110. Abstract of the Report of the Ad Hoc Panel on Technical Aspects of Nuclear Test Ban Proposals1
In responding to the JCS request for an analysis of the technical aspects of nuclear test ban proposals, the Panel has focused upon the effects which either a Comprehensive Test Ban or a 4.75 Threshold Ban would have upon the keystone of US National defense: the strategic deterrent. Three areas of critical vulnerabilities, which if exploited by the Soviet Union would seriously compromise our deterrent, have been discussed in the context of the underground nuclear tests required for their correction. Upon examining the capability of the Soviets to exploit these vulnerabilities the Panel concluded that
We have no evidence whether or not the Soviets have already achieved the necessary nuclear developments, but if not, even a comprehensive ban could not prevent their acquisition.
To maintain our deterrent, our best course is to pursue with all vigor the programs now in progress for eradicating these vulnerabilities. Many of these programs involve underground nuclear experiments. The Panel therefore further concluded that
From the standpoint of our current and planned military-technical programs the present is a particularly disadvantageous time for the US to enter into a Comprehensive Test Ban Agreement.
Looking forward to the future and the obvious continued need for a high level of competence in nuclear technology to maintain our deterrent, we see as one of our greatest potential losses that
Under a comprehensive test ban our scientific and technical competence in nuclear weapons design and in weapons effects would deteriorate substantially in about three years and be seriously degraded in ten.
[2 paragraphs (10 lines of source text) not declassified]
Turning to proliferation, which has been advanced as one of the principal motivations for extending the Limited Treaty, we find that
On a purely technical basis, for a country bent on becoming a nuclear power, the lack of testing would inhibit the development of thermonuclear weapons [Page 286] and light-weight fission weapons, but could not prevent the development of primitive but effective fission weapons.
After a section dealing in some detail with what might be done if a Treaty extension appears inevitable, the report attempts to answer the four specific JCS questions (Section X). Finally, a summary and list of major conclusions is presented.
[Here follow a Table of Contents, the text of the report, and three appendices.]
- Source: Washington National Records Center, JCS 383, Central Policy File: FRC 86 A 5, Folder 2557. Top Secret; Restricted Data. The report contains a transmittal letter from Panel Chairman W.G. McMillan to General J.P. McConnell, Chief of Staff,USAF, January 14. Also attached is a cover memorandum from General Earle G. Wheeler, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, to members of the Committee of Principals (JCSM-78-66), February 3, stating that the Joint Chiefs of Staff designated the U.S. Air Force as the executive agent to establish a panel for an independent analysis of technical problems relating to test ban proposals to evaluate the security implications of further nuclear test restraints.↩