I attach a memorandum of conversation which I had yesterday with Ambassador
Dobrynin because it seems to me
to lend clear force to your Armistice Day request that while we work on the
Atlantic nuclear problem, we keep Soviet interests in mind.2 We will have more on this next week
when Ball and McNamara have completed their exploration
in London and Paris,3 but I begin to
think more and more that it is an opportunity for a real Johnson
break-through here. It is clear that the Germans no longer really expect
that we will support an MLF, and I believe
that if you and Erhard could reach a
firm agreement in early December, that no new weapons systems is necessary,
the way might be open toward a non-proliferation treaty and toward a new
collective arrangement for command control and consultation in NATO.4
Attachment7
MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION
With Ambassador Dobrynin
Wednesday, November 24
1-3 p.m.
Ambassador Dobrynin and I had the
most candid and cordial conversation of our three-year acquaintance
today. In approximate order of importance, the topics we discussed are
as follows:
1. European nuclear arrangements. The Ambassador raised this subject
toward the end of the lunch—which is where he has usually raised the
thing most on his mind in our past talks.
The moment he raised the question, I told him that I was troubled by the
lack of clarity in the Soviet position on ANF and MLF and other
arrangements. Sometimes the Soviet Union seemed to be saying to us that
it was only the MLF that was
objectionable. At other times Soviet representatives seemed to be
hostile to all possible arrangements, even those for simple
consultation.
The Ambassador parried by saying that the Soviet Union had a hard time
telling just what we had in mind. He said that he had been unable to
satisfy repeated requests from his government for an accurate account of
purposes and meaning of the McNamara special committee (even his NATO colleagues in Washington had told him
that they honestly did not know what it was all about). The Ambassador
said that it would be easier for the Soviet Union to comment on our
policy if it knew exactly what that policy was. He said that he knew
there was a difference of opinion within the USG as between believers in collective weapons systems and
believers in consultation. He said that he had the impression that there
was not a firm decision in the USG and
he implied that the Soviet Union could not express a fully defined
position until it knew what it had to deal with on our side.
I pointed out to the Ambassador that this position in turn created
difficulties in Washington. We were determined to move ahead with
necessary defensive arrangements, while at the same time we worked for
the cause of non-proliferation. The Ambassador was certainly correct in
believing that different kinds of arrangements were preferred by
different groups here, but I pointed out that as long as it appeared
that the Soviet Union was equally opposed to all arrangements, it would
be hard for anyone in this government to believe the choice we made
would have any effect on relations with the Soviet Union.
[Page 266]
The Ambassador said very earnestly that he understood this point and that
for this reason it would be of the greatest value to the Soviet
Government if he could have a wholly private and informal indication of
the real plans and preferences of the USG as soon as they might be decided. He was sure that such
a private indication of our position would be helpful, almost no matter
what it was. The Ambassador cited as an example the announcement today
of a 700-man reduction in our forces in Berlin. He thought that 24 hours
private notice of this decision would have been most helpful in
Moscow.
I told the Ambassador that I understood the value of private
communication. The Ambassador, on his part, assured me that the Soviet
Union would have no interest whatever in using any such private
communication to undermine our relations with the Germans—he said that
he thought we worry too much about that, and that this simply was not
the framework within which these matters were reviewed within the Soviet
Government. The Soviet Government’s concern about the Germans was real
and deep, as he had told me often before. The Ambassador remarked that
he had often been told by his friends in the State Department that
Soviet protests in the nuclear field were merely another example of the
Soviet hostility toward NATO, and that
he wanted me to understand that this was not the case. Of course, NATO was not a Soviet favorite, but the
problem of nuclear proliferation and Germany was far different and much
more serious. On non-proliferation, he added, the Soviet Government had
exposed itself to severe criticism from quarters he need not name (I
inferred China); that should prove its sincerity.
I told the Ambassador that we understood the Soviet concern with Germany
and that indeed we shared it. I told him that I could give him
categorical assurance that there was no one in the USG who had the smallest intention of
allowing the Germans to have national control of nuclear weapons, and no
one who would support the Germans in any effort to use any German
nuclear role as an instrument of pressure against the Soviet Union. The
Ambassador indicated that he believed me, but he made it equally plain
that his confidence was not shared in Moscow.
My own private and personal conclusion from this extended exchange, the
flavor of which I have not fully recaptured, is that we may well be able
to win Soviet acceptance of any nuclear arrangement in the West which
does not involve an immediate decision to build a new weapons system
like the MLF, and which clearly avoids
any increase in direct German access to the nuclear trigger. I believe
that both the McNamara committee
and the revised ANF now under discussion
could meet this condition. I believe that Dobrynin is right and serious in his emphasis upon the
value of early private communication with the Soviet Government when we
know our mind in this matter.
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Since in fact no one now wants the MLF, I
think we may well be able to make some money with Moscow if we tell them
privately before we sink it publicly.
In sum, I believe that what Dobrynin said on this subject may open the way for us to
meet our NATO responsibilities and move
at the same time toward an agreement on non-proliferation. At the very
least, the Ambassador’s position seems to me to reinforce the importance
of the President’s stated view that we should approach the problem of
Atlantic nuclear defense with a full awareness of the concerns of the
Soviet Government. (I should add that I told Ambassador Dobrynin that this was the President’s
position.)
[Here follows discussion of Vietnam, private communication, the Ford
Foundation, and habits of the Soviet bureaucracy.]
