPT, December 15, 1967.

1. Safeguards: Foster said that, as was the case with the procedure used to find a solution for Articles I and II, we should deal with heart of the matter as regards Art III and avoid complicating solution we both want by attempting to use politically unacceptable labels. After exhaustive allied consultations, US has concluded the road to solution lies through Nov 2 formulation.²

Roshchin wondered whether the expression “road lies through Nov 2 formulation” meant that solution would have to be based exactly on that formulation or something similar. Foster said US has now made clear its firm view and he felt Sovs should be able to evaluate meaning of this expression. Foster reiterated we need deal with reality of Euratom’s existence, its ownership of fuels, and its common facilities. Verification by IAEA would have to avoid extremes of complete duplication on one hand or mere paper check on the other. He was sure that arrangement resulting from agreement to be concluded with IAEA would provide equal treatment for nonnuclear parties as regards safeguards to guard against diversion of fissionable materials to weapons.

Roshchin felt situation complicated by fact that US resting on Nov 2 formulation while Sov prefer Sept 2³ and there is very little time left in which to bridge the gap. He wondered if Foster had any ideas as to the direction in which the US could move in order to help find a solution to Art III. Foster repeated that the Nov 2 formulation was the only one which could be made acceptable to our allies and he was not in a position to suggest any changes.

2. Amendments: Foster expressed preference for going back to first alternative amendments clause considered earlier.⁴ If this not possible for Sovs, however, he suggested following language as way to make present amendments article more widely acceptable: “2. Any amendment to this treaty must be approved by a majority of the votes of all the parties to the treaty, including the votes of all nuclear-weapon states party to this treaty and all other parties which, on the date the amendment is circulated, are members of the Board of Governors of the International Atomic Energy Agency. The amendment shall enter into force for each party that deposits its instrument of ratification upon the deposit of instrument of ratification by a majority of all the parties, including the instrument of ratification of all nuclear-weapon states party to this treaty and all other parties which, on the date the amendment is circulated, are members of the Board of Governors of the International Atomic Energy Agency. Thereafter, it shall enter into force for any other party upon the deposit of its instruments of ratification.” Roshchin made no comment other than to say he would report language to Moscow.

3. Duration: Foster expressed hope Moscow was considering our proposal regarding duration.⁵ We believe such a clause will help gain adherence of several key position nuclear powers. He added that Sovs now had received all of our ideas concerning essential elements for NPT and were now in position to look at treaty in terms of a final overall solution. Roshchin expressed concern over tendency to reconsider understanding previously reached between US and Soviet Union and felt this could lead to interminable discussion with no result. As regards duration clause, he also wondered if US having suggested 25-year duration, others would suggest various shorter periods.

Foster stressed US still prefers unlimited duration but convinced that this matter required further consideration by US and Soviet Union if we are to obtain necessary signatories to treaty. It was pointed out that clause suggested by US was not designed to limit treaty to 25 years, but on contrary to provide for extension of treaty after 25 years. Foster added that if USSR and US reach agreement on such clause, they could stand fast against attempt to provide for shorter period.

4. Assurances: Roshchin said that he was not clear as to the meaning of proposed US clause on non-use of nuclear weapons (paras 6 and 7 state 74017).⁶ What was meant by the phrase “Not engaged in an armed attack assisted by a nuclear-weapon state?” Would it mean in practice that this assurance would not apply to members of NATO and the Warsaw Pact? Foster replied that US and Sovs would have considerable freedom in determining circumstances in which assurances would or would not apply. He believed it was clear that if member of one of these alliances attacked member of another, it would be presumed that it had the assistance of its nuclear ally. In any event each nuclear power was free to make this determination on the basis of its own judgment. Foster gave the same reply when Roshchin asked if the same situation would obtain with respect to a country like Spain or some other ally of US.

Roshchin then inquired whether the declaration to be made on the subject of assurances would have to be similar or whether there could be some difference. Foster said that they should be at least similar in order not to detract from their value. Perhaps they need not be identical but two governments should consult in advance and compare their proposed statements.

5. Limiting Nuclear Arms Race: Foster took opportunity to remind Roshchin that US remains eager to discuss problem of halting and limiting arms race in strategic nuclear vehicles and hoped that Moscow was continuing to give matter favorable consideration. Roshchin repeated that his delegation had no instructions on this matter but that he would report Foster’s view to Moscow.

Tubby

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF 18-6. Secret; Limdis. Repeated to Bonn, Brussels, The Hague, London, Moscow, Rome, New York, Tokyo, and to the Mission at NATO.
2. See Document 216.
3. The September 2 Soviet draft has not been further identified.
4. See enclosure to Document 220.
5. See Document 221.
6. Paragraphs 6 and 7 of telegram 74017 to the Mission to NATO, November 23, read: “6. New paragraph D for our draft UNSC Resolution: ‘D. Welcomes the intention expressed by nuclear-weapon states to refrain from the threat or use of nuclear weapons against any non-nuclear-weapon state that has undertaken not to manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, or control over such weapons or devices, and that is not engaged in an armed attack assisted by a nuclear-weapon state:’ ‘New paragraph 6 for our draft US Declaration (the existing para 6 to become para 7):’ ‘6. The United States affirms its intention to refrain from the threat or use of nuclear weapons against any non-nuclear-weapon state that has undertaken not to manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons or devices, or control over such devices, and that is not engaged in an armed attack assisted by a nuclear-weapon state.’” (Department of State, Central Files, DEF 18-6)