106. Telegram From the Embassy in the Soviet Union to the Department of State1
2008. 1. Following is distillation of remarks on nuclear-sharing problem which were interspersed in my conversation last night with Gromyko (Embtel 2000)2 on general state of our relations.
2. Leaving question of Vietnam which we had been discussing, Gromyko said he wished to address question of proliferation of nuclear weapons. Soviet Government believed, he said, that it was not too late to remedy this situation. In common with UK, USSR and other countries, we should not allow nuclear weapons to spread. Time would come when we too might regret our current policy. USSR was resolutely opposed to FRG’s access to nuclear weapons in any form, but believed this to be not just in Soviet interest but in interest of all major powers. Referring to his statement to recent meeting of Supreme Soviet,3 Gromyko said Soviets believed that door to solution of this problem was not yet closed and they would not like to see it closed. It seemed to him that President Johnson should now address himself with greater sympathy to their position on non-dissemination.
3. I said that I had always felt our interests were basically the same on non-proliferation, and I referred him to communique issued at end of Erhard visit which I thought served interest of non-proliferation.4 I made point again that Soviets should understand interest of peoples, who had missiles targeted against them, in sharing in their own defense. I was glad to hear him say that door was still open, and I hoped we could make progress when the meetings in Geneva resumed. Our view was the same, I repeated, on point of not allowing additional political entities to gain control over nuclear weapons. Our differences related to means of accomplishing this purpose.
4. Gromyko responded by warning that if by any chance we reached agreement with FRG on access, including access on “political plane,” to questions relating to use of nuclear weapons, that would close door to agreement on non-proliferation and Soviets would have to take [Page 275] necessary steps looking to their own security and that of their allies. In meantime, reports had appeared, Gromyko said, that de facto decisions had been taken to give access to Germans “on political plane.” If this were so, truth would [come]out sooner or later and this would eliminate possibility of non-proliferation agreement.
5. I pointed out that this got down to question of definition, and asked Gromyko to clarify whether in his remarks on this subject to Supreme Soviet he had been referring to present arrangements. Gromyko replied that what he was talking about was the nuclear committee idea, which they considered unacceptable. For the Germans to take part in preparation of nuclear strategy would, he said, be considered access. When I remonstrated that this had nothing to do with access, he insisted that “if a country has a means of taking part in decisions on use of nuclear weapons, this is access.”
6. I said I believed we were following more realistic policy on this matter than they were. If a country, whether it was a member of NATO or the Warsaw Pact, had hundreds of missiles trained upon it as Soviet leaders had publicly said was case with respect to FRG, wasn’t effect of this to exert pressure on them to secure their own in absence other defense arrangements? If Soviet Government was going so far as to consider that political consultation constituted “access,” they were putting tremendous pressure on a country to get its own weapons. While Soviets focused on Germany, it seemed to me that Soviet position barring political consultation had still broader implications for countries like India which had nuclear capability plus a hostile neighbor on its border. Gromyko protested that this was introducing unrelated question.
7. I told Gromyko that I appreciated his willingness to discuss these issues frankly with me, and that I would carefully report his remarks.
- Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF 18. Confidential.↩
- Not printed. (Ibid., POL US-USSR)↩
- Reference presumably is to Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko’s address of December 9 before the Supreme Soviet. Extracts are printed in American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1965, pp. 454-456 and 494-497.↩
- Chancellor Ludwig Erhard of the Federal Republic of Germany visited the United States December 19-21 for talks with President Johnson, Secretary Rusk, and other government officials on December 20-21. The joint statement issued following discussions with Chancellor Erhard is in Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Lyndon B. Johnson, 1965, Book II, pp. 1165-1167.↩