129. Memorandum From the Acting Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (Fisher) to President Johnson 1
SUBJECT
- Constructive Initiatives Addressed to Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union
In NSAM 345 you requested proposals for U.S. initiatives addressed to Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union.2 To this end, Mr. Foster and I would like to submit for your consideration the following suggestions in the field of arms control and disarmament.
Non-Proliferation Agreement
The subject that has received the greatest attention during recent negotiations is, of course, a non-proliferation agreement. Such an agreement is looked upon by many as the most logical and urgent next step forward in arms control and disarmament. An initiative on our part to break the present deadlock on this subject is dependent upon the decisions that are to be made on NATO nuclear sharing arrangements. If these decisions do not involve a “hardware solution,” it may well prove possible to negotiate an agreement with the Soviet Union without sacrifice to any legitimate interest of any member of the NATO alliance. The United States should, we believe, avoid dismissing a non-proliferation agreement with the oversimplified arguments that since the Soviets do not intend to proliferate anyway, there is little value in an agreement with them; and that if other countries wish to go nuclear, this would be a matter of such supreme national interest that a treaty would not stand in their way. Without a non-proliferation agreement it is fair to say that we have no hope of stopping the spread of nuclear weapons on the basis of unilateral appeals. On the other hand, if we and the USSR were to agree to a non-proliferation treaty, probably all of the non-nuclear powers that are in danger of going nuclear would find it difficult not to adhere to such a treaty. Thus the issue would not be whether a treaty would stand in the way of the supreme national interest of such countries. The issue would rather be whether a US-Soviet sponsored international consensus, finalized in a treaty, would be a factor to be taken into account in determining what the supreme national interest of these countries was. Clearly it would be.
[Page 320]ABM and Missile Launcher Freeze
A second possible initiative would be the suggested letter from you to Chairman Kosygin proposing an eighteen-month “truce” in deployment of anti-ballistic missile launchers and strategic fixed land-based missile launchers. This proposal was outlined in the memorandum I submitted to you on May 2, 1966.3
Threshold Test Ban
Recent significant improvements in seismic identification capabilities now make it possible for the US to verify through national means an extension of the Limited Test Ban agreement to cover all underground tests having a seismic magnitude of 4.75 or higher. Thus we are, with respect to underground tests of a magnitude of approximately 30 KT or higher, in a situation very similar to that of 1963 with regard to tests in the atmosphere, underwater and outer space. An agreement of this type would not be a complicated one since no international inspection machinery would have to be created. Moreover, the mere making of such a proposal would itself be highly regarded throughout the world as a constructive step forward.
Attached is a paper which deals with the threshold test ban proposal in greater detail.4 We plan to submit the proposal in the near future to the Committee of Principals but thought it advisable for you to be aware of this possible initiative in the context of NSAM 345.
I am sending copies of this memorandum and its attachment to Secretaries Rusk and McNamara in the event that you may wish to discuss these suggestions with them.
- Source: Johnson Library, Bator Papers, Nonproliferation, August 3, 1965-July 29, 1966, Box 30. Secret; Limited Distribution.↩
- NSAM No. 345, dated April 22, on Nuclear Planning is printed in Foreign Relations, 1964–1968, vol. XIII, Document 159.↩
- Document 126.↩
- Not printed.↩