112. Memorandum of Conversation1
SUBJECT
- US-UK Disarmament Discussion: Test Ban (U)
- (January 19-20, 1966)
PARTICIPANTS
- See Attached List2
Lord Chalfont considered that inability to make headway on a non-proliferation treaty at Geneva would make some movement toward a test ban desirable. The Canadians shared this view. A comprehensive test ban would also contribute to non-proliferation objectives. The U.K. considered that as a result of progress in seismic detection the risks involved in a comprehensive test ban without on-sites were so small as to be politically acceptable. The U.K. would, however, continue publicly to support the U.S. position, despite growing pressures at home. Lord Chalfont asked whether the U.S. saw any possibility of a comprehensive test ban without on-sites. If not, perhaps further thought might be given to suggestions for an international “detection club” or to the concept of “challenge inspections” suggested in the ICY report.
Mr. Foster said that at this time there was no possibility of the U.S. abandoning its insistence on on-sites. “Challenge inspections” would introduce elements of such great instability as to make any test ban concluded on these bases less than useful. Mr. Foster said that consideration was still continuing within the USG of a half-a-loaf approach, including a threshold test ban. He did not feel that there was much basis for optimism as to the results of our consideration, however. In any event, the U.S. remained firmly opposed to any linking of a threshold ban and a moratorium. The U.S. had devoted considerable research to ways of simplifying on-site modalities and making them less intrusive, and it was not impossible that at some stage the Soviets might return to accepting some form of on-sites.
Mr. Fisher elaborated further on the subject of “challenge inspections.” He doubted whether they would have a strong deterrent effect against violation. If, as the ICY report admits, it was unlikely that the [Page 290] Soviets would admit inspectors into their territory anyway in response to a “challenge,” it hardly seemed just that the onus for initiating withdrawal from the test ban would have to fall on the innocent party. A test ban based on “challenge inspections” would also have considerable de-stablizing effect in US-USSR bilateral relationship. Referring to studies on a threshold test ban, Mr. Fisher said on a personal basis that three main problems seemed to be involved: a) whether a threshold ban would have practical value if the USSR and countries such as India could still test under the threshold; b) whether it might seriously inhibit countries from going nuclear; and c) to what extent it would prevent us from doing what we want to do. Mr. Fisher asked for U.K. views on the possible inhibiting effect on non-nuclear states of a threshold test ban or even of the offer of such a test ban. In short, would it be worthwhile even to propose one?
Lord Chalfont replied that in his opinion a threshold test ban would not have much concrete effect; its real value would be mainly tactical. However, the whole question of acceptability of a test ban seemed to be viewed on the U.S. side in absolute terms. The U.K. considered that the danger of breach of agreement on extension of the limited test ban to all tests was very small, since seismic capabilities were now so highly developed that a country would have to go to great lengths to conceal even very small underground tests. He realized that there were political factors that the USG had to take into account. A more important question, however, was whether the U.S. was able to give up underground testing. Mr. Fisher replied that he did not believe the U.S. could agree to cease underground testing unless the broader implications for other areas of some Soviet acceptance of the principle of verification made it worthwhile. However, for us to accept a cessation of underground testing without obtaining any change in the Soviet position on inspection would simply generate mistrust and suspicion of possible violation. Mr. Fisher recalled the atmosphere that had prevailed during the moratorium.
Mr. Barber, describing DOD’s interim conclusions on the effects in the bilateral US-USSR context, of cessation of underground testing, said that the U.S. would not be able positively to identify some 4-6 Soviet underground tests if they were to be conducted elsewhere than at presently known Soviet test sites. While the number of tests would be small, what was significant was that the few tests of these yields conducted in the U.S. test program had been very important for ABM warhead development. The question, therefore, was whether the U.S. could risk an agreement under which the Soviets might carry out such tests to their military advantage.
Lord Chalfont said the basic question was whether it was likely the Soviets would sign a test ban if they intended to violate it. Mr. Fisher noted that our open society was incapable of the kind of secrecy that the [Page 291] Soviets could maintain, so that we could safely proceed only on the basis of what we could find out through verification.
Lord Chalfont said that he was quite content to wait and see whether some movement might be possible on the U.S. side. A threshold test ban at magnitude 4.75 would be valuable for tactical and presentational reasons and could have some significance for non-proliferation.
Sir Harold Beeley3 commented that the U.K. saw some advantage in “challenge inspections.” Acceptance of this concept by the Soviets would involve admission by them that the only way of proving innocence is by on-site inspection. He thought that this would be a valuable gain for the West. Furthermore, he thought that if a challenge inspection were refused, it would be relatively easy to fix odium for the withdrawal on the adversary. Sir Harold further suggested that it might be possible to combine a threshold test ban with challenge inspections. Mr. Foster said that we would want to give study to Sir Harold’s suggestion.
Sir Harold also thought that a threshold test ban might be strengthened if it were indicated that in time the seismic threshold could perhaps be lowered. Mr. Barber asked whether this would really be negotiable or was simply a suggestion as to possible tactics. Sir Harold replied that otherwise it might be difficult to defend a threshold ban offer against the argument that if it was possible to lower the threshold this far then why not all the way, that is, to zero.
Mr. Foster said that we would give careful consideration to the British views. The test ban question could be discussed further by the Western Four in Paris, and it was also certain to come up at the NAC meeting.
Lord Chalfont concluded that it would be very helpful to the U.K. if the U.S. could come forward at Geneva with a proposal of this sort (i.e., threshold test ban), since the British government was under some pressure at home to give up demands for on-site inspection.
- Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF 18. Secret. Drafted by William F. Miller (ACDA/IR) on January 27 and approved in ACDA/D. A handwritten note on the source text indicates that this conversation was held at the British Embassy. Memoranda of two other conversations, January 19, are ibid. No memoranda of the January 20 conversations were found.↩
- Not printed.↩
- Deputy Head of the British Delegation to the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee.↩