Office of the Historian

107. Draft Memorandum of Conversation1

Washington, January 11, 1966, 6 p.m.

SUBJECT

  • Message from Soviet Prime Minister Kosygin to President Johnson on Non-proliferation

PARTICIPANTS

  • His Excellency Anatoliy F. Dobrynin, Soviet Ambassador
  • Acting Secretary George W. Ball
  • Deputy Under Secretary for Political Affairs, U. Alexis Johnson
  • Mr. Walter J. Stoessel, Jr., Deputy Assistant Secretary for European Affairs

Ambassador Dobrynin called, at his request, on the Acting Secretary. He said he wished to present a personal message from his Prime Minister to President Johnson on the subject of non-proliferation.2 The Ambassador noted that the message was confidential and that it was being handled in the same way as previous confidential communications between Soviet leaders and the President. Although the original text in Russian was not signed, the Ambassador reiterated that the message was from the Soviet Prime Minister. He handed to Mr. Ball an unofficial translation in English of the Prime Minister’s message.

After reading the message, the Acting Secretary said that it would be transmitted to the President at once and that a reply would be prepared.

The Acting Secretary commented that we have a difference of view with the Soviet Government with regard to what we consider as the same purpose, namely, that the FRG should play a constructive role in Europe and not a destructive one. In this connection, our stand is conditioned by the effects of efforts in the past to stabilize the situation in Europe. If we are to prevent developments which could lead in the direction of destroying Europe, we must make it possible for non-nuclear powers to exercise some influence in the control of nuclear weapons. Otherwise, the energies of these powers might be channeled in harmful directions.

The Acting Secretary said that he was sure this line of argumentation was familiar to Ambassador Dobrynin and he regretted that we have not been able to persuade the Soviet Government of the correctness of our views. The Acting Secretary emphasized that we do not envisage a situation where a German Government would have the possibility of making an independent decision to detonate nuclear weapons. We see three alternatives in regard to the control of nuclear weapons: [Page 277]

1.
Attempt to maintain a situation where the powerful nations already possessing nuclear weapons do not share their nuclear power with others and keep non-nuclear countries in a state of permanent inferiority.
2.
Allow countries not having nuclear weapons to develop nuclear capability on an independent, national basis. We consider this a disastrous course.
3.
Establish a collective arrangement where control over nuclear weapons would be shared and no new independent capabilities would be created. We feel that this offers the best prospects.

The Acting Secretary said that we are very sincere in desiring non-proliferation and that we have given great thought to our policy in this regard. He did not know if it would be possible to reconcile the United States and Soviet views but he assured the Ambassador that the Soviet message would be studied carefully.

  1. Source: Department of State, Pen Pal Correspondence: Lot 77 D 163. Secret; Exdis. Drafted by Walter J. Stoessel, Jr. (EUR). The conversation was held in Ball’s office.↩
  2. Document 108.↩