Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XI, Arms Control and Disarmament

176. Memorandum From the Joint Chiefs of Staff to Secretary of Defense McNamara¹

JCSM-30-67

Washington, January 19, 1967.

SUBJECT

• Questions Relating to a Possible Freeze Agreement on Strategic Forces (U)

1. (U) Reference is made to your memorandum, dated 18 January 1967,² on the above subject, which requested the views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff on a draft position paper, dated 13 January 1967,³ on the above subject, prepared in the Department of State in consultation with the US Arms Control and Disarmament Agency.

2. (C) The Joint Chiefs of Staff have reviewed the draft position paper and interpose no objections to exploring with the Soviets means of leveling off strategic offensive and defensive missile forces. However, they reaffirm their recommendation that a decision be made now to initiate deployment of Nike-X for an initial operational capability in FY 1972. They do not believe that Soviet decisions as to future development of their offensive missile force are as directly dependent on the US ABM decision as is implied in the draft position paper. They believe that the Soviet problems and uncertainties of coping with a US ABM defense would reduce the risk of a Soviet attack. Accordingly, they believe that consideration of arms control agreements should not be permitted to delay a decision for an initial deployment of a US ABM system. If the Soviets are interested in an ABM deployment freeze, a prior announcement by the United States of a decision to initiate deployment of Nike-X should provide pressure on them to seek an agreement.

3. (S) Examination of various, previous strategic nuclear delivery vehicle (SNDV) freeze proposals has emphasized the many complexities in finding practical solutions to the conditions necessary to make a freeze concept acceptable from the standpoint of national security. The discussions presented in the draft position paper indicate the complexities inherent in attempting to negotiate with the Soviet Union in this area. The following are assumptions and conclusions which are in the draft position paper and which are subject to serious reservations by the Joint Chiefs of Staff:

a. The exclusion of current construction of the Tallinn⁴ System, a most significant strategic deployment, from the freeze.

b. The dependence upon unilateral intelligence for verifying possible freeze agreements, and the stated acceptability of arrangements that cannot be effectively verified.

c. The assumption that full scale testing is required before deploying MIRVs and penetration aids.

d. The apparent assumption that a US ballistic missile defense deployment would not provide a useful contribution to the total US strategic posture with regard to both the USSR and Communist China.

4. (C) In view of the lack of interest expressed by the Soviets in this subject, it is believed that any US Government approach to the problem should be to determine, first, whether or not the Soviets are interested, in any way, in any form of an SNDV freeze and, if so, when and to what extent, including or excluding ABMs.

5. (C) If the Soviet representatives show any interest in this matter and indicate specific areas to be explored, the provisions of a freeze proposal should be developed with full, deliberate consideration, including review and analysis by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, prior to any commitment outside the US Government.

6. (C) The Joint Chiefs of Staff have consistently held that any arms control agreement should provide for adequate verification other than by complete reliance on unilateral intelligence. Disagreement within the US intelligence community on the ABM capability of the Soviet Tallinn System reinforces this position. Exploratory talks need not be blocked by failure to agree on verification procedures. The USSR should be informed early in the discussions that it will be necessary to establish appropriate verification procedures in conjunction with reaching a general area of understanding on forces to be frozen before there can be a formal agreement.

7. (C) Although the proposal would not preclude research, development, and testing, there is a seeming inconsistence in the discussion which indicates that under certain conditions the United States should agree to refrain from making the qualitative improvements now planned for strategic offensive forces (Poseidon, Minuteman III, and MIRVs) and that flight testing of MIRVs and other penetration aids should be precluded. In contrast to this, it is proposed in the paper that, since unilateral intelligence is incapable of detecting changes incorporated in missiles to improve their performance, no limit be placed on changes in missile characteristics as such. The Joint Chiefs of Staff believe that, in order to avoid Soviet technological surprise and resulting degradation of US military posture, research, development, and prototype testing must be permitted under any freeze agreement and that US-planned improvements in its missile characteristics must be pursued.

8. (S) It should be noted that the US force posture and development/deployment actions are extremely sensitive to the possession of a MIRV capability by the Soviets. Therefore, the DOD established policy for its agencies on this subject is that all papers and discussions will be classified Secret-NOFORN Except UK and Canada. This policy was adopted to prevent acceleration of any potential Soviet MIRV capability resulting from failure to safeguard the concept and its strategic advantages. The Joint Chiefs of Staff oppose initiating any discussion of MIRVs with the USSR. However, they recognize that the Soviets may raise this subject and that US participants in any such discussions must be prepared to respond.

9. (C) The Joint Chiefs of Staff agree with the draft position paper that the United States should in no way indicate its willingness to consider a trade-off of a freeze on manned bombers for a freeze of SAMs, with or without ABM capability. Any consideration of an ABM freeze must include SAMs with a significant ABM capability.

10. (C) With reference to discussion in the draft position paper of the nature of the agreement to be sought, the Joint Chiefs of Staff agree that exploratory talks should be conducted informally until a basis for an agreement is reached or it is evident that no agreement is possible. However, should an agreement be reached between the United States and the USSR limiting strategic arms, the Joint Chiefs of Staff would consider it essential that such agreement be formalized as a treaty.

11. (S) In summary, the Joint Chiefs of Staff:

a. Interpose no objections to exploring with the Soviets means of leveling-off strategic offensive and defensive forces. However, this should not be interpreted as affecting their previous recommendations to initiate deployment of Nike-X for an operational capability in FY 1972.

b. Believe that any US Government approach should be to determine first whether or not the Soviets are interested in a limitation on strategic arms and, if so, to what extent.

c. Consider that any specific arms control proposal, prior to committing it outside the US Government, should be provided to the Joint Chiefs of Staff for review. Such proposals should be analyzed in the light of the then current situation; for example, the required flexibility for handling the Chinese threat.

d. Believe the USSR should be informed early in the discussions that the United States intends to address the subject of verification after a general area of agreement is determined.

e. Consider it essential that research, development, and prototype testing must be permitted and US planned improvements in missile characteristics must be pursued.

f. Oppose initiating any discussion of MIRVs with the USSR.

g. Believe that any consideration of an ABM freeze must include SAMs with a significant ABM capability.

h. Consider it essential that an agreement between the United States and the USSR limiting strategic arms be formalized as a treaty.

For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:

Earle G. Wheeler ⁵
Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff

1. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Agency File, Department of Defense, Vol. IV, June 1966. Secret.
2. Not further identified.
3. Not further identified.
4. In the mid-1960s the Soviets began deploying a swath of radars and interceptors across the U.S. ICBM corridor. This system, code named Tallinn because it first appeared near the Estonian capital city of this name, may or may not have had ballistic missile defense capabilities. (Simon P. Worden, SDI and the Alternatives (Washington, D.C.: National Defense University Press, 1991), pp. 38-43)
5. Printed from a copy that indicates Wheeler signed the original.