135. Letter From Secretary of Defense McNamara to Secretary of State Rusk1
Washington, June 7, 1966.
Dear Dean:
I think the growing pressures for proliferation in India indicates that we
should reconsider our position on the nonproliferation treaty. I suggest
that we consider language in our draft treaty which would make clear that
the United States and other nuclear powers would each maintain a veto over
its weapons. I have enclosed proposed language to this effect.
May we discuss these proposals at your convenience.
Sincerely,
Enclosure3
NONPROLIFERATION TREATY
Present US Version—Article I
Each of the nuclear-weapon States party to this treaty undertakes:
- 1.
- Not to transfer nuclear weapons into the national control of
any non-nuclear-weapon State, or into the control of any
association of non-nuclear-weapon States.
- 2.
- Not to provide to any non-nuclear-weapon State or association
of such States—
- (a)
- assistance in the manufacture of nuclear weapons, in
preparation for such manufacture, or in the testing of
nuclear weapons; or
- (b)
- encouragement or inducement to manufacture or
otherwise acquire its own nuclear weapons.
- 3.
- Not to take any other action which would cause an increase in
the total number of States and associations of States having
control of nuclear weapons.
- 4.
- Not to take any of the actions prohibited in the preceding
paragraphs of this Article directly, or indirectly through third
States or associations of States, or through units of the armed
forces or military personnel of any State, even if such units or
personnel are under the command of a military alliance.
Proposed US Version—Article I
Each of the nuclear-weapon States party to this treaty undertakes not to
transfer nuclear weapons into the control of another nuclear-weapon
State, any non-nuclear-weapon State, or any association of States.
Additionally, nuclear-weapon States will take no action, direct or
indirect, which would increase the total number of States or
associations of States having control of nuclear weapons. Assistance or
encouragement to the research, production, or test programs of
non-nuclear-weapon States, which could result in the development of a
nuclear weapons capability, is prohibited.