72. Memorandum From Edward K. Hamilton of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Special Assistant (Rostow)1
SUBJECT
- Taking MAP out of the Foreign Aid BILL
As you know, McNamara has long favored separating MAP legislation from economic aid. He has a long list of reasons, ranging from the severe and repeated cuts in MAP appropriation requests to DOD annoyance that State/AID now has a final (albeit little used) say on MAP policy and operations. He has made several attempts in past years to get the Congress to go along with a split, but he has always been undone by Doc Morgan who (1) hasn’t wanted to give up jurisdiction over MAP to the Armed Services Committee and (2) has shared the old Rayburn position that military aid in the same bill is what gets economic aid through the House.
As MAP has declined and become more concentrated in countries less central to AID concerns, the merits of McNamara’s case have become more and more accepted. Only the Budget Bureau now debates the substance. Katzenbach and Gaud would go along with the separation if it made tactical sense on the Hill.
[Page 210]This year’s DOD proposal is more violent than usual. It proposes not only that military and economic aid be separated, but that military aid be abolished as a separate appropriation and buried in the service requests in the Defense budget. MAP funds would be dispersed among nine separate appropriations, except those for credit sales—which would be provided for in a new bill—and those for grant aid to Latin America and Africa not related to base rights ($26 million), which would stay in the Foreign Aid BILL.
Warnke made this proposal in the Katzenbach Task Force.2 Katzenbach and Gaud did not differ on the merits, but suggested that it is a bad year to pick a fight with Morgan on this old chestnut. It was agreed that Warnke and Gaud would talk to Morgan to test the water.
McNamara showed up for the meeting with Morgan. Morgan did not give a direct answer, but agreed to give McNamara an informal hearing before the full Committee. (He said he was less hostile to the proposal than in previous years, but that not everybody on the Committee would agree.) McNamara said he would think about this procedure. Katzenbach’s Task Force Report told the President that this issue would be held in abeyance until these consultations were over and that we would then return to the President for a decision. Meanwhile, the budget was locked up on the old basis.
We now hear that the Committee wants McNamara on Tuesday or Thursday of next week. He hasn’t yet decided definitely whether he will go. His staff prepared a memorandum to the President proposing that he make a strong Administration pitch for the split. But yesterday, he told his staff that there was no need to go back to the President and instructed them to put together the figures necessary to back up the proposal. They are now doing that.
Charlie Schultze will try today to head off McNamara. He will argue that this would subject us to the charge of scurrying to hide MAP in the face of last session’s criticism; that our “low profile” approach to aid would not benefit from a jurisdictional struggle on the Hill; that we have an understanding with Morgan that we will let him know before we make a decision; that the $26 million which would be left to AID would be the most unpopular part of MAP and a real drag on the Foreign Aid Bill; that McNamara specifically promised the Committee last year that he would not make such transfers; and that this action would hurt the chances of passing the new separate credit sales bill. Charlie will suggest McNamara go ahead with his soundings now, but with a view to making the change next session.
[Page 211]I drag you through all this because (1) I think this decision should be made by the President, and (2) I think Schultze’s tactical arguments are sound. What we don’t need in this year’s debate on the aid bill, in the wake of last year’s arms sales uproar, is a plausible argument that the Administration is trying to get MAP out from under the scrutiny of the foreign affairs committees. I judge this cost much greater than the principal benefit—a lower foreign aid figure ($2.5 billion rather than $3.1 billion).
I recommend you call McNamara and suggest that this decision needs clearance with the President before an Administration position is announced. (I can’t be sure, of course, that he hasn’t already checked with the President privately. If so, so be it.)
- Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Subject File, Foreign Aid, Box 16. Secret.↩
- Document 70.↩