Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XI, Arms Control and Disarmament

121. Telegram From the Mission to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and European Regional Organizations to the Department of State¹

Paris, March 2, 1966, 2116Z.

5414. Subject: NAC, March 2: Disarmament, Non-Proliferation and Nuclear Sharing.

1. This message reports Chalfont’s briefing of NAC on his and Wilson’s discussions in Moscow last week.² (Other aspects Moscow talks and NAC disarmament consultation covered septels.)³

2. Most important aspect to come out of Chalfont briefing and subsequent discussion in NAC was that “moving target” is being presented by Soviets and their allies so far as defining what proliferation really means in NATO context. As brought out by Chalfont and Cleveland, Soviets seem to have moved from defining proliferation as FRG sharing in ownership, to FRG access, and now to FRG “association” with nuclear arrangements. Chalfont pointed out that Polish rep at ENDC on Mar 1 went one step further by objecting “to any increased influence in the Western alliance by the FRG.”

3. Following are highlights Chalfont presentation on Moscow talks: He said Kosygin spoke of the one “insuperable” obstacle to non-proliferation treaty as the whole complex of nuclear sharing problems. Kosygin was harder and more vigorous than other Soviet spokesmen, and made clear, with no ambiguity, that so long as NATO contemplates any arrangement bringing the FRG into closer association with nuclear weapons, there will be no chance of a treaty. Soviets totally rejected UK views that nothing contemplated in NATO involves proliferation. Soviets said we are trying to bring the FRG into closer association and this constitutes a “political proliferation.” (In reply to question from Alessandrini (Italy) as to origin of phrase “political forms of proliferation,” Chalfont said this term originated with Gromyko.) Soviets specifically said it would do no good to suggest that consultative arrangements are acceptable, since this too is proliferation.

4. Chalfont, expressing his distress over Soviet attitude, said it is up to US to assess whether this is negotiating or final position. When pressed for his personal assessment, Chalfont said he thought Soviets are serious in wanting non-proliferation agreement, and that they will finally, after long process, accept NATO nuclear arrangements which we can make clear do not constitute proliferation. However, Soviets are aware of differences within NATO, see an opportunity to make trouble within Alliance, and will play this as hard as possible.

5. At this point Cleveland commented that Soviets have presented moving target on what they might accept in sharing arrangements (para 2 above). He was not, however, clear as to whether Moscow talks threw any further light on Soviet attitudes toward existing NATO arrangements in Europe, which their treaty draft seems to exclude. Chalfont replied that he could make only general comment that Soviets seemed not to wish to attack existing arrangements, although he pointed out that UK was careful not to raise this specific point in Moscow.

6. Concluding, Chalfont agreed with moving target description, saying that Soviets are broadening objections from technical to political forms of proliferation. He described this new Soviet position as totally untenable and unnegotiable. We must therefore see whether it is only a negotiating position. In these circumstances the prior and urgent need is for East-West agreement as to what a non-proliferation treaty would bar as proliferation. It appears, said Chalfont, that while we can proceed with discussions at Geneva, this is a matter for specific, high-level political decision.

Cleveland

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF 18. Confidential. Repeated to Geneva, London, and Warsaw and pouched to all other NATO capitals.
2. See footnote 2, Document 119.
3. See footnote 3, Document 122.